Gaylor v. US DOJ

2006 DNH 069

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: June 14, 2006
• Docket: CV-05-414-PB
• Status: Published

Opinion

Gaylor v . US DOJ CV-05-414-PB 06/14/06

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Gregory Alan Gaylor

v. Case N o . 05-cv-414-PB Opinion No. 2006 DNH 069 U.S. Department of Justice

O R D E R

Gregory Gaylor has filed a complaint asserting claims under

the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.

and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a et seq. The

government has moved to dismiss for lack of proper venue.

The applicable venue statutes provide in pertinent part for

venue “in the district in which the complainant resides, or has

his principal place of business, or in which the agency records

are situated, or in the District of Columbia. . . .” 5 U.S.C. §

552(a)(4)(B); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(5). Gaylor claims that he is a

resident of Texas1 but argues that venue is proper in this

1 Although Gaylor is incarcerated in New Hampshire, he does not contest the government’s assertion that his incarceration in this state does not make him a New Hampshire resident. Nor does he challenge the government’s contention that the records he district because New Hampshire is his principal place of

business. To support this argument, Gaylor claims that he is

“the general partner of Tejas Timber Resources Joint Venture, a

foreign joint venture registered with the New Hampshire Secretary

of State.” Pl.’s O b j . ¶ 1 . The government replies by arguing

that Gaylor has produced no evidence to demonstrate that Tejas

Timber Resources has its principal place of business in this

state. The absence of such evidence is particularly glaring, the

government argues, because Tejas Timber Resources is a foreign

partnership that has not been in good standing in New Hampshire

since 2004. I find the government’s argument persuasive.

Accordingly, I lack venue to consider Gaylor’s complaint.

Gaylor asks me to transfer his action to the Northern

District of Texas as an alternative to dismissal. The government

argues that a transfer is unwarranted because it has already

responded to Gaylor’s FOIA request. Gaylor, however, remains

dissatisfied with the government’s response. Thus, I am

unwilling to dismiss the case simply because Gaylor brought it in

the wrong district. 28 U.S.C. § 1406 provides in pertinent part

seeks are located in another district.

-2- that “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case

laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or

if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any

district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28

U.S.C. § 1406(a). The District Court for the District of

Columbia has special expertise in FOIA matters. In re Scott, 709

F.2d 7 1 7 , 720 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing legislative history

recognizing that District of Columbia courts have special

expertise in FOIA matters). Thus, it would be more efficient to

transfer the case to the District of Columbia rather than the

Northern District of Texas.

The motion to dismiss (Doc. N o . 9 ) is denied. The case

shall be transferred to the District of Columbia.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge June 1 4 , 2006

cc: Gregory Alan Gaylor, pro se Gretchen Leah Witt, Esq.

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