George Austin v. Georgetown University

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 22, 2023
• Docket: 21-16191
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 22 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE JARVIS AUSTIN, No. 21-16191

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:19-cv-05631-YGR

v. MEMORANDUM* GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY; GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER ORGANIZATION; DOE, Photographer Commissioned by Georgetown; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Federal Student Aid,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 16, 2023**

Before: BENNETT, MILLER, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

George Jarvis Austin appeals pro se from the district court’s order

dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction his action alleging federal and state law

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). claims against Georgetown University and Georgetown University Law Center.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem

Int'l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Austin’s claims against the

Georgetown defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction because Austin failed to

allege facts sufficient to establish that these defendants had enough claim-related

contacts with California to provide the court with specific personal jurisdiction

over them. See Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1015, 1022-25 (9th Cir.

2017) (discussing requirements for specific personal jurisdiction).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Austin’s

operative complaint without leave to amend because further amendment would be

futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th

Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard for review and explaining that leave to amend

may be denied where amendment would be futile); Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp.,

358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Where the plaintiff has previously filed an

amended complaint . . . the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is

particularly broad.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2 21-16191 We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

3 21-16191