Gemperle v. Comm'r
This text of 2016 T.C. Memo. 1 (Gemperle v. Comm'r) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Decision will be entered under
In 2007, Ps granted to a qualified donee a facade easement on their Chicago residence, which constituted a certified historic structure in a historic district, so that the easement was eligible for classification as a "qualified conservation contribution" within the meaning of
R seeks to (1) deny Ps any deduction for their contribution of the easement or, alternatively, to permit a deduction not to exceed $35,000, and (2) impose 40% gross valuation misstatement penalties under
*2 1.
2.
3.
HALPERN,
| 2007 | $17,201 | $3,440 | $6,880 |
| 2008 | 9,724 | 1,945 | 3,890 |
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Decision will be entered under
In 2007, Ps granted to a qualified donee a facade easement on their Chicago residence, which constituted a certified historic structure in a historic district, so that the easement was eligible for classification as a "qualified conservation contribution" within the meaning of
R seeks to (1) deny Ps any deduction for their contribution of the easement or, alternatively, to permit a deduction not to exceed $35,000, and (2) impose 40% gross valuation misstatement penalties under
*2 1.
2.
3.
HALPERN,
| 2007 | $17,201 | $3,440 | $6,880 |
| 2008 | 9,724 | 1,945 | 3,890 |
The deficiencies are attributable to respondent's disallowance of a charitable contribution deduction for 2007 and a corresponding carryover deduction for 2008 ($69,186 for 2007 and $38,814 for 2008 for a total disallowance of $108,000) that petitioners claimed on account of their 2007 donation of a facade easement (plus cash, the deduction of which respondent does not challenge) to Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois (Landmarks). With respect to the underpayments resulting from those disallowances, respondent determined accuracy-related penalties of 40% for a gross valuation misstatement under
The parties have stipulated certain facts and the authenticity of certain documents. The facts stipulated are so found, and the documents stipulated are accepted as authentic.
Petitioners resided in Chicago, Illinois, when they filed the petition.
Since 1975, petitioners have owned and resided in a house*4 built in 1898 in the Lakewood/Balmoral neighborhood of Chicago (Lakewood house). In 1999, the U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service (Park Service), established the neighborhood as a historic district and also listed the Lakewood house on the National Register of Historic Places. On or about December 17, 2007, the Park Service certified that the Lakewood house constituted "a 'certified historic structure' for a charitable contribution for conservation purposes in accordance with the Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1980."
After learning of the availability of conservation easement charitable contribution deductions at a 2002 or 2003 presentation by Landmarks, petitioners considered and, in 2007, decided to pursue, with Landmarks the creation of a *5 facade easement on the Lakewood house. Landmarks assisted petitioners in the creation and contribution (to it) of the facade easement, including the providing of forms (presumably a model for the easement contribution agreement itself) and a list of potential appraisers. Petitioners chose from that list Gwendolyn J. Fiorenzo to appraise the facade easement (Fiorenzo appraisal). Ms. Fiorenzo prepared two appraisals of the proposed*5 facade easement, both dated December 21, 2007, the second of which corrected errors in the first and was considered, by petitioners, to be the actual, final appraisal.3 The second appraisal was stated to be as of November 28, 2007. Both appraisals valued the proposed facade easement at $108,000, the total amount that petitioners deducted for their contribution of the easement to Landmarks.
Ms. Fiorenzo's first appraisal arrived at the $108,000 figure (a 12% reduction in her before-easement valuation of the Lakewood house) without identifying the after-easement comparable properties, and it concluded that the comparable properties' loss in value from the easement "typically ranged from 9% to 18%."4*6 Her second appraisal did identify eight after-easement comparable *6 properties, found the loss-in-value range for them to be between 8% and 24%, but, consistent with her first appraisal, found a 12% loss in value for the Lakewood house.
On December 28, 2007, petitioners, in their capacities as trustees of trusts in their respective names, each, as "grantor" of "an undivided 1/2 interest", and Landmarks, as "grantee", entered into a "preservation easement" (agreement) with respect to the Lakewood house, by which petitioners conveyed the easement (facade easement) to Landmarks. The agreement recites that the obligations imposed by the facade easement were deemed to run as a binding servitude with the land and the agreement was to bind not only petitioners but also their successors as owners of the property (without distinction, petitioners). Under the terms of the agreement, petitioners agreed not to "demolish, remove or raze" the Lakewood house "or any portion of the Protected Elements" (in general,*7 the entire *7 exterior of the house, the roof and chimney, and a stone entrance arch), and they further agreed that, "[w]ithout the prior written permission of * * * [Landmarks]", they would not partially demolish or remove the Lakewood house or alter the "Protected Elements, including * * * any alteration, partial removal, construction, remodeling or physical or structural change, or change in surfacing", nor would they expand or reduce the Lakewood House "either horizontally or vertically", and they agreed generally to maintain the house and the protected elements. In addition, petitioners made a cash contribution to Landmarks of $10,800, which was 10% of the $108,000 charitable contribution deduction that they anticipated from their contribution to Landmarks of the facade easement.
Petitioners timely made joint returns of income on Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for their 2007 and 2008 taxable (calendar) years (2007 and 2008 return, respectively). Those returns show that they were prepared by a paid tax return preparer, Norton V. Binenfeld, certified public accountant (C.P.A.). Petitioners attached to the 2007 return an incomplete Form 8283, Noncash Charitable*8 Contributions, claiming a deduction for the noncash charitable contribution of the facade easement to Landmark. No appraisal is included with the 2007 return. On or around October 22, 2010, petitioners submitted a corrected *8 Form 8283 to respondent. Both Forms 8283 show that they are a version of Form 8283 that was revised in December 2006. Both state: "An appraisal is generally required for property listed in Section B (see instructions)." Section B addresses donated property valued at over $5,000. Instructions for Form 8283, also revised December 2006, state that, for contributions of easements made on buildings in historic districts, the taxpayer must include with his return a "qualified appraisal".
At the commencement of the trial, the Court addressed respondent's motion in limine to bar petitioners from asserting that the Fiorenzo appraisal (Exhibits 4-J and 13-J attached to the stipulation of facts) qualifies as evidence of the value of their facade easement. In his motion, respondent noted that petitioners had failed to list Ms. Fiorenzo as a witness, and he argued that he "would be prejudiced if the Fiorenzo appraisal was admitted*9 as evidence * * * [of value] due to his inability to cross examine * * * [her] concerning the facts, analysis and conclusions purportedly set forth in * * * [the two exhibits]." Petitioners, in fact, did fail to produce Ms. Fiorenzo as a witness. As a result, we granted respondent's motion and excluded the Fiorenzo appraisal as evidence of the value of the facade easement.
Petitioners did call three witnesses, in addition to themselves. None of them qualified as (nor did petitioners claim that they were) experts in appraising real estate. Therefore, their proffered written submissions failed to constitute expert reports, and, for that reason, we granted respondent's motions in limine to exclude those submissions from evidence. We did permit petitioners, however, to elicit testimony from all three as fact witnesses. None of the three purported to or did, in fact, establish a value for petitioners' facade easement.
The first witness, Thom Greene, an architect, testified that the zoning laws for the Lakewood/Balmoral district would not prohibit petitioners from expanding the Lakewood house by, for example, attaching an addition to the house. The second, Pamela*10 Ball, a realtor, testified that houses, like the Lakewood house, on 50-foot lots are highly valued because they can be expanded. The third, Maureen Murnane, also a realtor, testified that respondent's expert appraiser improperly referred to one of the houses located, like the Lakewood house, on Lakewood Avenue as a comparable property in valuing the Lakewood house before petitioners' contribution of the facade easement.
Respondent introduced into evidence two expert reports, and the authors of those reports testified in support thereof. The first expert, Howard Kanter, criticized the Fiorenzo appraisal, primarily on the ground that it fails to satisfy various requirements of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal. The second expert, Brian Flynn, testified that the facade easement had a value in the range of zero to $35,000.
*12
Respondent sets forth several grounds for his position that petitioners are not entitled to any deduction for their contribution to Landmarks of the facade easement, including: (1) the absence of a qualified appraisal as required by
For any contribution relating to a registered historic district made after the date of enactment of the provision [Aug. 17, 2006], taxpayers must include with the return for the taxable year of the contribution a qualified appraisal of the qualified real property interest (irrespective of the claimed value of such interest) and attach the appraisal with the taxpayer's return * * * .
The parties have stipulated a copy of the 2007 return, and nothing resembling*17 a qualified appraisal is included with it. Indeed, petitioners concede on brief: "We admit that the full [Fiorenzo] appraisal was not included with the [2007] return". For lack of a qualified appraisal included with the 2007 return, we will sustain respondent's adjustments disallowing for 2007 and 2008 petitioners' charitable contribution deductions claimed on account of their contribution of the facade easement to Landmark.
Respondent seeks to impose a 40% accuracy-related penalty for each of the years in issue under
We have sustained respondent's adjustments disallowing petitioners any charitable contribution deduction for the contribution of the facade easement to Landmarks on the ground that they failed to comply with the requirement of *18
Because the resulting 2007 and 2008 underpayments of tax are fully attributable to petitioners' disregard of
*20 As discussed
On brief, petitioners criticize Mr. Flynn's "before" valuation of $780,000 for the Lakewood house, which is $85,000 less than their proffered "before" valuation of $865,000. Because they accept Mr. Flynn's "after" valuation of $745,000, they determine a $120,000 value for their facade easement, which is $12,000 more than their deduction based upon the Fiorenzo appraisal. Petitioners' criticism of Mr. Flynn's "before" valuation is based largely upon his allegedly improper adjustments to the sale prices of houses that he considered comparable to the Lakewood house. That criticism is problematic in the light of petitioners' acceptance of Mr. Flynn's "after" valuation,*23 which makes adjustments to the sale prices of comparable houses on the same bases that he used in adjusting the "before" sale prices. Petitioners have not persuaded us that Mr. Flynn's valuation of their facade easement is unreasonably low.
In the absence of expert testimony that the value of the easement was greater than $35,000, we accept that amount as its value for purposes of *22 determining whether petitioners are liable for
Accepting, as we do, that $35,000 constitutes the maximum value of petitioners' facade easement, petitioners' $108,000 valuation thereof is more than 200% "of the amount determined to be the correct amount of such valuation", thereby triggering the application of 40% gross valuation misstatement penalties under
Petitioners are liable for 40% substantial valuation misstatement penalties on the portions of their 2007 and 2008 underpayments attributable to reporting the value of the facade easement to be in excess of $35,000.
Footnotes
1. Unless otherwise stated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. We round all dollar amounts to the nearest dollar.↩
2. The tax deficiencies are based upon respondent's revenue agent's disallowance of petitioners' total deduction for their contribution of the facade easement (i.e., they are based upon the agent's determination that the facade easement had no value), and the alternatively imposed
sec. 6662↩ penalties are 40% and 20% of those deficiencies, respectively.3. Petitioners provided the second appraisal to respondent on August 6, 2013.↩
4. Because, generally, no established market exists for determining the fair market value of an easement, the "before and after" appraisal method is normally used to determine the fair market value of restrictive easements with respect to which charitable contribution deductions are claimed; i.e., the appraiser must compute a "before" value of the property in its current condition unrestricted by the easement and an "after" value of the property as encumbered by the easement, the excess of the former over the latter constituting the fair market value of the easement.
See ;Hilborn v. Commissioner , 85 T.C. 677, 689-690 (1985)see also sec. 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i), Income Tax Regs.↩ 5.
Sec. 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii), Income Tax Regs. , enumerates 11 items that a qualified appraisal must include:(A) A description of the property in sufficient detail for a person who is not generally familiar with the type of property to ascertain that the property that was appraised is the property that was (or will be) contributed;
(B) In the case of tangible property, the physical condition of the property;
(C) The date (or expected date) of contribution to the donee;
(D) The terms of any agreement or understanding entered into (or expected to be entered into) by or on behalf of the donor or donee that relates to the use, sale, or other disposition of the property contributed * * * ;
(E) The name, address, and * * * the identifying number of the qualified appraiser; * * *
(F) The qualifications of the qualified appraiser who signs the appraisal, including the appraiser's background, experience, education, and membership, if any, in professional appraisal associations;
(G) A statement that the appraisal was prepared for income tax purposes;
(H) The date (or dates) on which the property was appraised;
(I) The appraised fair market value (within the meaning of
§ 1.170A-1(c)(2) ) of the property on the date (or expected date) of contribution;(J) The method of valuation used to determine the fair market value, such as the income approach, the market-data approach, and the replacement-cost-less-depreciation approach; and
(K) The specific basis for the valuation, such as specific comparable sales transactions or statistical sampling, including a justification for using sampling and an explanation of the sampling procedure employed.
6. Respondent agrees that Landmarks is a qualified organization.↩
7. We see no reason to reverse that evidentiary ruling. Pursuant to
Rule 143(g)(1) , an expert witness is required to prepare a written report for submission to the Court, which, pursuant toRule 143(g)(2) , is "received in evidence as the direct testimony of the expert witness". Because the written report constitutes the expert witness' direct testimony, it is necessary that the expert witness be available for cross-examination regarding the truth or accuracy of the assertions in the written report. Otherwise, the written report constitutes excludable hearsay evidence. "The essential requirement of the hearsay rule * * * is that statements offered testimonially must be subjected to the test of cross-examination." 5 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1365, at 28 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). "The premise that the opportunity of cross-examination is an essential safeguard has become the principal justification for the general exclusion of hearsay statements." 1 McCormick on Evidence, sec. 19, at 152 (7th ed. 2013). Moreover, even though the loss of a nonparty witness' direct testimony may impose a severe hardship on the party relying on that testimony, which, under certain circumstances, might justify a court's exercise of its discretion to admit such testimony,see id. , that circumstance does not arise in this case, where Ms. Fiorenzo's failure to testify arose out of petitioners' voluntary decision not to make her available,see .Estate of Tanenblatt v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 2013-263↩, at *9-*128. As discussed
supra↩ , none of petitioners' three fact witnesses established a value for the easement.
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2016 T.C. Memo. 1, 111 T.C.M. 1001, 2016 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 2, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gemperle-v-commr-tax-2016.