Gatsas v. Manchester School

2007 DNH 010

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: January 25, 2007
• Docket: 05-CV-315-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

Gatsas v . Manchester School 05-CV-315-SM 01/25/07 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Katherine Gatsas, Plaintiff

v. Civil N o . 05-cv-315-SM Opinion N o . 2007 DNH 010 Manchester School District also known as School Administrative Unit N o . 3 7 , Defendant

O R D E R

Plaintiff moves for partial reconsideration of the court’s

order of November 7 , 2006, granting in part, and denying in part,

defendant’s motion for summary judgment (document n o . 3 0 ) .

Specifically, plaintiff urges the court to reconsider its

judgment in favor of the defendant with respect to the state

disparate treatment claim under New Hampshire Rev. Stat. Ann.

(“RSA”) 354-A (Count II) and on the retaliation claim (Count

III).

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is granted as to

Count II and denied as to Count III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that summary judgment on Count II was

improperly granted in favor of the defendant because RSA 354-A

provides for a private right of action for unlawful

discrimination beyond the administrative procedure established by

that statute, provided certain procedural conditions are

satisfied. She is correct. See RSA 354-A:21-a; Perrotti-Johns

v . Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 DNH 7 9 , *16 (D.N.H. July 1 1 ,

2006); Struffolino v . McCoy, 2004 DNH 1 7 4 , *3 (D.N.H. November

3 0 , 2004); Munroe v . Compaq Computer Corp., 2002 DNH 186, *31

(D.N.H. October 1 8 , 2002). Specifically, RSA 354-A:21-a now

provides, in pertinent part, that

[a]ny party alleging to be aggrieved by any practice made unlawful under this chapter may, at the expiration of 180 days after the timely filing of a complaint with the commission, or sooner if the commission assents in writing, but not later than 3 years after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, bring a civil action for damages or injunctive relief or both, in the superior court for the county in which the alleged unlawful practice occurred or in the county of residence of the party.

Because plaintiff satisfied the procedural prerequisite of filing

this case more than 180 days after she filed her complaint with

2 the New Hampshire Commission for Civil Rights,1 she is entitled

to pursue the state claim.

Further, an unlawful discriminatory practice under New

Hampshire includes those “[p]ractices prohibited by the federal

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.” RSA 354-A:2 XV(b). The

analysis necessary to adjudicate the Title VII claim is thus

identical to that necessary to consider the state claim. As

described in its previous order, there is a genuine dispute of

material fact as to the District’s motivation in denying Gatsas

the interim position, and accordingly, the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment as to Count I was denied.

Defendant concedes that the legislature created a private

right of action when it amended RSA ch. 351-A, but opposes the

motion for reconsideration on grounds that it was filed one day

late and that plaintiff cannot “recover twice” for the same cause

of action wearing two hats. The motion for reconsideration does

not appear to have been tardy, but, in any event, no prejudice

resulted. The error of law is clear, and while plaintiff cannot

1 Plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination was filed with the New Hampshire Commission on or about April 1 4 , 2003, (Writ ¶ 7 ) , and this suit was originally filed in state court on August 4 , 2005.

3 recover twice, she is entitled to recover damages under the state

statute that are not permitted under federal law. Because the

state statute provides for a private right of action, and because

the standards for the federal and state claims are identical,

upon reconsideration, defendant’s motion for summary judgment as

to Count II is also denied.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion for partial reconsideration (document no.

31) is granted in part and denied in part. As to Count II, the

court grants plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and, upon

reconsideration, denies defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

thereby reinstating Count II. As to Count III, the court denies

the motion for reconsideration and the court’s previous order

stands.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe /Chief Judge

January 25, 2007

cc: Leslie H. Johnson, Esq. Kathleen C. Peahl, Esq.