1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VINCENT GENOSA, an individual, Case No.: 3:24-cv-00063-AJB-BLM 12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING SUMMARY 14 JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 15 GLOBAL K9 PROTECTION GROUP, DEFENDANT ON CLAIMS 1 AND 2 LLC, an Alabama Limited Liability OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT; 16 Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, 17 (2) DECLINING TO EXERCISE Defendant. JURISDICTION OVER THE 18 REMAINING STATE CLAIMS AND 19 GLOBAL K9 PROTECTION GROUP, COUNTERCLAIM; LLC, an Alabama Limited Liability 20 Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, (3) DENYING AS MOOT ALL 21 OTHER PENDING MOTIONS; and Counterclaim Plaintiff, 22 (4) CLOSING CASE. 23 v. (Doc. Nos. 12, 19, 26) 24 VINCENT GENOSA, an individual, 25 Counterclaim Defendant. 26 27 28 1 Before the Court are Global K9 Protection Group, LLC’s (“Defendant”) and Vincent 2 Genosa’s (“Plaintiff”) cross-motions for summary judgment in this employment action. 3 (Doc. Nos. 12, 19.) The parties have filed their respective oppositions and replies. (Doc. 4 Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25.) Also pending is an ex parte application to file a sur-reply and a 5 response thereto. (Doc. Nos. 26, 27.) The Court finds the matters suitable for determination 6 on the papers and without oral argument, and hereby VACATES the previously scheduled 7 motion hearing on April 10, 2025. See Local Civ. R. 7.1.d.1 8 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary 9 judgment on Claims 1 and 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, declines to exercise supplemental 10 jurisdiction over, and thereby DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE, the remaining 11 state claims and counterclaim, and DENIES AS MOOT all other pending motions. 12 I. BACKGROUND 13 Plaintiff worked for Defendant from November 2018 to February 2021. At the time 14 of his employment, Plaintiff served in the California Army National Guard and requested 15 military leaves of absence to fulfill his service. Defendant granted all of Plaintiff’s requests 16 for military leave. And contrary to its written policy that military leaves of absence are 17 unpaid, Defendant compensated Plaintiff during such leave. When Defendant realized its 18 error in 2020, it informed Plaintiff of the overpayment and sought to recoup it. Defendant 19 asked Plaintiff to sign a Voluntary Payroll Deduction Authorization Form by a deadline 20 and informed him that he would be terminated if he did not sign the form. Plaintiff sent 21 Defendant a resignation letter two days before the deadline. 22 On January 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this federal court pleading 23 federal-question jurisdiction and the following causes of action: (1) discrimination in 24 violation of California Military and Veterans Code § 389; (2) discrimination in violation 25 of 38 U.S.C. § 4311; (3) retaliation in violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5; and (4) 26 wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (Doc. No. 1, Compl. at 1, 3–7.) 27 Defendant thereafter filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the Complaint, asserting a state 28 1 counterclaim for “Common Count: Money Had and Received.” (Doc. No. 6 at 8–9.) The 2 instant cross-motions for summary judgment follows. 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 Defendant moved for summary judgment on all four of Plaintiff’s causes of action, 5 arguing that he cannot establish the elements of his claims. Pertinent here, Plaintiff’s 6 opposition focused solely on his state retaliation and wrongful termination claims and 7 unequivocally stated that “[he] does not oppose Defendant’s motion as to his first two 8 claims for violations of the California Military Veteran’s Code, or 38 U.S.C. § 4311” (Doc. 9 No 22 at 4.) As Plaintiff concedes to Defendant’s request for dismissal of his discrimination 10 claims under California and federal law as without merit, the Court dismisses those claims 11 with prejudice and grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this respect. 12 There being only state-law claims and counterclaim remaining in this suit, the Court 13 considers whether to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over them. “A court 14 may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims once it has 15 ‘dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 16 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). The court’s decision to decline to 17 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) is 18 informed by “values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri v. Varian 19 Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 20 Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated, and the Ninth Circuit has repeated, that “in the 21 usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors 22 will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” 23 Id. (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (alterations 24 omitted). 25 Having dismissed Plaintiff’s cause of action under 38 U.S.C. § 4311—the only claim 26 arising out of federal law—the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 27 28 1 the remaining state-law claims and counterclaim. As noted, the Court may dismiss pendent 2 state-law claims if, as here, all federal claims are dismissed before trial. See 3 Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350 n.7. Moreover, the Court has not expended 4 significant judicial resources on this matter beyond resolving the threshold concessions in 5 the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Little substantive activity concerning 6 the state-law claims and counterclaim have occurred, and the parties may refile in state 7 court the same pleadings and briefs they have filed here. See Artis v. D.C., 583 U.S. 71, 75 8 (2018) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) and holding that the statute pauses the clock on a 9 statute of limitations until 30 days after the state law claim is dismissed by the federal 10 court). Lastly, as a matter of comity, this Court is a court of limited jurisdiction that should 11 defer to the state court on the labor and employment issues that are clearly within that 12 court’s jurisdiction and expertise. 13 Thus, in the exercise of its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this Court 14 declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims for 15 retaliation and wrongful termination and Defendant’s state-law counterclaim for common 16 count. Accordingly, the Court dismisses those claims without prejudice to refiling in the 17 appropriate state forum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). 18 // 19 // 20 // 21
22 1 The Court notes that as Plaintiff has elected to abandon his claim under 38 U.S.C.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VINCENT GENOSA, an individual, Case No.: 3:24-cv-00063-AJB-BLM 12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING SUMMARY 14 JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 15 GLOBAL K9 PROTECTION GROUP, DEFENDANT ON CLAIMS 1 AND 2 LLC, an Alabama Limited Liability OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT; 16 Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, 17 (2) DECLINING TO EXERCISE Defendant. JURISDICTION OVER THE 18 REMAINING STATE CLAIMS AND 19 GLOBAL K9 PROTECTION GROUP, COUNTERCLAIM; LLC, an Alabama Limited Liability 20 Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, (3) DENYING AS MOOT ALL 21 OTHER PENDING MOTIONS; and Counterclaim Plaintiff, 22 (4) CLOSING CASE. 23 v. (Doc. Nos. 12, 19, 26) 24 VINCENT GENOSA, an individual, 25 Counterclaim Defendant. 26 27 28 1 Before the Court are Global K9 Protection Group, LLC’s (“Defendant”) and Vincent 2 Genosa’s (“Plaintiff”) cross-motions for summary judgment in this employment action. 3 (Doc. Nos. 12, 19.) The parties have filed their respective oppositions and replies. (Doc. 4 Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25.) Also pending is an ex parte application to file a sur-reply and a 5 response thereto. (Doc. Nos. 26, 27.) The Court finds the matters suitable for determination 6 on the papers and without oral argument, and hereby VACATES the previously scheduled 7 motion hearing on April 10, 2025. See Local Civ. R. 7.1.d.1 8 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary 9 judgment on Claims 1 and 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, declines to exercise supplemental 10 jurisdiction over, and thereby DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE, the remaining 11 state claims and counterclaim, and DENIES AS MOOT all other pending motions. 12 I. BACKGROUND 13 Plaintiff worked for Defendant from November 2018 to February 2021. At the time 14 of his employment, Plaintiff served in the California Army National Guard and requested 15 military leaves of absence to fulfill his service. Defendant granted all of Plaintiff’s requests 16 for military leave. And contrary to its written policy that military leaves of absence are 17 unpaid, Defendant compensated Plaintiff during such leave. When Defendant realized its 18 error in 2020, it informed Plaintiff of the overpayment and sought to recoup it. Defendant 19 asked Plaintiff to sign a Voluntary Payroll Deduction Authorization Form by a deadline 20 and informed him that he would be terminated if he did not sign the form. Plaintiff sent 21 Defendant a resignation letter two days before the deadline. 22 On January 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this federal court pleading 23 federal-question jurisdiction and the following causes of action: (1) discrimination in 24 violation of California Military and Veterans Code § 389; (2) discrimination in violation 25 of 38 U.S.C. § 4311; (3) retaliation in violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5; and (4) 26 wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (Doc. No. 1, Compl. at 1, 3–7.) 27 Defendant thereafter filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the Complaint, asserting a state 28 1 counterclaim for “Common Count: Money Had and Received.” (Doc. No. 6 at 8–9.) The 2 instant cross-motions for summary judgment follows. 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 Defendant moved for summary judgment on all four of Plaintiff’s causes of action, 5 arguing that he cannot establish the elements of his claims. Pertinent here, Plaintiff’s 6 opposition focused solely on his state retaliation and wrongful termination claims and 7 unequivocally stated that “[he] does not oppose Defendant’s motion as to his first two 8 claims for violations of the California Military Veteran’s Code, or 38 U.S.C. § 4311” (Doc. 9 No 22 at 4.) As Plaintiff concedes to Defendant’s request for dismissal of his discrimination 10 claims under California and federal law as without merit, the Court dismisses those claims 11 with prejudice and grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this respect. 12 There being only state-law claims and counterclaim remaining in this suit, the Court 13 considers whether to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over them. “A court 14 may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims once it has 15 ‘dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 16 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). The court’s decision to decline to 17 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) is 18 informed by “values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri v. Varian 19 Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 20 Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated, and the Ninth Circuit has repeated, that “in the 21 usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors 22 will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” 23 Id. (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (alterations 24 omitted). 25 Having dismissed Plaintiff’s cause of action under 38 U.S.C. § 4311—the only claim 26 arising out of federal law—the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 27 28 1 the remaining state-law claims and counterclaim. As noted, the Court may dismiss pendent 2 state-law claims if, as here, all federal claims are dismissed before trial. See 3 Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350 n.7. Moreover, the Court has not expended 4 significant judicial resources on this matter beyond resolving the threshold concessions in 5 the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Little substantive activity concerning 6 the state-law claims and counterclaim have occurred, and the parties may refile in state 7 court the same pleadings and briefs they have filed here. See Artis v. D.C., 583 U.S. 71, 75 8 (2018) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) and holding that the statute pauses the clock on a 9 statute of limitations until 30 days after the state law claim is dismissed by the federal 10 court). Lastly, as a matter of comity, this Court is a court of limited jurisdiction that should 11 defer to the state court on the labor and employment issues that are clearly within that 12 court’s jurisdiction and expertise. 13 Thus, in the exercise of its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this Court 14 declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims for 15 retaliation and wrongful termination and Defendant’s state-law counterclaim for common 16 count. Accordingly, the Court dismisses those claims without prejudice to refiling in the 17 appropriate state forum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). 18 // 19 // 20 // 21
22 1 The Court notes that as Plaintiff has elected to abandon his claim under 38 U.S.C. § 4311, he has, in effect, withdrawn it from the operative complaint. In a recent case, Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. 23 Wullschleger, the Supreme Court explained that regardless of whether a case was removed or originally filed in federal court, “the plaintiff’s excision of [his] federal-law claims deprives the district court of its 24 authority to decide the state-law claims remaining.” 604 U.S. 22, 43 (2025). The case involved a plaintiff 25 who amended her complaint to delete all the federal law claims and left nothing but state-law claims behind. Id. at 25. Here, because Plaintiff’s withdrawal of his federal claim effectively amends the 26 complaint and leaves nothing but state-law claims behind, he has arguably divested the Court of its authority to hear the remaining claims and counterclaim. See id. at 36 (“If a plaintiff files a suit in federal 27 court based on federal claims and later scraps those claims, the federal court cannot go forward with a now all-state-claim suit.”). The Court need not, and will not, decide this issue, however, as it dismisses 28 1 || HL. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby orders: 3 e Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART. 4 (Doc. No. 12). The Court enters summary judgment in favor of 5 Defendant and against Plaintiff on his discrimination claims under 6 California Military and Veterans Code § 389 (Claim 1) and under 38 7 U.S.C. § 4311 (Claim 2). These claims are DISMISSED WITH 8 PREJUDICE. 9 e Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court DECLINES to exercise 10 supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims for 11 retaliation (Claim 3) and wrongful termination (Claim 4) and 12 counterclaim for common count. These claims are DISMISSED 13 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 14 e All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT, (Doc. Nos. 19, 15 26), and all upcoming hearings or deadlines in this matter are 16 VACATED. 17 e The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and 18 close this case. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 ||Dated: March 10, 2025
23 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28 5 pe