Gene K. Lee Medical Corporation v. Elevance Health Inc., et al.

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJuly 6, 2026
Docket2:26-cv-06151
StatusUnknown

This text of Gene K. Lee Medical Corporation v. Elevance Health Inc., et al. (Gene K. Lee Medical Corporation v. Elevance Health Inc., et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gene K. Lee Medical Corporation v. Elevance Health Inc., et al., (C.D. Cal. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JS-6

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 26-6151 FMO (CTSx) Date July 6, 2026 Title Gene K. Lee Medical Corporation v. Elevance Health Inc., et al.

Present: The Honorable Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge Vanessa Figueroa None None Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No. Attorney Present for Plaintiff: Attorney Present for Defendants: None Present None Present Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Remanding Action On April 14, 2026, Gene K. Lee Medical Corporation (“plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior Court (“state court’) against Elevance Health, Inc., Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance Company, and Blue Cross of California (“defendants”), asserting only state law claims. (See Dkt. 1, Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at { 1); (Dkt. 1-1, Complaint at □□ 35- 68). On June 5, 2026, defendants removed the case to this court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (See Dkt. 1, NOR at {8). Having reviewed the pleadings, the court hereby remands this action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In general, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Aremoving defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near- canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing defendant”). If there is any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in favor of remanding the action to state court.' See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”). Indeed, at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and, indeed, we have held that the district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.”); Washington v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2009 WL 1519894, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (a district court

' An “antiremoval presumption” does not exist in cases removed pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 26-6151 FMO (CTSx) Date July 6, 2026 Title Gene K. Lee Medical Corporation v. Elevance Health Inc., et al. may remand an action where the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction “either by motion or sua sponte”). Although federal question jurisdiction “[mJost directly . . . arises under federal law when federal law creates the cause of action asserted[,]” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013), there is “another longstanding, if less frequently encountered, variety of federal ‘arising under’ jurisdiction” in which “federal-question jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims[.]” Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2366-67 (2005); see Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258, 133 S.Ct. at 1064 (“[E]ven where a claim finds its origins in state rather than federal law . . . a special and small category of cases [exist] in which arising under jurisdiction still lies.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). In such cases, “federal jurisdiction over a State law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258, 133 S.Ct. at 1065. For purposes of removal based on federal question jurisdiction, the well-pleaded complaint rule “provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Smallwood v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 660 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987)). “As the master of the complaint, a plaintiff may defeat removal by choosing not to plead independent federal claims.” ARCO Envt'l Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Health and Envt'l Quality of Montana, 213 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit has clarified that the Grable test does not dispense with the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Cal. Shock Trauma Air Rescue v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 636 F.3d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 2011). As such, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, the existence of a federal defense is not enough to justify removal to federal court. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. at 2430 (“[I]t is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint[.]”) (emphasis in original). Here, plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to pay the full amount owed for the medical services plaintiff provided. (See Dkt. 1-1, Complaint at ff] 14-15). Plaintiff contested the underpayment using the independent dispute resolution (“IDR”) procedure established by the federal No Surprises Act (“NSA”), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-111, et seq. (See id. at | 20). Through the IDR process, plaintiff received favorable arbitration rulings that defendants failed to pay the full amount owed for the medical services provided. (See id. at Jf] 23-32). Defendants contend that removal is proper because this action could have originally been brought in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, because plaintiff's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof.

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Gene K. Lee Medical Corporation v. Elevance Health Inc., et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gene-k-lee-medical-corporation-v-elevance-health-inc-et-al-cacd-2026.