Geary v. Stanley Med. Research Inst.

Maine Superior

Geary v. Stanley Med. Research Inst.

DecidedOctober 10, 2006

DocketWALcv-05-003

StatusUnpublished

This text of Geary v. Stanley Med. Research Inst. (Geary v. Stanley Med. Research Inst.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Geary v. Stanley Med. Research Inst., (Me. Super. Ct. 2006).

Pincite

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT WALDO, ss CIVIL ACTION 2~~t~~·~1q-OR~)dj ......, ALICE GEARY, = =:, ORDER ON THE DEFENDANTS-' .' ,, Plaintiff MATTHEW CYR AND LORIE ~ ;:,:... ;._~~~ STEVENS'S MOTION FOR-::J ~~ -~-:; " ('1 (" : ':::J v. SUMMARY JUDGMENTc') s/) roC:;: c - ~~:; :;; l> THE STANLEY MEDICAL :::;c:J RESEARCH INSTITUTE, et al., -- (/) :.;;;

Defendants

Defendants Matthew Cyr and Lorie Stevens move for summary judgment on the

plaintiff's complaint. 1 The defendant Stevens argues that she did not cause any of the

alleged harm to the plaintiff. Both defendants argue that there is no private right of

action under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA); the defendants are immune

from liability based on negligent or reckless conduct; the plaintiff cannot raise an issue

of material fact regarding the elements of causes of action for interference with and

mutilation of a corpse, for negligent, reckless, or intentional misrepresentation, or for

reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Defs.' 9/21/06 Mem. at 1-2;

The defendants filed an 85-paragraph statement of undisputed material facts. The plaintiff responded to the defendants' statement and filed her own 170-paragraph statement of additional material facts. Neither submission constitutes a "short, and concise statement of material facts" as required by Rule 56. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(l) & (2); Stanley v. Hancock County Commissioners, 2004 ME 157, 'J[ 29, 864 A,2d 169, 179 (court has discretion to deny motion for summary judgment if a "party submits an unnecessarily long, repetitive, or otherwise convoluted statement of material facts that fails to achieve the Rule's requirement of a 'separate, short, and concise' statement"). The parties also incorporate "motions to strike" in their responses. See Randall v. Potter, 366 F. Supp. 2d 120, 121 n.l ("The motion to strike has become the evil twin of the motion for summary judgment."); M.R. Civ. P. 56(i) (effective 4/2/07) ("Motions to Strike Not Permitted"). The analysis required by Rule 56(h) renders a motion to strike unnecessary. 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 2901-2911 (2006). For the following reasons, the motion is granted in

part and denied in part. 2

Count I: Violation of UAGA

There is no private right of action to enforce the UAGA.

Count II: Negligence & Count VI: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The UAGA provides that a person who acts in good faith is not liable for

damages "in any civil action." 22 M.R.S.A. § 2907(3). The definition of good faith under

the UAGA requires that in order to be liable for damages in a civil action, the

defendants must have acted "maliciously, possessed a design to defraud or to seek an

unconscionable advantage over the plaintiff[], or acted out of something other than an

honest belief ...." Carey v. New En&land Organ Bank, 843 N.E.2d 1070, 1083; 22

M.R.S.A. § 2907(3) (emphasis added). The good faith immunity "is designed for

situations . . . where because of confusion, an organ is removed without genuine

consent." Lyon v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 531,536 (D. Minn. 1994); see Perry v. Saint

Francis Hosp. and Medical Crr., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1564-65 (D. Kan. 1995) (hospital

and harvester not entitied to summary judgment on negligence claim under Kansas

UAGA).

Proximate Cause: Defendant Stevens & Count III: Interference with and Mutilation of a Corpse

The plaintiff has raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether any

conduct by defendant Stevens was a proximate cause of plaintiff's damages3 and

2 The court incorporates into this order the orders dated June 8, 2007 in the Allen case on the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the order dated July 6, 2007 in the Geary case on the defendants SMRI and Torrey's motion for summary judgment, and the order dated November 21, 2005 in the Bourgoin, Grant. Howes, King, Leblanc, Marceau, and Monzingo cases on defendants SMRI and Torrey's motion to dismiss.

2 whether the defendants intentionally mistreated or improperly dealt with the body,

prevented its proper burial, or interfered with the plaintiff's right to the body. See, ~

Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Material Facts (PSAMF), 9[9[ 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 33 (dates

were changed on Q1), 134-136 (existence of three consents with ME numbers), 139, 147,

157; Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Material Facts

(DRSAMF), 9[9[ 8, 9, 10, 11, 33, 139, 147, 157.

Count IV: Negligent, Reckless, or Intentional Misrepresentation

The plaintiff has failed to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding the

elements of a cause of action for misrepresentation. In her complaint, the plaintiff

alleges that she gave no written or oral consent for any organ or tissue to be taken from

Raymond Geary's body, that the defendants falsely stated to the Medical Examiner's

Office that the plaintiff had consented, and organs and tissue were removed from Mr.

Geary's body. See Plaintiff's Complaint, 9[9[ 16-24, 48-53; DSUMF, 9[ 79; PSOMF, 9[ 79;

PSAMF, 9[9[ 34, 139, 151, 152; DRSAMF, 9[9[ 34, 139, 151, 152. There is no alleged

misrepresentation on which the plaintiff relied. See Maine Eye Care Associates v.

Gorman, 2006 ME 15, 9[ 19, 890 A.2d 707, 711; Rand v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2003 ME

122, 9[ 13, 832 A.2d 771, 774.

Counts V: Reckless or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The court will assume that the Law Court would recognize a cause of action

based on the allegations in this case. See Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Maine, Inc.,

534 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Me. 1987); Rubin v. Matthews Int'l Corp., 503 A.2d 694, 699 n.5

(Me. 1986); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868 (1979). The court will also assume that

the Law Court would allow a cause of action against persons and agencies other than

3 The plaintiff has raised issues of fact regarding Mr. eyr's instructions to have consents witnessed before submission to the Medical Examiner's Office, the defendant Stevens's witnessing the consents, and

3 those who performed the autopsy or directly handled the body. See, ~ Burgess v.

Perdue, 721 P.2d 239, 244 (Kan. 1986) (suits for interference with dead bodies allowed

against persons or agencies other than those who actually performed the autopsy or

directly interfered with the body).

The entry is

The Defendants Cyr and Stevens's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED on Counts I, IV, and VII of the Plaintiff's Complaint. Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendants Cyr and Stevens and against the Plaintiff on Counts I, IV, and VII of the Plaintiff's Complaint.

The Defendants Cyr and Stevens's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED on Counts II, III, V, VI of the Plaintiff's Complaint.

Date: July 10, 2007

the submission of the consents to the Medical Examiner's Office.

4 STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT WALDO, ss CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NOS. CV -05-003

ALICE GEARY,' ORDER ON THE DEFENDANTS THE Plaintiff STANLEY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE AND DR. E. FULLER v. TORREY'S MOTION FOR-, g SUMMARY JUDGMENT .

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI