Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen Inc.

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen Inc.. Read the opinion of the Court — 310 F. Supp. 3d 467
District Court, D. Delaware·Decided March 9, 2020·No. 1:17-cv-01407·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

GENENTECH, INC. and CITY OF : HOPE, : Plaintiffs, : Civ. No. 17-1407- CFC, Consol. Vv. : AMGEN INC., : Defendant.

GENENTECH, INC. and CITY OF ° HOPE, Plaintiffs, □□ : Civ. No. 18-924-CFC

AMGEN INC., Defendant.

Michael P. Kelly, Daniel M. Silver, Alexandra M. Joyce, MCCARTER &ENGLISH, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Daralyn J. Durie, Adam R. Brausa, Eric C. Wiener, Eneda Hoxha, DURIE TANGRI LLP, San Francisco, California. Counsel for Plaintiffs Genentech, Inc. and City of Hope. (C.A. No. 17-1407-CFC and C.A. No. 18-924-CFC). Paul B. Gaffney, David I. Berl, Thomas S. Fletcher, Kyle E. Thomason, Teagan J. Gregory, Charles L. McCloud, Kathryn S. Kayali, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP, Washington, D.C. Counsel for Plaintiff Genentech, Inc. (C.A. No. 17-1407- CFC).

William F. Lee, Lisa J. Pirozzolo, Emily R. Whelan, Kevin S. Prussia, Andrew J. Danford, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; Robert J. Gunther Jr.,. WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP, New York, New York; Nora Passamaneck, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP, Denver, Colorado. Counsel for Plaintiff Genentech, Inc. (C.A. No. 18-924-CFC). Melanie K. Sharp, James L. Higgins, YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendant Amgen Inc. (C.A. No. 17-1407-CFC). Neal C. Belgam, Eve H. Ormerod, Jennifer M. Rutter, SMITH KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS LLP, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendant Amgen Inc. (C.A. No. 18-924-CFC).

MEMORANDUM OPINION

March 9, 2020 Wilmington, Delaware

sone eM. ccrsaxc Genentech, Inc. and City of Hope (collectively, Genentech) brought these

patent infringement actions against Amgen, Inc. pursuant to the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), 42 U.S.C. § 262. Pending before me is the matter of the construction of the disputed claim term “following fermentation” in United States Patent Number 8,574,869 (the Kao or #869 patent). The Kao patent teaches methods and means of preventing disulfide bond reduction during the manufacturing of therapeutic antibodies. #869 patent at 1:17-22. I initially heard argument on the meaning of “following fermentation” and other disputed claim terms at two Markman hearings convened in April 2019. C.A. No. 17-1407, D.I. 340; C.A. No. 18-924, D.I. 182.' In memorandum opinions issued in June 2019, I explained that I was unable to construe “following fermentation” based solely on the intrinsic evidence, and I ordered a hearing “‘to determine if ‘following fermentation’ can be construed by resort to extrinsic evidence or is invalid for indefiniteness.” D.I. 256 at 19.2

' See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (“[T]he construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court”). * Identical documents were usually filed in both cases. In addition, the memorandum opinions’ discussions of “following fermentation” are identical. Accordingly, all citations are to the docket for C.A. No. 18-924 unless otherwise noted.

The parties thereafter presented me with extrinsic evidence in the form of affidavits, treatises, articles, reports, and competing expert testimony at an evidentiary hearing on October 16, 2019. D.I. 372; D.I. 373. Based on the extrinsic evidence and my reconsideration of the intrinsic evidence in light of that extrinsic evidence, I have concluded that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would understand “following fermentation” to mean “after the earlier of harvesting or purification has begun,” and I will construe the term accordingly. I set forth the legal standards that govern claim construction in my earlier memorandum opinions. See D.I. 256 at 3-5. Rather than repeat those standards here, I incorporate by reference the earlier memorandum opinions. I write primarily for the parties and, to a large degree, presume familiarity with the

underlying technology. I. Claim | of the Kao patent teaches [a] method for the prevention of the reduction of a disulfide bond in an antibody expressed in a recombinant host cell, comprising, following fermentation, sparging the pre- harvest or harvested culture fluid of said recombinant host cell with air, wherein the amount of dissolved oxygen (dO2) in the pre- harvest or harvested culture fluid is at least 10%.

#869 patent at 107:44-49 (reformatted for clarity and emphasis added). As I explained in my earlier memorandum opinions, the construction of “following fermentation” involves two questions. First, what is “fermentation?” And second, when does “fermentation” end? D.I. 256 at 15. Unfortunately, as I also discussed in my earlier memorandum opinions, the Kao patent neither defines fermentation nor allows for a cogent inference of fermentation’s meaning, let alone when it ends. The patent is plagued by typographical errors and sloppy language; it suggests at times that fermentation is

synonymous with “production” and “manufacturing” and at other times that fermentation is distinct from these concepts. /d. at 16, 19 n.6. To add to the confusion, the patent does not consistently use or assign meaning to “production” and “manufacturing.” /d. at 19 n.6. As Genentech’s counsel conceded (to his credit) at oral argument, “certain words like manufacturing and production may not be used quite as precisely as one would like in the Kao patent.” C.A. No. 17-1407, D.I. 340 at 25:20-22. Resort to extrinsic evidence is therefore necessary. See Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[Ijf after consideration of the intrinsic evidence there remains doubt as to the exact meaning of the claim terms, consideration of extrinsic evidence may be necessary to determine the proper construction.”).

II. Genentech argues that “fermentation” refers to “the growing of the cells and the producing of the protein [i.e., antibody]” in the manufacturing process. D.I. 528 at 13:20-22; see also id. at 66:13-22.3 Amgen insists that I should reject this definition, D.I. 373 at 4, but it has used “fermentation” in the context of antibody manufacturing to mean exactly what Genentech says the term means. Specifically, in its 2011 Annual Report, Amgen stated that the “[b]ulk manufacturing” of its biological products “includes fermentation and/or cell culture, processes by which

our proteins are produced.” D,I. 376-2 at Appx. 449 (emphasis added). In addition, Amgen’s expert, Dr. Glacken, admitted during cross-examination at the evidentiary hearing that “[w]ithin the context of the Kao patent, the person of ordinary skill would understand the term fermentation to refer to cell culture

processes for making antibodies.” D.I. 528 at 145:14—19; see also id. at 152:7-9 (Glacken) (admitting that “using fermentation synonymous[ly] with mammalian cell culture is becoming more common”). Genentech’s proposed definition of fermentation is well supported by other extrinsic evidence. For instance, Kemp states that therapeutic antibodies “are produced ... via mammalian cell fermentation.” D.I. 376 at Appx. 248. And

3 The parties used “protein” and “antibody” interchangeably, and I will therefore do the same.

Geigert states that “fermentation” is used interchangeably with “cell culture,” which the parties equate with cell growth and antibody production. See C.A. No. 17-1407, DI. 271-2, Ex.

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