General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co.

201 F.2d 645, 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 62, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 4331
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 13, 1953
Docket11450
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 201 F.2d 645 (General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co., 201 F.2d 645, 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 62, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 4331 (6th Cir. 1953).

Opinion

McALLISTER, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court holding certain claims of patents 1 relating to broiling, baking, and roasting features of electric cooking stoves, patentable and infringed by appellants. For convenience, appellees and appellants will hereafter be referred to as appellee and appellant.

These patents, as contended by appellee, relate to an oven for an electric range which has upper and lower baking heating units which are manually connected to, and disconnected from, the electric power source, by a single switch which controls them both, simultaneously. The upper unit, in operation, has a lesser baking heat output than the lower unit, and the relationship between the baking heat output of the upper and lower units is claimed by appellee to be a nonvariable, (fixed and predetermined relationship which may not he changed by the user and which, in operation, always gives a uniform oven heat, or proper heat balance, or, as plaintiff has termed it, “balanced heat” within the oven for baking. An automatic control, such as a thermostatically controlled switch, con *646 nected into the oven circuits-, turns the upper and lower baking units on and off intermittently, automatically, and simultaneously during a baking operation to maintain the same balanced heat relationship in the oven at all times during a baking operation, and to maintain the oven at substantially the selected degree of temperature setting. A further claim of the invention includes the use of a broiling unit within the oven which is likewise controlled by the single switch that controls the upper , and lower baking units, as above explained, in such manner that the broiling heat may not be used simultaneously with the baking heat, thus preserving the balanced heat relationship within the oven during the baking operation. The district court found in favor of appellee on all of its foregoing claims and contentions. 2

With regard to the invention in the Bradbury Patent, appellee maintains that it resides in the concept of “balanced heat” for baking — the even distribution of heat throughout the oven, secured by means of an upper baking element of smaller heat capacity than the lower baking element, as set forth in the claims.

It may here be remarked that appellee emphatically points out that before appellant had placed any of its allegedly in *647 fringing electric ranges on the market, Westinghouse Company, then the second largest electric range manufacturer, sought a license under certain of appellee’s patents, among others, those here in issue, and having secured it, extensively advertised and sold its ranges, emphasizing the “balanced heat” feature. It also appears that in 1940, before this suit began, appellant sought a patent claim for an electric oven heating system comprising broiling and baking circuits, with means for preventing the simultaneous energization of the broiling and baking features, which the Patent Office rejected on the ground that it had been “obviously fully met” by appellee’s patent.

Appellant attacks the findings of the district court on the ground that “balanced heat” is a mere sales slogan and does not appear in the specifications; that the “fixed and nonvariable relationship” set forth in the findings of the court and emphasized by appellee in its brief likewise does not appear in the specifications of the Bradbury Patent, and can not be read into the claims; that there is no basis for the finding that Bradbury’s invention embodied a single knob or switch control for controlling the fixed and nonvariable relationship in baking and also for controlling the broiling operation for the reason that this relationship is not recited in any of the claims; and that the findings of the district court in this regard were clearly erroneous.

It is contended by appellant that Bradbury, in Forms 1 and 3 of his patent drawings, shows two switches, one for baking and one for broiling; that while Form 2 has a single switch, it has three heats and is not fixed and nonvariable; that Claims 14 and 24 have nothing to do with broiling; that two switches are expressly called for in Claim 11; that Claims 1, 14, and 24 recite “switch means” broadly and read on each of Bradbury’s three forms; and that none of the claims is expressly limited to one switch.

With respect to the claims of the Bradbury Patent of 1936, 3 here in issue, appellant submits that they merely follow the *648 prior art; and appellant specifies, as the best examples thereof, the Hotpoint RA-73 range, the Capek Patent of 1891, the Smith “Wilwear” Patent of 1929, the McCormick Patent of 1928, and appellee’s own Estate range models, No. 76 of 1924, and No. 84 of 1922.

' In declaring that its invention of the Bradbury range introduced the concept of “balanced heat” in electric range cooking, appellee contends that such invention caused a complete departure, throughout the industry, from former electric cooking and electric range design; that it departed entirely from the prior concepts and practices of providing a large multiplicity of heat input relationships, variable at will by the itser of the range, and of baking with bottom heat alone.

So-called balanced heat, then, as claimed by appellee, is effected by an electric oven, with an upper baking element having smaller heat capacity than a lower baking element,, whereby, through substantially even distribution of heat throughout the oven, a balanced heat condition is secured within the oven space — together with a top broiling element adapted for directing downward radiation " into the oven, with means for preventing. energization of the •broiling element simultaneously with the baking elements.

The essential nature of various processes of cooking is pertinent to this case, and certain preliminary observations on the subject are appropriate.

In broiling, heat is transferred from the heating elements to meat, for example, primarily by high intensity, high temperature radiation, so that the outside of the meat is seared and cooked quickly, and the inside portion is cooked to a much lesser degree.

In baking, the heat is transferred from the heating elements to the adjacent air, which expands and moves into contact with the food, that is, by convection, where the heat is conducted through the food mass. Some heat is transferred directly to the food through the racks and utensils in the oven; and, since each hot body in the oven radiates, to some extent, to each cooler part, some heat is also, transferred to the food, in baking, by radiation. In baking, complex chemical changes are uniformly produced through the ingredients of the food. The heat radiation in baking is low intensity, low temperature radiation, as compared with the high intensity, high temperature radiation of incandescent heat sources, directly exposed to the food, as in broiling.

In roasting, the bulk of the heat is transferred into the center of the roast by convection and conduction, to cook the inside slowly. In roasting, some additional radiant heat may be desired in order to sear or brown the outside surface of the meat.

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Bluebook (online)
201 F.2d 645, 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 62, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 4331, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/general-motors-corp-v-estate-stove-co-ca6-1953.