General Foods Corp. v. Commissioner

4 T.C. 209, 1944 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 39
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedOctober 19, 1944
DocketDocket No. 2178
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 4 T.C. 209 (General Foods Corp. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
General Foods Corp. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 209, 1944 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 39 (tax 1944).

Opinion

OPINION.

HaRRON, Judge:

The only question presented is the proper method of computing the foreign tax credit to which petitioner is entitled under section 131 (f) of the Revenue Act of 1934.1 During the taxable years, petitioner had received dividends from certain of its wholly owned foreign subsidiaries. These subsidiaries had paid income taxes to a foreign government and the dividends received by petitioner were part of the income which had been previously taxed by the foreign government. The issue between the parties relates only to the amount of credit allowable under the statute. Petitioner contends that it is entitled to foreign tax credit in the amounts of $200,620.47 and $265,813.67 for the taxable years 1934 and 1935, re-spectivety. Kespondent claims that the proper amounts of credit are $196,613.66 and $228,193.36. The differences in the amounts of, credit arise from different methods of computation based upon divergent interpretations of the statute.

In computing the foreign tax credit to which a domestic corporation is entitled under section 131 (f), two computations must be made. The first computation relates to the amount of foreign tax •which the domestic corporation is deemed to have paid on the dividends received by it from its foreign subsidiary. This computation is made under the first part of section 131 (f) and, in the usual case, the amount of credit is readily determinable. However, in this proceeding, the computation is complicated by the fact that the dividends received by petitioner were paid in part from the subsidiary’s profits of the current year and in part from the subsidiary’s profits of prior years.

The second computation is based upon the proviso or limitation in section 131 (f) that the amount of foreign tax deemed to have been paid shall in no case exceed the ratio of the dividends received by the domestic corporation to the domestic corporation’s entire income for the year in which the dividends were received applied to the United States tax of the domestic corporation for that year. These computations are separate and distinct from each other and involve ratios based upon entirely different factors. The parties disagree on the method to be applied to both computations.

The first computation is made under that part of section 131 (f) which provides that “a domestic corporation which owns a majority of the voting stock of a foreign corporation from which it receives dividends in any taxable year shall be deemed to have paid the same proportion of any income * * * taxes paid by such foreign corporation to any foreign country * * * upon or with respect to the accumulated profits of such foreign corporation from which such dividends were paid, which the amount of such dividends bears to the amount of such accumulated profits.” The term “accumulated profits” is defined in the subsection as the amount of the foreign corporation’s gains, profits, or income in excess of the taxes imposed upon such profits or income. The subsection further provides that respondent “shall liave full power to determine from the accumul ated profits of what year or years such dividends were paid * *

In computing the foreign tax deemed to have been paid by petitioner under the subsection, respondent has used the ratio of the dividend paid by the subsidiary to the accumulated profits of the subsidiary from which such dividend was paid. He has then applied the ratio to the foreign taxes paid by the subsidiary. In this he has followed the statute. However, since the dividends were paid in part from the profits of the current year and in part from the profits of prior years, respondent, in order to apply the ratio, determined the accumulated profits for each year, the dividends paid out of accumulated profits segregated by years, and the foreign taxes paid for each year. He then computed the credit for the foreign tax deemed to have been paid by separate years and then took a total of such credits. See schedule 2. This was the method of computation used by petitioner on its original returns and it conformed to the rules and regulations in effect during the taxable years. The regulations provided that if a domestic corporation signified in its return a desire to claim the foreign tax credit, Treasury Department Form 1118 was to be filed and “that form was to bo carefully filled in with all the information there called for and with the calculations of credits there indicated.” Eegulations 86, art. 131-3. Schedule B of Form 1118 required that the dividends paid out of accumulated profits be segregated by years, as well as the accumulated profits, as defined in the statute, the total profits, and the amount of tax payments made annually by the foreign subsidiary. The ratio as set forth in the first part of section 131 (f) Avas then applied for the separate years and the “amount of tax payments deemed to have been paid on profits distributed as dividends” was determined by totaling the credits for the separate years.

Petitioner argues that the language of the statute requires that the terms “accumulated profits,” “the accumulated profits * * * from which such dividends were paid,” and “the amount of such accumulated profits” be construed not as relating to the accumulated profits of a particular accounting year, but as relating to the entire amount, as a single sum or unit, of the accumulated profits of the foreign corporation from which the dividends received by the domestic corporation were paid. It argues that the term “accumulated profits” is properly to be considered as synonymous with “surplus” or “earned surplus.” Similarly, it argues that the amount of dividends received by the domestic corporation within the taxable year is a single sum or unit, regardless of the number of accounting years from the accumulated profits of which such dividends were paid; that the “income * * * taxes paid * * * upon or with respect to the accumulated profits * * * from which such dividends were paid” are a single unit derived by computation; and that only one computation is to be made to determine the tax paid upon or with respect to accumulated profits from which the dividend was paid.

We think respondent’s method of computation under the first part of section 131 (f). is consistent with both the meaning and purpose of the statute. Although it has never been judicially passed upon, it has been consistently used over a long period of years and has been before the courts in many cases. See American Chicle Co. v. United States, 41 Fed. Supp. 537; affd., 316 U. S. 450; Coca-Cola Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Supp. 616; International Milling Co. v. United States, 27 Fed. Supp. 592. The subsection gives the term' “accumulated profits” a particular meaning and not the meaning for which petitioner contends. The meaning of “accumulated profits,” as defined in the statute, can not be given effect when dividends are paid in part from prior years unless the dividends are segregated to separate years. The subsection gives the respondent the right to determine that segregation. Taxes are imposed on the profits of an accounting year or period and the term “accumulated profits” as defined in the subsection would indicate a meaning of annual accumulated profits rather than accumulated profits in the nature of surplus.

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General Foods Corp. v. Commissioner
4 T.C. 209 (U.S. Tax Court, 1944)

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Bluebook (online)
4 T.C. 209, 1944 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 39, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/general-foods-corp-v-commissioner-tax-1944.