MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jan 20 2017, 7:55 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Timothy J. Burns Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Chandra K. Hein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Geoffrey Quarles, January 20, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1605-CR-1187 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Barbara Crawford, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49G09-1505-F6-18176
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-CR-1187 | January 20, 2017 Page 1 of 8 [1] Geoffrey Quarles challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his
conviction for Level 6 felony criminal recklessness 1 and the sufficiency of
evidence rebutting his claim of self-defense. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] On May 22, 2015, Quarles and his friend Darryl Hardy met at a bar to celebrate
Hardy’s birthday. Christian Canelas was working security for the bar. He was
in the parking lot as the bar closed and was intervening between a couple who
was arguing outside the bar.
[3] Quarles reached into his vehicle, pulled out a gun, 2 and fired in the direction of
the bar. When Quarles discharged his weapon, Canelas was standing in the
parking lot between Quarles and the bar. Canelas testified Quarles fired the gun
“at a forty-five degree angle towards the club.” (Id. at 59.) Prior to the shots
being fired, Canelas had not heard any yelling or seen anyone approaching
Quarles. After the shots, Quarles left the scene.
[4] The police were called and sent out a dispatch about the shooter. An officer
observed Quarles driving erratically and pulled him over. He matched the
description sent out by the police at the bar, and Canelas identified Quarles as
the shooter. The State charged Quarles with Level 6 felony criminal
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2 (2014). 2 It is undisputed that Quarles legally possessed the handgun and had a valid license to carry it.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-CR-1187 | January 20, 2017 Page 2 of 8 recklessness. A jury found him guilty. The court entered Quarles’ conviction
“reduced to an A misdemeanor under Indiana’s Alternate Misdemeanor
Sentencing statute,” (id. at 303), and sentenced Quarles to 365 days suspended
to probation.
Discussion and Decision Sufficiency of Evidence
[5] When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in support of a conviction, we will
consider only probative evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
judgment. Binkley v. State, 654 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied. The
decision comes before us with a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. We do not assess the
credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining whether the
evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Reversal
is appropriate only when no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus, the evidence is not
required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and is sufficient
if an inference reasonably may be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at
147.
[6] The definition of criminal recklessness provides “[a] person who recklessly,
knowingly, or intentionally performs an act that creates a substantial risk of
bodily injury to another person commits criminal recklessness.” Ind. Code §
35-42-2-2(a) (2014). The charging information stated:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-CR-1187 | January 20, 2017 Page 3 of 8 On or about May 22, 2015, Geoffrey Quarles did recklessly with a deadly weapon, to wit: handgun, perform an act, to-wit: fire the handgun, that created a substantial risk of bodily injury to Christian Canelas;
All of which is contrary to statute and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
(App. Vol. II at 17.) Thus, to prove Quarles committed this offense, the State
had to prove Quarles’ use of his handgun put Canelas at substantial risk for
bodily injury.
[7] Quarles admits he fired the handgun, but he asserts Canelas was not put in
danger because he shot over the building, which was above Canelas’ head. 3
The State argues Canelas was in danger because, although Quarles fired over
Canelas’ head, the bullets could have ricocheted off the building behind
Canelas. We agree with the State.
[8] In support of his argument, Quarles points to Elliot v. State, 560 N.E.2d 1266
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990), and Boushehry v. State, 648 N.E.2d 1174 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995), reh’g denied. In Elliot, we reversed a conviction of criminal recklessness
with a deadly weapon because the defendant had not created a substantial risk
of bodily injury by firing over uninhabited fields and woods while all other
people present were behind him. 560 N.E.2d at 1267-68. In Boushehry, we held
3 Quarles notes that due to the way he was charged, the substantial risk of bodily injury had to be to Canelas and not the other patrons. We agree and address only whether the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate substantial risk of bodily injury to Canelas.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-CR-1187 | January 20, 2017 Page 4 of 8 a defendant had not created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another when
he shot geese in a field because no one else was “near the line of fire.” 648
N.E.2d at 1177.
[9] Here, however, Quarles shot in Canelas’ direction. While Quarles may have
been aiming above the building, that does not negate the substantial risk he
created by shooting in Canelas’ direction. Although Quarles claims he was
only trying to defuse the situation, he was firing in the direction of the bar and
Canelas was between him and the bar. The State’s evidence demonstrated a
substantial risk of bodily injury to Canelas. See Woods v. State, 768 N.E.2d
1024, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (when firing “in close proximity” to people “it
is not improbable that a bullet could have ricocheted and struck one of the
nearby people”).
Rebuttal of Self-Defense Claim
[10] Quarles also asserts the State did not present sufficient evidence to rebut his
claim of self-defense. “A person is justified in using reasonable force against
any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person
reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-
41-3-2 (2013). To prevail on such a claim, a person “must show that he: (1) was
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MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jan 20 2017, 7:55 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Timothy J. Burns Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Chandra K. Hein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Geoffrey Quarles, January 20, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1605-CR-1187 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Barbara Crawford, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49G09-1505-F6-18176
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-CR-1187 | January 20, 2017 Page 1 of 8 [1] Geoffrey Quarles challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his
conviction for Level 6 felony criminal recklessness 1 and the sufficiency of
evidence rebutting his claim of self-defense. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] On May 22, 2015, Quarles and his friend Darryl Hardy met at a bar to celebrate
Hardy’s birthday. Christian Canelas was working security for the bar. He was
in the parking lot as the bar closed and was intervening between a couple who
was arguing outside the bar.
[3] Quarles reached into his vehicle, pulled out a gun, 2 and fired in the direction of
the bar. When Quarles discharged his weapon, Canelas was standing in the
parking lot between Quarles and the bar. Canelas testified Quarles fired the gun
“at a forty-five degree angle towards the club.” (Id. at 59.) Prior to the shots
being fired, Canelas had not heard any yelling or seen anyone approaching
Quarles. After the shots, Quarles left the scene.
[4] The police were called and sent out a dispatch about the shooter. An officer
observed Quarles driving erratically and pulled him over. He matched the
description sent out by the police at the bar, and Canelas identified Quarles as
the shooter. The State charged Quarles with Level 6 felony criminal
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2 (2014). 2 It is undisputed that Quarles legally possessed the handgun and had a valid license to carry it.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-CR-1187 | January 20, 2017 Page 2 of 8 recklessness. A jury found him guilty. The court entered Quarles’ conviction
“reduced to an A misdemeanor under Indiana’s Alternate Misdemeanor
Sentencing statute,” (id. at 303), and sentenced Quarles to 365 days suspended
to probation.
Discussion and Decision Sufficiency of Evidence
[5] When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in support of a conviction, we will
consider only probative evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
judgment. Binkley v. State, 654 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied. The
decision comes before us with a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. We do not assess the
credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining whether the
evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Reversal
is appropriate only when no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus, the evidence is not
required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and is sufficient
if an inference reasonably may be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at
147.
[6] The definition of criminal recklessness provides “[a] person who recklessly,
knowingly, or intentionally performs an act that creates a substantial risk of
bodily injury to another person commits criminal recklessness.” Ind. Code §
35-42-2-2(a) (2014). The charging information stated:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-CR-1187 | January 20, 2017 Page 3 of 8 On or about May 22, 2015, Geoffrey Quarles did recklessly with a deadly weapon, to wit: handgun, perform an act, to-wit: fire the handgun, that created a substantial risk of bodily injury to Christian Canelas;
All of which is contrary to statute and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
(App. Vol. II at 17.) Thus, to prove Quarles committed this offense, the State
had to prove Quarles’ use of his handgun put Canelas at substantial risk for
bodily injury.
[7] Quarles admits he fired the handgun, but he asserts Canelas was not put in
danger because he shot over the building, which was above Canelas’ head. 3
The State argues Canelas was in danger because, although Quarles fired over
Canelas’ head, the bullets could have ricocheted off the building behind
Canelas. We agree with the State.
[8] In support of his argument, Quarles points to Elliot v. State, 560 N.E.2d 1266
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990), and Boushehry v. State, 648 N.E.2d 1174 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995), reh’g denied. In Elliot, we reversed a conviction of criminal recklessness
with a deadly weapon because the defendant had not created a substantial risk
of bodily injury by firing over uninhabited fields and woods while all other
people present were behind him. 560 N.E.2d at 1267-68. In Boushehry, we held
3 Quarles notes that due to the way he was charged, the substantial risk of bodily injury had to be to Canelas and not the other patrons. We agree and address only whether the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate substantial risk of bodily injury to Canelas.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-CR-1187 | January 20, 2017 Page 4 of 8 a defendant had not created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another when
he shot geese in a field because no one else was “near the line of fire.” 648
N.E.2d at 1177.
[9] Here, however, Quarles shot in Canelas’ direction. While Quarles may have
been aiming above the building, that does not negate the substantial risk he
created by shooting in Canelas’ direction. Although Quarles claims he was
only trying to defuse the situation, he was firing in the direction of the bar and
Canelas was between him and the bar. The State’s evidence demonstrated a
substantial risk of bodily injury to Canelas. See Woods v. State, 768 N.E.2d
1024, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (when firing “in close proximity” to people “it
is not improbable that a bullet could have ricocheted and struck one of the
nearby people”).
Rebuttal of Self-Defense Claim
[10] Quarles also asserts the State did not present sufficient evidence to rebut his
claim of self-defense. “A person is justified in using reasonable force against
any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person
reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-
41-3-2 (2013). To prevail on such a claim, a person “must show that he: (1) was
in a place where he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or
participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or
great bodily harm.” Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-CR-1187 | January 20, 2017 Page 5 of 8 [11] “When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the
State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements.” King v.
State, 61 N.E.3d 1275, 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “The State may meet this
burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant
did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its
evidence in chief.” Id.
[12] “The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a
claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the
evidence claim.” Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801. Thus we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. If the evidence is
sufficient to support the trier of fact’s conclusion, we will not reverse the
verdict. Id.
[13] Quarles does not deny he shot the gun. However, he contends he was acting
reasonably by firing “warning shots into the air when being threatened by an
angry mob of patrons from the club.” (Appellant’s Br. at 14.) Quarles testified
that a worker at the bar had gotten upset with him and incited other patrons to
harm him. Quarles and Hardy both felt threatened by the patrons’ behavior
inside the bar, but they did not leave. At closing time, Hardy and Quarles both
thought the patrons were approaching them outside the bar. Quarles stated he
only fired the gun because he was trying to defuse the situation and he had no
intention of shooting anyone. He also claimed he then left the scene because he
feared for his life.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-CR-1187 | January 20, 2017 Page 6 of 8 [14] To prevail on a claim of self-defense, Quarles must demonstrate both subjective
and objective components of the reasonableness of his belief regarding his peril.
Huls v. State, 971 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. To have a
reasonable belief as required by the Indiana self-defense statute, a defendant
must demonstrate that he had a subjective belief that the force used was
necessary to prevent serious bodily injury and that a reasonable person would
have believed the force he used was necessary under the circumstances. Littler
v. State, 871 N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ind. 2007).
[15] Quarles claims he was “intimidated” by the actions of the patrons inside the
bar, (Tr. at 202), and when they started to approach him outside and shout
threats, he did not drive off because he “didn’t think [he] had a chance.” (Id. at
216.) However, Hardy testified that he had urged Quarles to leave, but Quarles
did not. Hardy also testified that, although he heard “screaming,” “yelling,”
and “cussing,” (id. at 242), from the other patrons, he never saw any weapons
and he did not hear specific threats of attacking Quarles. Moreover, Canelas
testified he did not hear any yelling regarding Quarles and he did not see
anyone near Quarles. Thus, although Quarles introduced the claim of self-
defense, the fact-finder was presented with evidence suggesting Quarles
willingly participated or did not have a reasonable fear of death or great bodily
harm. See Gomez v. State, 56 N.E.3d 697, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (it is the fact-
finder’s purview to decide whether the force employed was reasonable and
whether the “State disproved an element of [defendant’s] defense” claim). The
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-CR-1187 | January 20, 2017 Page 7 of 8 fact-finder was not required to believe Quarles reasonably drew a handgun and
shot it.
Conclusion [16] The State presented sufficient evidence to prove substantial risk of bodily injury
to Canelas and to rebut Quarles’ self-defense claim. Accordingly, we affirm.
[17] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-CR-1187 | January 20, 2017 Page 8 of 8