General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co.

28 F.2d 641, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 2407
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedNovember 23, 1928
Docket3654
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 28 F.2d 641 (General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 2407 (3d Cir. 1928).

Opinions

WOOLLEY, Circuit Judge.

General Electric Company, plaintiff below, appeals from a decree of the District Court dismissing its bill of complaint for infringement of United States letters patent No. 1,082,933 issued to it on December 30,1913, as assignee of William D. Coolidge, the inventor, for “tungsten and method of making the same for use as filaments of incandescent electric lamps and for other purposes.” The bill charges that the De Forest Radio Company, a manufacturer of radio tubes, and the Reb-elen Piano Company, one of its retail distributors, infringed the product claims 24, 26, 27, 28, 33 and 34 of the patent by using and selling drawn tungsten wire as the filamentary cathodes of their vacuum tubes and further that the De Forest Company was guilty of contributory infringement of the process claims of the patent, Nos. 1 to 23 (8, 13 and 15 excepted), in the manufacture of such wire for that purpose. Aside from the defense of noninfringement the defendants attacked the validity of the patent from many angles. The court found all claims in suit void.

As it is not permissible, even were it possible, to state in a judicial opinion the broad subject to which the patent in suit is directed and review its scientific and mechanical development, we shall address this discussion to those who know tungsten and are conversant with its metallurgy and with the litigation which, both at home and abroad, has followed its entrance and advance in the arts. For purposes of the present litigation the subtle features of the subject are sufficiently revealed by the discussions and the many eases cited in the opinions in Desmond Incandescent Lamp Co. v. General Electric Co. (C. C. A.) 27 F.(2d) 590; in the instant suit before the district court, 17 F.(2d) 90; and particularly in General Electric Co. v. Independent Lamp & Wire Co., 267 F. 825, where the same court held valid the same claims which later in the suit at bar it held invalid.

In doing this unusual thing the District Court did not reverse itself within the ordinary understanding of that term by deciding first one way and then the other way on the same facts but consistently arrived at differ[642]*642ent judgments on radically different records. The Independent Case was based on the belief long held by scientists and those active in the lighting art that tungsten is in nature highly brittle and therefore not capable of being drawn into wire and on the plaintiff’s contention supported by evidence ample to sustain the finding that Coolidge took the brittle element of nature and by his process converted it-into an entirely new metal with the alien characteristics of great ductility and high tensile strength and thereby rendered it capable of being drawn into wire and the wire used for filaments in incandescent electric lamps and radio vacuum tubes. Seemingly ductile tungsten was a chemical paradox. Hence it was there claimed that the metal obtained by the Coolidge process is not pure. tungsten but is something else which had been created not by nature but by Coolidge. H this were true, clearly Coolidge was an inventor of high order and was entitled to the reward of a patent for the product which he brought into existence. But it developed in the instant ease that while oxid of tungsten (WO3), the form in which tungsten usually exists and is found in the earth, is highly brittle, it was known by many at the time the Independent Case was on trial and is now conceded by every one that pure tungsten, or tungsten substantially pure, is not brittle at all but on the contrary is highly ductile. On evidence of that fact, when brought to the mind of the District Judge for the first time in this ease, he disregarded his previous ruling on a record now manifestly erroneous and entered the decree here on appeal holding the product claims invalid because they cover an element of nature with characteristics which nature alone has given it.

The plaintiff in this its second suit on the Coolidge patent no longer maintains, if we understand its position correctly, that pure tungsten is brittle but still contends, however, that the product of the patent with its high ductility is a new metal created by Coolidge and therefore, as a manufacture, is a proper subject-matter for product claims of a patent. The position of the defendants is of course diametrically opposite.

In these opposing positions of the parties there is drawn a sharp issue as to precisely what is the subject-matter of the patent, namely: Whether the tungsten of which the patent speaks is the tungsten of nature with its inherent quality of ductility or is a new metal produced by Coolidge which is wholly different from anything that nature provides. If it.is a natural thing then clearly, even if Coolidge was the first to uncover it and bring it into view, he cannot have a patent for it because a patent cannot be awarded for a discovery or for a product of nature, or for a chemical element. United States Industrial Chemical Co. v. Theroz Co. (C. C. A.) 25 F.(2d) 387. If it is not a natural thing but is a thing which Coolidge created possessing characteristics different from those given by nature, like dolomite, adamite, and carborundum, Baker Co. v. Kennedy Refractories Co. (C. C. A.) 253 F. 739; Pittsburgh Iron & Steel Co. v. Seaman-Sleeth Co. (C. C. A.) 248 F. 705; American Adamite Co. v. Mesta Machine Co. (C. C. A.) 18 F.(2d) 538; Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co. v. Carborundum Co. (C. C.) 83 F. 493, 499, he is without doubt entitled to a patent for it. Therefore it is manifest that we must at the very outset find one or the other of these contentions as a fact and adopt it as a premise on which to base a proper conclusion. As they are wholly opposite and do not overlap, one must be wholly accepted and the other wholly rejected.

True, while Coolidge in his patent application described the product as a new metal he did not ask for a patent for a new metal —a new composition of matter — :or describe it as such in the patent claims as the inventors in the dolomite and adamite patents did (supra). From the specification disclosures it appears that “starting with tungstic oxid (WO3)” he “purified” it in a gas furnace for a given time in order to “free it from oxygen, carbon and other impurities” and then in the next operation he subjected the purified tungstic oxid to electric heating for a given period at a temperature within given ranges, stating: “In this operation the tungstic oxid, or as it is called the 'yellow oxid,’ is progressively reduced to the blue oxid and then to the brown oxid and then to the pure metal.” It is then molded and worked in the manner described. This in substance is what Coolidge says in his specification in respect to the metal. In saying it is “the pure metal,” we think he meant tungsten pure for he so describes it in claim 26: “Substantially pure tungsten having ductility and high tensile strength.” And also in claim 28: “A form of tungsten metal pliable at room temperature.” Tungsten thus described is the tungsten of nature. Moreover, Coolidge applied for and his assignee was awarded a patent for “tungsten.” Coolidge took tungsten as it “existed” (WO3) or as it is found in the earth, its native abode, and by his process converted it into pure tungsten or tungsten that is substantially pure, and, doubtless, was first to discover that when pure it has characteristics, [643]*643notably those of ductility and high tensile strength, which are wholly different from the characteristics of the impure oxid of tungsten, notable among which is extreme brittleness. What he produced by his process was natural tungsten in substantially pure form.

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Bluebook (online)
28 F.2d 641, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 2407, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/general-electric-co-v-de-forest-radio-co-ca3-1928.