George A. Christensen v. United States

259 F.2d 192

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: September 24, 1958
• Docket: 14377
• Status: Published

Opinions

BURGER, Circuit Judge.

Appellant was convicted of housebreaking, larceny and unlawful possession of dangerous drugs.¹ Unidentified informants described and identified appellant to police and told where he could be found selling the stolen drugs. Upon going to the place fixed by the “tip”, a police plainelothesman found appellant going from place to place engaging persons in whispered conversation. Shortly thereafter appellant was seen to carry a small brown paper bag through the restaurant, and set it down while he put on his coat. This bag had been observed by the officer near appellant’s feet as he sat at one table. He was arrested before he picked the bag up again, and when directed to take the bag he denied ownership, possession or any knowledge of the bag or its contents. The bag’s contents were identified by a doctor as drugs stolen from his office. Before and on trial appellant claimed illegal search and seizure and moved to suppress and urges that point here. He also urges that there was no proof that the articles under dispute were in fact those stolen or that he had ever had possession of them.

The threshold question is whether there was probable cause to arrest appellant in these circumstances; if there was, his arrest and any seizure incident thereto were lawful. Cf. Smith v. United States, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 48, 254 F.2d 751. In determining whether there was probable cause for the arrest, we must view the situation as it appeared to “the eyes of a reasonable, cautious and prudent peace officer under the circumstances of the moment.” Bell v. United States, 1958, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 254 F.2d 82, 86. Taking into account the detailed description of appellant secured through the advance “tip” along with the detective’s observations of appellant’s appearance and conduct at the restaurant,² we hold that there was probable cause for the officer to make the arrest. We cannot view the advance “tip” information and the observations of the police detective in two separate, logic-tight compartments. Neither one standing alone would constitute probable cause, but together they composed a picture meaningful to a trained, experienced observer.

The property which the appellant claims was illegally seized from him was taken incident to this lawful arrest.³ Hence there are only two issues remaining with respect to this property: (a) whether it was in fact the stolen property and (b) whether it was in fact in the possession of appellant. The jury resolved both these issues adversely to appellant, and its finding is conclusive here.

Urging that there was insufficient evidence to support the first of these two factual conclusions, appellant also claims that a three-week interval between a theft and his arrest in possession of the stolen goods is too long to support the inference that the possession is guilty possession.⁴ We agree with Boehm v. United States⁵ that while the passage of time weakens the inference of guilt, the question whether or not to make the inference was for the jury.

Affirmed.

1 . Sodium phenobarbital, sodium pentabarbital and dextro amphetamine sulfate.

2 . Cf. Ellison v. United States, 1953, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 206 F.2d 476.

3 . Cf. Williams v. United States, 1956, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 161, 237 F.2d 789, where the seized property was indisputably in the defendant’s possession after what was held to be an illegal arrest.

4 . See Gilbert v. United States, 1954, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 215 F.2d 334.

5 . 2 Cir., 1921, 271 F. 454.