General Motors Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

656 F.2d 791, 211 U.S. App. D.C. 202
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJune 10, 1981
DocketNo. 80-1776
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 656 F.2d 791 (General Motors Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
General Motors Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 656 F.2d 791, 211 U.S. App. D.C. 202 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Opinion

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge J. SKELLY WRIGHT.

J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

The issue presented in this petition for review is whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has offered sufficient justification for failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, upon the request of General Motors Corporation (GM), prior to granting Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Company (Michigan Wisconsin) a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing Michigan Wisconsin to construct additional pipeline facilities and to deliver increased amounts of natural gas to some of its customers on “peak” demand days. We conclude that the Commission did not adequately explain its denial of GM’s hearing request. Accordingly, we remand the case to the Commission for reconsideration and the opportunity to provide further explanation.

I

Michigan Wisconsin is a natural gas company regulated by FERC. The company sells natural gas to various wholesale distribution customers (distributors), which in turn sell natural gas to end users. The volume of natural gas that distributors may purchase from Michigan Wisconsin, under contract, is subject to two important limitations approved by FERC. First, the amount of natural gas a distributor may purchase in the course of a year is limited to the distributor’s “annual entitlement.” Second, the amount of gas that may be purchased on any one day cannot exceed the “peak day entitlement” for the distributor.

This case involves an increase in peak day entitlements. On April 30, 1979 Michigan Wisconsin filed an application with FERC, pursuant to Section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1976), for a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing Michigan Wisconsin to increase peak day entitlements for 20 of its distribution customers and also to construct additional pipeline facilities necessary for increased deliveries. In explaining its request Michigan Wisconsin noted that “[bjecause of conservation efforts * * * and the shifting of some industrial loads to alternate fuels,” some of its distribution customers were “unable to utilize fully the annual gas supplies available to them under their service agreements with Michigan [205]*205Wisconsin.” 1 Such underutilization of annual entitlements would be rectified, Michigan Wisconsin suggested, if the distributors were permitted to purchase increased volumes of gas on peak demand days. A 1.1 percent increase in peak day entitlements for these distributors, without any concomitant increase in annual entitlements, would allow them “to serve new residential hookups and other high priority consumers desiring to switch from fuel oil to gas.” 2

In response to Michigan Wisconsin’s application GM, which purchases gas from several distribution customers of Michigan Wisconsin for which no increases in peak day entitlements were sought, moved to intervene in the proceedings and requested a formal evidentiary hearing on several issues. On November 1,1979 the Commission issued an order in which it allowed GM to intervene, but denied the company’s request for an evidentiary hearing and granted Michigan Wisconsin the certificate of public convenience and necessity it sought.3 GM then petitioned for rehearing, arguing again that the Commission must hold an evidentiary hearing. On May 14, 1980 the Commission issued an “Order Denying Rehearing,” in which it attempted to clarify further its decision to dispense with an evidentiary hearing.4 Shortly thereafter GM filed this petition for review of the Commission’s two orders, in which it challenges the Commission’s refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

II

The principal claim GM makes in this petition for review is that the Commission, in violation of the Natural Gas Act and its governing regulations,5 failed to hold a formal evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Michigan Wisconsin’s “supply situation over both the short and long terms is adequate to permit the proposed increase in peak day service.”6 GM concedes that [206]*206FERC need not hold an evidentiary hearing when no issue of material fact is in dispute.7 But in GM’s view, the issue of Michigan Wisconsin’s supply situation over the short term and long term presents an issue of material fact that requires an evidentiary hearing.

As we read the Commission’s orders, FERC offered two reasons8 for refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Michigan Wisconsin’s supply situation.9 First, the Commission suggested that where, as here, the gas company’s application involves only an increase in peak day entitlements, and no change in annual entitlements, FERC need not conduct an evidentiary hearing concerning the applicant’s supply situation. In such circumstances the necessary showing concerning the applicant’s supply situation was made when the Commission previously approved the annual entitlements.10 Second, FERC indicated that an evidentiary hearing on Michigan Wisconsin’s supply situation was unnecessary because Michigan Wisconsin had not recently curtailed any of its customers and did not expect curtailment during the coming year.11 In our view, the Commission’s [207]*207reasons, as presently stated, fail to justify a denial of an evidentiary hearing concerning the adequacy of Michigan Wisconsin’s long-term supply situation.12

A.

The Commission’s first ground' for denying GM’s hearing request — that Michigan Wisconsin did not seek an increase in annual entitlements — not only trivializes the Commission’s decision to increase peak day entitlements; it attributes continuing validity to earlier adequacy-of-supply showings. The Commission, in holding that adequacy-of-supply hearings are unnecessary where annual entitlements remain unaltered, seems to assume that the validity of the previous adequacy-of-supply showings continues uneroded by the passage of time. But in this case all of the current annual entitlements for Michigan Wisconsin’s distribution customers were certificated by FERC no later than 1975.13 While Michigan Wisconsin’s supply situation may have been adequate then to support the Commission’s approval of the annual entitlements, it is not clear that if the Commission were to reconsider those annual entitlements today, based on Michigan Wisconsin’s present and future supply situation as currently perceived, it would necessarily find them to be reasonable.14

What makes the Commission’s justification even more troubling is that in 1977 the Commission’s predecessor, the Federal Power Commission, denied, after evidentiary hearing, Michigan Wisconsin’s application seeking an increase in peak day entitlements but no increase in annual entitlements. As the Federal Power Commission then noted:

We agree with the Staff, the Judge, and General Motors that this application should be denied. As the Administrative Law Judge points out, the gas supplies of Michigan Wisconsin are declining sharply.

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Bluebook (online)
656 F.2d 791, 211 U.S. App. D.C. 202, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/general-motors-corp-v-federal-energy-regulatory-commission-cadc-1981.