RAPER, Justice.
The district judge, following a nonjury trial, entered a joint and several judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellees Habermans against the defendants (Heritage) (Brom-ley) (Gaudina). The judgment awarded damages of $54,591.48 and interest computed at the rate of 6% per annum for the period of time from September 26, 1973 to February 25, 1981 — this amounted to $24,-281.49. The total award was shown as $78,-873.27; however our computation indicates that it should have been for $78,872.97— there was a minor 30<p error.
In his Find
ings, the trial judge based recovery on the standards of duty set out in the provisions of the Uniform Securities Act of the State of Wyoming, § 17-117.1, et seq., W.S.1957, as amended (now § 17-4^101, W.S.1977, et seq.). Only Gaudina has perfected an appeal.
He raises as issues:
“1. Did the transaction between Heritage Trust Company and Habermans involve a ‘security?’ If so, was it exempt under W.S. 17-117.14(a)(3) [W.S.1957]? [Now § 17-4-114(a)(iii).
]
“2. Did Gaudina sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, in the exercise of reasonable care, of the untruth or omission of material facts?
“3. Did the Court properly set off the value of the property still held by Haber-mans in the award of judgment?
“4. Was there sufficient evidence to support the Judgment against Gaudina? “5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in failing to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Gaudina’s Motion to Dismiss after the first appeal was remanded?”
We will affirm except direct reduction of the judgment by $1,000.00.
Heritage was a corporation organized under the laws of Arizona to engage in the trust business in that state. Bromley was its principal officer, holding a controlling interest and directing its extensive operations. Gaudina was engaged on a commission basis by Bromley to sell its trust instruments in Wyoming.
Gaudina was a Colorado resident with a sales background in movie cameras, vacuum cleaners and insurance. He had two years of college business training. Any knowledge of trusts which he had was gathered during his experience as an insurance salesman and at seminars and conferences in connection with estate planning instruction. Through friends, he came into contact with Heritage and was employed by that company in April 1973. He was furnished with various sales materials and business cards showing him to be a “trust consultant.”
Gaudina’s father had been in the business of selling insurance and mutual funds out of Billings, Montana, but died in 1972. His territory had extended into Wyoming. Gaudina “inherited” all of his father’s business records which included a “black book” which contained the names of various Wyoming customers, prospects and contacts. With the aid of the little black book, he began contacting various persons in Wyoming there named. Included were the Ha-bermans, who he contacted and offered the services of Heritage. They had purchased mutual funds from Gaudina’s father or his associate, a Ted Schuman.
In his sales pitch to the Habermans he represented that if they placed their money into a trust account with Heritage, it would be invested in top quality — first quality— high quality investments, such as loans to third parties secured to the extent of 125% by first mortgages on real estate and that they would receive 14% interest in return. Gaudina readily admitted that he had so represented but he took the position that this was the information he had been given by Bromley and that he did not know the information to be false.
In addition, he left various printed materials with the Habermans, some in elaborate format which glowingly set out the “IMPORTANT BENEFITS YOU ENJOY
WHEN YOU CREATE A LIVING TRUST WITH HERITAGE TRUST COMPANY” by which “We design, install and take full responsibility for the administration of each plan and trust.” It was lavish in emphasizing:
“1. You add a margin of safety and protection for your investment because, as your trustee, Heritage Trust Company is responsible to you and the banking authorities who regulate us.
“2. Heritage Trust Company is licensed under the State of Arizona Banking Department, and, as such, conducts itself in the same manner as banks who maintain trust activities, and our
only
business is Trust.
“3. We have F.D.I.C. protection on cash in our depositary bank (Arizona Bank). “4. We have a million dollar fidelity bond on each employee.
“5. We have liability, and errors and omissions insurance.
“6. We are regularly examined by the State of Arizona bank examiners.” (Emphasis in original.)
The biography of Bromley, the company’s leader, which was included in the sales material and brochures set out an extensive and impressive banking and trust experience.
The Habermans warmed up to all this exposure. Having been persuaded, on September 26, 1973, they eagerly executed and delivered to Gaudina an impressive-appearing document entitled “REVOCABLE DECLARATION OF TRUST.” This form had been provided by Heritage and was referred to as an “inter vivos trust.” They concurrently paid over to Gaudina $18,-615.00 by check payable to Heritage Trust Company. They also, at a later time, transferred stock valued at about $36,000.00 to Heritage for their trust account. The last of the stock transfers was in November 1973. The Habermans received Heritage Trust receipts in acknowledgment of these deposits.
The bubble began to rupture on December 9,1974, when the Secretary of State for Wyoming issued and served a Cease and Desist Order upon Heritage Trust and Gaudina ordering them to immediately discontinue the offer and sale of securities of Heritage until they conformed to the requirements of the Wyoming Uniform Securities Act.
As pointed out by the trial judge in his Findings and Conclusions, this action was filed in 1975 and it “has ebbed and flowed in the backwaters of judicial administration and the shelves and files of attorney’s offices for more than 5 years and 5 months” at the district court level. We would add that the record presented a paper chase down a tortuous path with obstacles thrown up at every turn by the defendants.
The trial judge found, amongst other things, that the trust contracts were “securities” within the meaning of Wyoming’s Uniform Securities Act
and were not “exempted securities”; that Gaudina was an
agent of Heritage and Bromley, with Brom-ley the sole shareholder, owner and person in control of Heritage; that neither Gaudi-na nor Bromley were registered as agents
as required by the Wyoming Uniform Securities Act; that while neither Bromley or Gaudina committed common law fraud or conversion; “[t]he defendants have specifically violated the provisions of § 17.117.1 now § 17-4-101, W.S.; § 17.117.3 now [§] 17-4-103; and § 17.117.22 now § 17 — 4-112 [sic, should be 17-4-122], W.S.”
The trial judge went on to find and conclude that Gaudina in connection with the sale of securities to the Habermans “made untrue statements of material facts, although he did not know they were untrue at the time, but he did fail to state material facts with reference to the sale of the securities so as to make the totality of the statements made at that time misleading to the plaintiffs”; and that “Gaudina did not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know in the exercise of reasonable care of the untruth or omission of facts to the plaintiffs and Bromley, acting through his ‘agent’ Gaudina, is liable to the plaintiffs for the reason that he cannot hide behind the acts or omissions of Gaudina in this instance.”
We will add to this scenario as we pick our way through the issues.
I
There is no doubt that the investment document was a security. As explained in
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Heritage Trust Company,
supra fn. 4, in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s notes and mortgages taken by promoters in the sale of Arizona lots at high prices were peddled to unsuspecting and unworldly buyers. They were declared nonexempt securities early in the 1970’s. Bromley contrived the “inter vivos trust” document as a device to obtain funds which he in turn used to purchase such notes and mortgages. It was only a scheme to do indirectly what could not be done directly. Blue sky laws have as their primary purpose the suppression of fraudulent practices and the protection of the public from their own gullibility.
Lolkus v. Vander Wilt,
258 Iowa 1074, 141 N.W.2d 600 (1966).
Included in the exhibits is the Second Account and Report of the Receiver appointed by the Supreme Court of Arizona to take possession of the assets of the Heritage Trust Company, which set out how Bromley “invested” the money of trustors such as the Habermans. It was a devilish scheme that expanded into not only Arizona but also Indiana, Mexico, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, South Carolina, Texas, and probably other places. What is referred to as the Southwest Venture is particularly interesting and demonstrates the Heritage operation, as described by the Receiver:
“This ‘wraparound’ transaction occurred on February 27, 1974 and involved a series of sales of a parcel of property known as the W. G. Sawyer Tract located in Fort Bend County, Texas. The subject property was originally owned by one W. G. Sawyer, who sold his interests to John M. Stevenson, Jr., Trustee, for the sum of $811,543.34. Mr. Stevenson then immediately resold the same property to REACT Corporation, a Texas corporation, for $899,216.00. REACT Corporation in turn sold the property on the same date to Southwest Venture, a joint venture, acting through its managing venturers John M. Stevenson, Jr. and Leslie P. Saunders, and received a promissory note for the sales price of $1,116,000.00. REACT Corporation subsequently assigned and endorsed the promissory note payable to the order of Heritage Trust Company, as Trustee for the benefit of trustors whose funds contributed toward this investment.
“To finance this transaction, for payment of ‘fees’, ‘commissions’, ‘bonuses’, and incidental expenses, Heritage Trust Company extracted from certain trusts the total of $231,250.00. In keeping with its customary practice, Heritage then retained from this sum a 20% ‘commission’, which in this instance totaled $46,250.00. The
remaining $185,000.00 was forwarded to Houston to finance the necessary expenses. The records of Heritage Trust Company indicate that a portion of this amount was distributed from escrow as follows:
“Pavee and Purpose Amount
“Heritage Trust Company
(Prepaid Interest) $37,000.00
REACT Corporation (Commission) $21,175.00
REACCO Corporation (Commission) $31,762.00
Abraxas Land Corporation
(Real estate commission) $54,883.00
Pickfair Corporation
(Purpose unknown) $ 7,562.50
Rosenberg Abstract Company
(Survey) $ 2,394.56
Stewart Title Company (Closing fees) $ 1,056.24“
No payments were ever made on the promissory note, and Heritage was unable to pay the underlying lienholder, Sawyer, with a first mortgage; so he foreclosed. There was, as usual, nothing left for the trust. Many of such transactions appear in the Receiver’s report. Repeatedly, REACT or another company by the name of REACCO was a party — sometimes both — to the “wraparound” sales. Heritage was taking second and third mortgages to secure its financial participation in such transactions, using the trustor’s money including that invested by the Habermans, skimming off a twenty percent fee for itself — actually Bromley.
Section 17-117.13(k), W.S.1957, C.1965, now § 17 — 4-113(xi), W.S.1977, fn. 5, defining securities is identical for our purposes to 15 U.S.C. 77b(l), § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.
The United States District Court in
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Heritage Trust Company,
supra fn. 4, held the “inter vivos trust” agreements to be securities, relying on
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner, Enterprises, Inc.,
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert, denied 414 U.S. 821, 94 S.Ct. 117, 38 L.Ed.2d 53, wherein it was said:
“The 1933 and 1934 Acts are remedial legislation among the central purposes of which is full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of securities,
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
1946, 328 U.S. 293, 299, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 90 L.Ed. 1244;
Tcherepnin v. Knight,
1967, 389 U.S. 332, 337, 88 S.Ct. 548, 19 L.Ed.2d 564. It is a familiar canon of legislative construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly,
Tcherepnin v. Knight,
supra, 389 U.S. at 337, 88 S.Ct. 548 [at 553]. The Acts were designed to protect the American public from speculative or fraudulent schemes of promoters. For that reason Congress defined the term ‘security’ broadly, and the Supreme Court in turn has construed the definition liberally. In
SEC v. Joiner Corp.,
1943, 320 U.S. 344, 64 S.Ct. 120, 88 L.Ed. 88, the Court stated: ‘However, the reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reached if it be proved as matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as “investment contracts,” or as “any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’ ”.’ 320 U.S., Id. at 351, 64 S.Ct. at 123. In
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
supra, the Court stated that the definition of a security ‘embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.’ 328 U.S. Id. at 299, 66 S.Ct. at 1103. And in the recent case of
Tcherepnin v. Knight,
supra, the Court stated, ‘[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the word “security” in the Act, form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality.’ Id. at 336, 88 S.Ct. at 553. * * * ” (Footnotes omitted.) 474 F.2d at 480-481.
See in addition,
Melton v. Unterreiner,
575 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1978) also involving Heritage against another of its agents. The
Uniform Securities Act has been interpreted in the same light.
Department of Commerce v. DeBeers Diamond Investment Ltd.,
89 Mich.App. 406, 280 N.W.2d 547 (1979);
Sauve v. K.C., Inc.,
91 Wash.2d 698, 591 P.2d 1207 (1979).
Gaudina claims that it was not determined until 1975 when
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Heritage Trust Company,
supra, was decided that these particular “inter vivos trust” documents were declared securities. However it was long the law, set out in
Securities and Exchange Commission
v.
W. J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 90 L.Ed. 1244,163 A.L.R. 1043 (1946), cited by the court in
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Heritage Trust Company,
supra, and
Melton v. Un-terreiner,
supra, that the test for determining whether an agreement was an “investment contract” under the statute is found within the following definition:
“ * * * [A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party * * *.” 328 U.S. at 298-299, 66 S.Ct. at 1103.
That definition fits the “inter vivos trust” agreement here like a glove. This criteria has been adopted by states for application to the same term appearing in § 401 of the Uniform Securities Act, (§ 17-117.13(k), W.S.1957, C.1965, now § 17-4r-113(xi), W.S. 1977) supra, fn. 5.
State v. Duncan,
Mont., 593 P.2d 1026 (1979);
Department of Commerce v. DeBeers Diamond Investment,
supra.
State, Commissioner of Securities v. Hawaii Market Center,
52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105, 47 A.L.R.3d 1366 (1971) applies the rule even more broadly.
Sauve v. K. C., Inc.,
supra;
AMR Realty v. State Bureau of Securities,
149 N.J.Super. 329, 373 A.2d 1002 (1977).
In
Marshall v. Harris,
276 Or. 447, 555 P.2d 756 (1976) it was held that an agreement purchasing an interest in two race horses was an “investment contract” and the transaction was a sale of a security under the Oregon Securities Law; the
Howey
definition which we adopt was approved. The person making the sale was not the owner of the horses. The court there stated that knowledge by the person making the sale that there was a violation was not a necessary element of liability because otherwise evasion of the statute would be easily accomplished and thereby deprive it of much of its effect. Referring to other Oregon authority, it quoted, there is “a class of gentlemen * * * [who] ‘toil not neither do they spin’” but who “lie awake nights endeavoring to conceive some devious and shadowy way of evading the law.” The aim the court pointed out is to construe the securities law liberally so as to afford the greatest possible protection to the public.
When Gaudina or any other person undertakes to sell an investment, he is obligated to know the law surrounding such transactions and what is and what is not a security. It has long been a basic precept that ignorance of the law is no excuse. It would be impossible to administer the securities act if ignorance of its requirements and the surrounding case law were a defense.
Utermehle v. Norment,
197 U.S. 40, 55, 25 S.Ct. 291, 296, 49 L.Ed. 655, 661 (1905).
Gaudina claims that the securities of the Heritage Trust Company are exempt in that it is a trust company within the purview of § 17-117.14(a)(3), W.S.1957, C.1965, now § 17-4~114(a)(iii), W.S.1977, as it existed prior to amendment in 1975, fn. 3:
“(a) The following securities are exempted from sections 7 and 15 [§§ 17-117.7 and 17-117.15]:
* * * * * *
“(3) any security issued by a state or national bank or trust company authorized to do business in the state.”
The language of the original act, as adopted in 1965 and in effect until 1975 when only
the words “or trust company” were removed, is different from § 402(a)(3) of the Uniform Securities Act, 7A ULA 638, the source, which exempts:
“(3) [any security issued by] and
representing an interest in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, any
bank
organized under the laws of the United States, or any
[a state or national] bank,
savings institution,
or trust company
organized and supervised under the laws of any
[authorized to do business in the state].” (Emphasis added to words in the Uniform Act not in the Wyoming Act. Bracketed words appear in the Wyoming Act.)
By changing the words “any state” to “the state,” a legislative intent was manifested to confine the section to trust companies authorized to do business
in the state
of Wyoming. By changing the language of the uniform act there is an analogy to what this court has articulated on several occasions with respect to legislative amendment of an existing statute. In such case, it is presumed that a change was intended.
State ex rel. Albany County Weed and Pest District v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Albany,
Wyo., 592 P.2d 1154 (1979). We endeavor to make such change effective.
Brown v. State,
Wyo., 590 P.2d 1312 (1979). The change is therefore that for application of the exemption, banks and trust companies must be authorized to do business in the state of Wyoming.
The transactions in question took place September through November, 1973, prior to issuance by the Secretary of State of a certificate of authority issued to Heritage on June 26, 1974, “pursuant to the provisions of the Wyoming Business Corporation Act.”
The conclusion must be that the securities of Heritage were not authorized for sale as exempt under the laws of Wyoming at the time of these transactions.
We will go on to add that the name Heritage Trust Company alone does not qualify the company as a trust company exempt under § 17-117.14(a)(3), W.S.1957, C.1965 before amendment by § 1, ch. 66, S.L.Wyo.1975, which eliminated the securities of a trust company as exempt. The term trust company is not defined by the Uniform Securities Act.
We can only conclude that it refers to the type of trust company authorized by § 13-5-101, et seq., W.S.1977. We see no authority of a trust company to issue securities such as the “inter vivos trust” document issued here.
Inherent in the definition of a trust company is the fact that there are well defined fiduciary duties which must be performed in the administration of a trust. The so-called trust document here provides that the trustee, Heritage, “shall have the full power in its absolute discretion * * * (a) to sell, redeem, transfer, exchange, invest or reinvest any property belonging to the Trust Estate
irrespective of any rule of law governing investments by fiduciaries”!
(Emphasis added.) It is apparent that Heritage, in selling these “trusts” with the exclusion of any fiduciary duties, could not qualify as a trust company under the trust company
laws of this state. It is unthink
able that a trustee not have the obligations of a fiduciary. See Uniform Fiduciaries Act; § 4-1-101, et seq., W.S.1977. A trustee cannot by agreement escape the fiduciary obligations of a trustee under Wyoming statutory provisions. Heritage was therefore not a bona fide trust company.
II
It is the assertion of Gaudina that he sustained his burden of proof that he did not know in the exercise of reasonable care of the untruth or omission of material facts. This burden is placed upon any person who sells a security by § 17-117.22(a)(2), W.S. 1957, C.1965, now § 17-4-122(a)(ii), W.S. 1977. The Supreme Court of the United States has approved this shifting of the burden under the federal act.
Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427, 431, 74 S.Ct. 182, 184, 98 L.Ed. 168, 173 (1953). However, it does not make any difference whether he knew the truth of the statements he made.
Gaudina was a person unlawfully acting as an agent in the sale of unexempt securities and had not registered as such an agent as required by § 17-117.3, W.S.1957, C.1965, now § 17 — 4-103, W.S.1977, supra fn. 7. This automatically made him civilly liable under § 17-U7.22(a)(l), W.S.1957, C.1965, now § 17-4-122(a)(i), W.S.1977, fn. 7. The various unlawful acts creating civil liability are in the alternative, as underscored. Gaudina was a person who sold nonexempt, unregistered securities in violation of § 17-117.7, W.S.1957, C.1965, now § 17-4-107, W.S.1977. This also automatically created civil liability under § 17-117.-22(a)(1), W.S.1957, C.1965, now § 17-4-122(a)(i), W.S.1977.
In
Cola v. Terzano,
129 N.J.Super. 47, 322 A.2d 195 (1974) it was held that the state’s Uniform Securities Law was intended to protect the uninitiated and to prevent fraud on the public. All who participated in the sale of an unregistered security, including the salesman, have a civil liability: An agent is charged with knowledge of the registration requirements and liable for his assistance in the distribution of unregistered securities. The court held that it is clear that liability attaches “by operation of law” to the sale by any person of any nonexempt, unregistered security and gives rise to a cause of action against all those who participated in the sale.
Recovery under the Uniform Securities Act does not depend upon a showing of a seller’s consciousness of the falsity of the material misrepresentations he makes.
Bradley v. Hullander,
272 S.C. 6, 249 S.E.2d 486, 499 (1978). Agents are charged with knowledge of registration requirements and there is a duty not to assist unlawful sales; civil liability follows as a matter of course.
Young v. Kwock,
52 Haw. 273,474 P.2d 285, 44 A.L.R.3d 582 (1970);
Giordano v. Auditore,
355 Mass. 254, 244 N.E.2d 555 (1969);
Miller v. Griffith,
Ohio, 196 N.E.2d 154 (1961). Liability under the Connecticut Blue Sky Laws, similar to our securities law, for sale of unregistered securities rests on the sale itself and knowledge of the fraud or good faith is immaterial.
Moerman v. Zipco, Inc.,
302 F.Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y.1969), aff’d 422 F.2d 871 (1970).
We need go no further in the consideration of this question. Section 17-117.-22(a)(2), W.S.1957, C.1965, now § 17-4-122(a)(ii), W.S.1977, pertaining to ignorance of the untruth of material facts, applies to situations regardless of whether the security is registered, exempted, or sold in violation of the registration requirements. 7A U.L.A. 671-672, Commissioners’ Note. We need not reach these matters.
The only facts necessary are that a security was sold, that it was unregistered, and that it was not exempt. Here the security was not only unregistered but it was also sold by an unregistered agent, which also creates civil liability without more.
Ill
Gaudina claims that the trial court in the award of judgment should have set
off the value of property still held by the Habermans. The testimony and exhibits disclose that one of the investments made by Heritage was the purchase of four unimproved, one and one-half acre lots with no water in a subdivision out in the middle of some of the nowhere of Arizona, twelve miles out of Elkhorn. The Habermans’ trust account was charged $4,500.00 for one and $6,000.00 for each of the other three, for a total of $22,500.00, subject to a first mortgage of an Arizona bank. They each apparently have a value of $800.00 if free and clear but are subject to a mortgage of $3,500.00 against each, $2,700.00 more than they were worth. Though the figure does not appear to be exact, the Habermans received about $1,000.00 from Heritage by way of interest. They have lost the entirety of their principal. Under the clear provision of § 17-117.22(a), W.S.1957, C.1965, now § 17-4-122(a), W.S.1977, $1,000.00 must be deducted from that part of the judgment allowing 6% statutory interest. The statute provides for “less the amount of any income received on the security.”
IV
Gaudina asks whether there was sufficient evidence to support the judgment against him. As set out in Parts I and II of this opinion, all the evidence necessary to create civil liability under the Wyoming Uniform Securities Act was present. Gaud-ina’s admissions dissipated any conflict in the evidence.
V
Gaudina’s final claim is that the district court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Gaudina’s motion to dismiss after remand by this court as an outcome of the first appeal. Gaudina argues that since the case was remanded on September 21, 1978 (the mandate of this court is dated September 19, 1978), his motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute the case filed on August 24, 1979 should have been granted, citing Rule 14, Uniform District Court Rules and Rule 41(b), W.R.C.P.
It should be noted that the language of the rules cited is expressed as permissive rather than mandatory. The record discloses that some four years of delay had been created by Bromley and Gaudina through failure to appear for the taking of depositions and their judge shopping for continuances of various procedural events set for hearing. It appears that the district judge, who usually presided over this case, closely controls his own docket without prodding by counsel and assumed responsibility for the delay in question because following remand by this court the clerk of the district court inadvertently placed the case in the records of closed cases and its pendency was not called to his attention. In the light of those preceding events, the motion to dismiss was denied for what we see as a decision based upon what the presiding judge considered an injustice to the Habermans, if he should do otherwise. Additionally, courts favor a policy of disposition of cases on their merits. 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 2370, pp. 216-17. Gaudina makes no showing of prejudice. The remedy of involuntary dismissal under the circumstances here rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson’s, Inc.,
416 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1969).
We wish it understood, however, that this court by its ruling on this issue in this case does not intend to in any way abrogate the power of trial courts, acting on their own initiative or upon motion of a party to clear their calendars of cases that
have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of parties seeking relief.
Link v. Wabash Railroad Company,
370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). Involuntary dismissal requires a weighing of circumstances and judicial policies.
Affirmed, except that the district court is instructed to deduct $1,000.00 from the allowance of 6% statutory interest and amend its judgment accordingly.
