General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Edwards

213 N.C. 736
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedJune 15, 1938
StatusPublished

This text of 213 N.C. 736 (General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Edwards) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Edwards, 213 N.C. 736 (N.C. 1938).

Opinion

Clarkson, J.

T. T. Edwards, the defendant, disaffirmed his contract, demanded judgment for what he had paid on the truck (which was seized by plaintiff under claim and delivery — not replevined), and set up the defense of infancy. All the issues were answered by consent of the parties to the controversy except the second: “Was the defendant T. T. Edwards at said time a minor, as alleged in the defendant T. T. Edwards’ answer?” This issue was submitted to the jury by consent and was answered “No.”

“In Chandler v. Jones, 172 N. C., 569 (572), Allen, J., says: 'The contract of an infant is voidable and not void, and it may be either ratified or disaffirmed upon attaining majority at the election of the infant. If money is paid to an infant upon a contract and it is consumed or wasted, the infant may recover the full amount due under the contract.’ Rawls v. Mayo, 163 N. C., 177; Hogan v. Utter, 175 N. C., 332; Gaskins v. Allen, 137 N. C., 430; Baggett v. Jackson, 160 N. C., 31. See Faircloth v. Johnson, 189 N. C., at p. 431. The defense of infancy must be set up in the answer, and if not pleaded will be considered as waived. Hicks v. Beam, 112 N. C., 642.” Cole v. Wagner, 197 N. C., 692 (699). See Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N. C., 109; Hight v. Harris, 188 N. C., 328; Coker v. Bank, 208 N. C., 41.

The determination of the controversy depended on the jury’s answer to the second issue. T. T. Edwards testified that he was 21 years of age on 15 April, 1936. The truck was purchased on 5 March, 1936; at that time he was not asked how old he was and he did not tell his age. That he bought a truck prior to this time, in 1935, from Mid-South Motors, Inc., his codefendant in this action. The mother and father of T. T. [740]*740Edwards testified that be was bom on 15 April, 1915. A book and tbe Bible were offered in evidence to corroborate tbem. Tbe plaintiff and defendant Mid-Soutb Motors, Inc., contradicted tbe evidence of T. T. Edwards and introduced O. L. Seymour, vice president and manager of Mid-Soutb Motors, Inc., who testified that be was with tbe business on 15 March, 1936, and sold tbe truck to Edwards. That prior to that time be bad sold a truck to Edwards. That Edwards made tbe customary down payment and tbe balance was financed through tbe plaintiff. He testified that be asked Edwards certain questions as to bis birth and Edwards said be was born 4/15/1914. Seymour then made entry on tbe statement as follows: “Customer’s full name — T. T. Edwards. First— Surname— Date of birth — 4/15/1914. Color — White. (This was signed.) Undersigned warrants tbe truth and accuracy of foregoing information. Customer signs — T. T. Edwards.” Tbe witness Seymour further testified: “He (Edwards’ father) was present when be bought tbe other truck. I am talking about tbe truck T. T. Edwards bought from my company in 1935. Q. Was T. T. Edwards at that time asked by you as to what bis age was and a statement taken just as in this case? Ans.: Yes, sir. And bis age was recorded, and there was no contention at that time by bis father, who was present, that be was under age.”

E. B. Bowman testified: “I saw T. T. Edwards sign bis name down there on tbe line indicated for tbe customer to sign on statement which has been identified as defendant Mid-Soutb Motors, Inc., Exhibit No. 1.”

Tbe general reputation of O. L. Seymour, T. T. Edwards and bis father and mother were proved to be good. There was no plea of ratification or estoppel and tbe case was tried on-the theory that if tbe jury found that T. T. Edwards was a minor be was entitled to judgment for tbe payments be bad made on tbe truck. Plaintiff bad seized tbe truck under claim and delivery and same bad not been replevied. On this aspect tbe court charged tbe jury as follows : “Now, on this second issue, gentlemen of tbe jury, which is tbe only one you are concerned with in this case, tbe burden of proof is on tbe defendant T. T. Edwards to satisfy you from tbe evidence and by tbe greater weight thereof that be was a minor on 5 March, 1936, and that is tbe question necessary for you to decide in this case — whether or not on this day tbe defendant T. T. Edwards was a minor.”

There was no objection to tbe charge as to tbe burden of proof. We see no merit in tbe exceptions and assignments of error made by T. T. Edwards challenging tbe correctness of tbe court below’s admitting evidence of alleged oral declarations of tbe said Edwards as to bis age and questionnaire alleged to have been signed by him. Tbe issue was one of age. Edwards now says be was one month and 10 days under age when be got tbe truck and signed tbe contract. Tbe vendor, O. L. Seymour, testified that be.told him tbe date of bis birth was 15 April, [741]*7411914, and signed a statement to that effect, and “Warrants tbe truth and accuracy of foregoing information.” The question of the truth or falsity of a matter does not depend on whether the testimony was given by a minor or adult. If it is competent its credibility is for the jury. We think the evidence competent to contradict the testimony of T. T. Edwards and his witnesses, and the issue of age was for the jury to determine.

The defendant T. T. Edwards prayed the court below to give two special instructions. The first was modified and explained and as given we see no prejudicial error. The second was declined as written, but the substance given in the charge. In this we see no error. Odum v. Oil Co., ante, 478 (483-4).

The court below in its charge said: “The plaintiff says and contends, gentlemen of the jury, that on the day this contract was made and executed, to wit: 5 March, 1936, that the defendant in this case appeared to be a man who had reached his majority, that is, 21 years of age, and that they had dealt with him before and says and contends that he made representations to them before that he was 21 years of age and the plaintiff says and contends that on this day in question in answer to a form that it was necessary to fill out before this contract could be entered into, the defendant T. T. Edwards told Mr. Seymour he was 21 years of age and answered certain other questions, so the plaintiff says and contends, gentlemen of the jury, that the defendant now is trying to dis-affirm this contract and get out of an obligation and recover the money he has paid out on account of the fact of his minority and his claim that on the day in question he was not of age, and the' plaintiff says and contends you ought not to believe that (that you ought to find from the facts and circumstances in this case that the defendant was of age on the day in question, 5 March, 1936).”

The defendant T. T. Edwards excepted and assigned error to the above, which we cannot sustain. He contended that “It is submitted to the jury that plaintiff contended appellant was impeached because he pleaded his minority,” etc. That he was asserting a legal right which he was justified in doing without “inadversion or criticism,” and “Neither the court below nor this Court, as courts, and as ministers of the law, can be wiser than the law itself; and cannot in an official capacity entertain or express views at variance with the law as written.”

Edwards likewise contends that the charge is inaccurate in other respects as to the appearance of Edwards that he was 21 years of age. That the witness had dealt with him before and he made representations to them that he was 21 years of age.

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Related

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State v. . Sterling
156 S.E. 96 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1930)
Chandler v. . Jones
90 S.E. 580 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1916)
Hight v. . Harris
124 S.E. 623 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1924)
Sorrells v. . Decker
193 S.E. 14 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1937)
Smith v. Stanfield Hosiery Mill, Inc.
194 S.E. 83 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1937)
Baggett v. . Jackson
76 S.E. 86 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1912)
Hicks v. . Beam
17 S.E. 490 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1893)
Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer
116 S.E. 261 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1923)
In Re Will of Hardee
121 S.E. 667 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1924)
Coker v. Virginia-Carolina Joint-Stock Land Bank, Inc.
178 S.E. 863 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1935)
Gaskins v. Allen.
49 S.E. 919 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1905)
Hogan v. . Utter
95 S.E. 565 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1918)
Rawls v. . Mayo
79 S.E. 298 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1913)
Cole v. Wagner
197 N.C. 692 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1929)

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Bluebook (online)
213 N.C. 736, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/general-motors-acceptance-corp-v-edwards-nc-1938.