Gates v. New York Life Insurance

Michigan Court of Appeals

Gates v. New York Life Insurance

174 N.W.2d 862, 21 Mich. App. 21, 1969 Mich. App. LEXIS 776

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedDecember 10, 1969

DocketDocket 5,198

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 174 N.W.2d 862 (Gates v. New York Life Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gates v. New York Life Insurance, 174 N.W.2d 862, 21 Mich. App. 21, 1969 Mich. App. LEXIS 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).

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Opinions

Danhof, J.

Plaintiffs commenced suit against defendant insurance company, as beneficiaries of a life [25]*25insurance policy on the life of the deceased, alleging that the death of the insured, their, son, was “accidental” under the terms of the insurance ■ policy, and therefore, they were entitled to an additional $5,000 arising out of the double indemnity provisions of the policy. It is to be noted that the defendant company before the institution of the suit paid the face amount of the policy which was $5,000.

A jury trial was commenced in Benzie county circuit court by the plaintiffs. At the close.of the plaintiffs’ proofs, a directed verdict was entered, in favor of the defendant. A motion for a new trial was made and denied, and from this denial the plaintiffs appeal.

On appeal all testimony must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. A review of the record discloses there was no error committed in granting the directed verdict. Since this was an action to recover the double indemnity benefits under the policy the burden of proving that the death of the assured was accidental rested on the plaintiffs, see Dimmer v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York (1938), 287 Mich 168; Turner v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association (1946), 316 Mich 6. The standard in this state is whether the death of the deceased was accidental, unforeseen, involuntary or unexpected, that is, not according to the usual course of things, or not as expected; and if a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means or accidental death. Turner, supra. Also, Furbush v. Maryland Casualty Co.. (1902), 131 Mich 234. See also Hooper v. State Mutual Life Assurance Company of Worcester, Massachusetts (1947), 318 Mich 384, which case quotes with approval Furbush, supra, stating on p 391,

[26]*26“It is a well established rule that where insured is intentionally injured by another, and the injury is not the result of misconduct or an assault by the insured, but is unforeseen insofar as he is concerned, the injury is accidental within the meaning of accident policies.” (Emphasis supplied.)

It is obvious from the record that the plaintiffs had not sustained the burden of proof required of them. The deceased, knowing full well that he was wanted by law enforcement officers, armed himself, and put into operation the sequence of events which resulted in his death. It is clear that his death was not an unforeseen or unexpected happening; to the contrary, it was quite predictable that great bodily injury or death will result from such activity. Accordingly, the death of the deceased was not accidental.

Nor do we think that the court erred in refusing to allow the out-of-court statement of officer Alear to be introduced as substantive evidence. It is well established that prior inconsistent statements of a witness can be used only to attack the credibility of that witness. See Rosenberg v. Mageda (1930), 251 Mich 696; Gabrish v. Morse (1960), 361 Mich 39.

Affirmed, costs to the appellee.

Holbrook, J. concurred.

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Danhof, J.

Plaintiffs commenced suit against defendant insurance company, as beneficiaries of a life [25]*25insurance policy on the life of the deceased, alleging that the death of the insured, their, son, was “accidental” under the terms of the insurance ■ policy, and therefore, they were entitled to an additional $5,000 arising out of the double indemnity provisions of the policy. It is to be noted that the defendant company before the institution of the suit paid the face amount of the policy which was $5,000.

A jury trial was commenced in Benzie county circuit court by the plaintiffs. At the close.of the plaintiffs’ proofs, a directed verdict was entered, in favor of the defendant. A motion for a new trial was made and denied, and from this denial the plaintiffs appeal.

On appeal all testimony must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. A review of the record discloses there was no error committed in granting the directed verdict. Since this was an action to recover the double indemnity benefits under the policy the burden of proving that the death of the assured was accidental rested on the plaintiffs, see Dimmer v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York (1938), 287 Mich 168; Turner v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association (1946), 316 Mich 6. The standard in this state is whether the death of the deceased was accidental, unforeseen, involuntary or unexpected, that is, not according to the usual course of things, or not as expected; and if a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means or accidental death. Turner, supra. Also, Furbush v. Maryland Casualty Co.. (1902), 131 Mich 234. See also Hooper v. State Mutual Life Assurance Company of Worcester, Massachusetts (1947), 318 Mich 384, which case quotes with approval Furbush, supra, stating on p 391,

[26]*26“It is a well established rule that where insured is intentionally injured by another, and the injury is not the result of misconduct or an assault by the insured, but is unforeseen insofar as he is concerned, the injury is accidental within the meaning of accident policies.” (Emphasis supplied.)

It is obvious from the record that the plaintiffs had not sustained the burden of proof required of them. The deceased, knowing full well that he was wanted by law enforcement officers, armed himself, and put into operation the sequence of events which resulted in his death. It is clear that his death was not an unforeseen or unexpected happening; to the contrary, it was quite predictable that great bodily injury or death will result from such activity. Accordingly, the death of the deceased was not accidental.

Nor do we think that the court erred in refusing to allow the out-of-court statement of officer Alear to be introduced as substantive evidence. It is well established that prior inconsistent statements of a witness can be used only to attack the credibility of that witness. See Rosenberg v. Mageda (1930), 251 Mich 696; Gabrish v. Morse (1960), 361 Mich 39.

Affirmed, costs to the appellee.

Holbrook, J. concurred.

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174 N.W.2d 862, 21 Mich. App. 21, 1969 Mich. App. LEXIS 776, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gates-v-new-york-life-insurance-michctapp-1969.

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