Gearin v. Department of Revenue, Tc-Md 100664c (or.tax 5-27-2011)

CourtOregon Tax Court
DecidedMay 27, 2011
DocketTC-MD 100664C.
StatusPublished

This text of Gearin v. Department of Revenue, Tc-Md 100664c (or.tax 5-27-2011) (Gearin v. Department of Revenue, Tc-Md 100664c (or.tax 5-27-2011)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gearin v. Department of Revenue, Tc-Md 100664c (or.tax 5-27-2011), (Or. Super. Ct. 2011).

Opinion

DECISION
Plaintiff appeals Defendant's Notice of Deficiency Assessment, dated February 17, 2010, for the 2008 tax year. The notice denied Plaintiff the Working Family Child Care Credit, Dependent Care Credit, and the Head of Household filing status. Oral arguments were held on July 20, 2010, and August 16, 2010. Plaintiff appeared on his own behalf. Morgan Brown appeared on behalf of Defendant. During the August 16, 2010, proceeding, Plaintiff conceded that he was not entitled to the Head of Household filing status, but Plaintiff appeared to back away from that position during that proceeding. The court will therefore address that issue in its decision as well as the credits related to child care expenses.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff has a son, Sawyer, who was born January 7, 2003. Plaintiff and the child's mother, Angela K. Kagele (Kagele), were never married, although they did live together for several years. Subsequent to the parties' separation, they entered into a Stipulated General Judgment (Judgment) regarding custody and child support. That Judgment, signed by the parties in June 2007, provides in part that "[the parties shall share joint legal custody of the minor child [Sawyer] of the parties." (J at 4.) *Page 2

Plaintiff and Kagele executed a "Mediated Agreement" providing nearly identical language as to joint custody ("[t]he parents shall be joint legal custodians of Sawyer"). (Ptf's Ex 2 at 1.) The Mediated Agreement specifically addresses parenting time and provides in relevant part that Plaintiff has "parenting time each Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. The start of the father's parenting time shall vary according to the parents work schedule. * * * Sawyer shall be returned to the mother either Sunday evening or Monday morning." (Id.) Plaintiff has asserted both during the court proceedings and in his written submissions that, in actuality, he and Sawyer's mother share custody "relatively 50 50 and neither one of us could possibly prove who had him more than the other in 2008." (Ptf's Ltr at 1, Aug 16, 2010.) In his August 16, 2010, letter to the court, Plaintiff states that he "always picked up Sawyer Thursday after school and returned him either Sunday night or dropped him off Monday back at school." (Id.)

The child's mother signed a Form 8332, which is a federal "Release of Claim to Exemption for Child of Divorced or Separated Parents" (Release Agreement) on 8/31/07. (Id. at 9.) That Release Agreement specifies that Kagele chooses not to claim the child care exemption for Sawyer for 2006, and future even-numbered years, including "2008, 2010 etc[.]" (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he paid all of the child care expenses for his son Sawyer in 2008. Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff paid for and substantiated child care expenses in the amount of $5,148. (Def's Answer at 1.) Plaintiff had claimed a slightly larger amount, $5,760, on his 2008 return. (Id.) Plaintiff claimed a child care credit in the amount of $450 and a working family credit in the amount of $2,304. (Id.) Defendant denied both credits. Plaintiff insists he is entitled to both credits and believes that the instructions he followed in preparing his 2008 return support his position. Plaintiff contends that it is fair and reasonable for him to be *Page 3 entitled to the credits at issue because he paid for the child care and had custody of the child roughly one-half of the year in 2008. Moreover, Plaintiff believes it would be unjust to deny him the credit because Sawyer's mother claimed the credits on her 2008 Oregon return and Defendant denied her the credits because she did not pay for the child care. If Plaintiff is now denied the disputed credits, neither parent will receive the benefit the state clearly intended to confer upon them as relatively low income wage earners with work-related child care expenses.

II. ANALYSIS
The court must determine whether Plaintiff qualifies for: (A) the working family child care credit under ORS 315.262;1 (B) the dependent care credit under ORS 316.078; and (C) "head of household" filing status.

A. Working Family Child Care Credit

ORS 315.262 provides a refundable credit for certain low-income taxpayers to partially offset the taxpayer's child care costs incurred for the purpose of allowing the taxpayer to work or attend school. The credit is commonly referred to as the working family child care credit. ORS 315.262(3) states, in pertinent part:

"[a] qualified taxpayer shall be allowed a credit against the taxes otherwise due under ORS chapter 316 equal to the applicable percentage of the qualified taxpayer's child care expenses (rounded to the nearest $50)."

The term "child care expenses" is defined by statute as "the costs associated with providing child care to a qualifying child of a qualified taxpayer." ORS 315.262(1)(b) (emphasis added). *Page 4

The term "qualifying child" is tied to the definition under section 152 of the Internal Revenue Code. See ORS 315.262(1)(f). The IRC defines a qualifying child as:

"(1) * * * with respect to any taxpayer for any taxable year, an individual —

"(A) who bears a relationship to the taxpayer described in paragraph (2),

"(B) who has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of such taxable year,

"(C) who meets the age requirements of paragraph (3), and

"(D) who has not provided over one-half of such individual's own support for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins."

IRC 152(c).

Plaintiff's son does not meet the definition of a "qualifying child" under that general rule in IRC section 152(c)(B) because Plaintiff's home is not his son's principal place of abode.

However, the IRC alters this definition for divorced or separated parents. IRC 152(e) states:

"(1) In general. Notwithstanding subsection (c)(1)(B), * * * if —

"(A) a child receives over one-half of the child's support during the calendar year from the child's parents —

"(i) who are divorced or legally separated under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance,

"(ii) who are separated under a written separation agreement, or

"(iii) who live apart at all times during the last 6 months of the calendar year, and —

"(B) such child is in the custody of 1 or both of the child's parents for more than one-half of the calendar year, such child shall be treated as being the qualifying child or qualifying relative of the noncustodial parent for a calendar year if the

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bronson v. Moonen
528 P.2d 82 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1974)
Strain v. Department of Revenue
11 Or. Tax 121 (Oregon Tax Court, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Gearin v. Department of Revenue, Tc-Md 100664c (or.tax 5-27-2011), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gearin-v-department-of-revenue-tc-md-100664c-ortax-5-27-2011-ortc-2011.