General Electric Co. v. Sung

843 F. Supp. 776, 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1936, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 553, 1994 WL 51000
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJanuary 4, 1994
DocketCiv. A. 89-40094-GN
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 843 F. Supp. 776 (General Electric Co. v. Sung) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
General Electric Co. v. Sung, 843 F. Supp. 776, 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1936, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 553, 1994 WL 51000 (D. Mass. 1994).

Opinion

*778 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

GORTON, District Judge.

Pending before this Court is the motion of plaintiff, General Electric Company (“GE”), filed on August 18, 1993, for injunctive relief against Ujin Corporation, Ujin Diamond Manufacturing Company and Chin-Kyu Huh (collectively, “Ujin”). A hearing was held on GE’s motion on November 24, 1993. This Court has considered all memoranda in support of and in opposition to GE’s motion, as well as oral arguments of counsel.

I. Background

Chien-Min Sung (“Sung”), a geochemistry Ph.D., ended a seven-year employment relationship with GE Superabrasives in March 1984. When he left GE, Sung took with him an abundance of documents, including drawings and process instructions relating to the production of industrial synthetic diamond. In 1988, Sung and Iljin entered into several agreements under which Sung agreed to transfer to Iljin technology related to the production of industrial diamond.

GE filed an action against Ujin in 1989, alleging, inter alia, that they misappropriated GE trade secrets relating to the technology for manufacturing saw grade industrial diamond. After protracted discovery and pre-trial motions, the case was tried to a jury in July, 1993. At the close of the three-week trial, the Court charged the jury that, in order to find that Ujin had misappropriated any of the claimed GE trade secrets, comprised of 487 pages of documents contained in trial Exhibit A, it must find, among other things, that the documents in Exhibit A: 1) were valuable, 2) were not in the public domain, 3) were kept secret by GE, 4) were copied or derived by Sung from confidential GE documents in violation of his legal obligations to GE, 5) were obtained by Iljin with actual or constructive knowledge of those facts, and 6) were used by Iljin. On July 30, 1993, the jury returned a verdict in favor of GE and against Iljin for misappropriation of GE trade secrets.

GE waived its legal remedy with respect to its alleged lost profits and Iljin’s alleged unjust enrichment when it chose not to offer evidence of such monetary damages at trial. On November 15, 1993, this Court denied GE’s Motion for Reconsideration of its Request for an Equitable Accounting.

II. Discussion

It is well settled that equity will protect against the unwarranted use of a trade secret. See generally 3 R. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets, § 15.02[1][a]. The purpose of an injunction in a trade secret case is to protect the secrecy of the misappropriated information, eliminate the unfair advantage obtained by the wrongdoer and reinforce the public policy of commercial morality. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481, 94 S.Ct. 1879, 1886, 40 L.Ed.2d 315 (1974). An injunction to protect against the use of a trade secret is the appropriate remedy in a trade secret case if, absent such relief, plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury. See A-Copy, Inc. v. Michaelson, 599 F.2d 450, 452-453 (1st Cir.1978).

The jury found that Iljin misappropriated GE trade secrets and the evidence at trial clearly indicated that Ujin’s use of those trade secrets enabled them to produce saw grade diamond for commercial sale and thereby to compete with GE in the industrial diamond industry before it would have been otherwise possible. This Court concludes that GE will suffer irreparable injury if Iljin is allowed to continue to use the technology it wrongfully acquired from GE, and an injunction is therefore the appropriate remedy in this case. The only remaining issues to be decided by this Court relate to the scope, nature and duration of that injunction.

A. Scope of Injunction

The jury found that Iljin misappropriated 487 pages of documents that were GE trade secrets. Trade secret protection, however, extends not only to the misappropriated trade secret itself but also to materials “substantially derived” from that trade secret. USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 392 Mass. 334, 351, 467 N.E.2d 1271, 1284 (1984); Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc. 1993 WL 286484 (N.D.Ill. July 29, 1993). This Court must, therefore, deter *779 mine whether an injunction in this case should be limited to the documents contained in trial Exhibit A or extend to cover Iljin’s IJ-77 process.

The IJ-77 process is a 5,000-ton apparatus and specifications for its operation. It is designed and used to produce saw grade diamond on a commercial scale. The evidence at trial indicates that it took GE more than twenty years to develop its comparable, 5,000-ton “GE V” design for commercial production of saw grade diamond. Taek-Jung Shin (“Shin”), the Engineering Manager of Iljin Diamond, admitted at trial that 1) the IJ-77 design was developed by Iljin engineers with explicit reference to the GE trade secrets and 2) in creating the IJ-77, Iljin engineers modified the GE V design to make it “less aggressive”. Shin himself was intimately familiar with the GE trade secret technology and supervised the development of the IJ-77 design. Under Massachusetts trade secret law, these facts give rise to a compelling inference that the IJ-77 was substantially derived from GE trade secrets.

Where modifications in the process are made by persons cognizant of the trade secret ... proof of the independent derivation of the differing process is more difficult than would be the ease if an apparent “modification” were made by a person untainted with knowledge of the trade secret.

USM Corp., 392 Mass. at 352, 467 N.E.2d 1271.

The physical evidence sustains the inference. The evidence adduced from pretrial depositions, expert trial testimony and post-trial affidavits indicates that the dimensions and material specifications of the IJ-77 are substantially similar, and in some respects identical, to GE’s L-5000 and M-3000 designs in Exhibit A. See id (plaintiff entitled to relief where defendant’s machine is substantially similar to the machine incorporating a trade secret). Moreover, specific expert testimony indicated that 25% of the dimensions of the IJ-77 die and anvil are identical to the GE V dimensions.

Iljin argued at trial that the documents in Exhibit A were not used by Iljin and were not valuable. They attempted to establish that defense by showing that the documents were not necessary to the creation of the IJ-77. GE countered by offering evidence of a nexus between the stolen documents and the IJ-77. The jury found that the GE trade secrets had value and were used by Iljin, and therefore implicitly rejected Iljin’s contention that there was no connection between the stolen documents and the IJ-77.

This Court concludes that the IJ-77 was substantially derived from the 487 pages of documents determined by the jury to be GE trade secrets.

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843 F. Supp. 776, 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1936, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 553, 1994 WL 51000, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/general-electric-co-v-sung-mad-1994.