Gates v. Chicago, St. Paul & Kansas City Railway Co.

48 N.W. 1040, 82 Iowa 518
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedMay 21, 1891
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 48 N.W. 1040 (Gates v. Chicago, St. Paul & Kansas City Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gates v. Chicago, St. Paul & Kansas City Railway Co., 48 N.W. 1040, 82 Iowa 518 (iowa 1891).

Opinion

GiveN, J.

The petition shows that plaintiff is the owner of two lots on the corner of Sixth and Franklin streets in the city of Waterloo, upon which lots are two dwelling-houses; that the defendant located and constructed its railroad diagonally across Franklin street at an angle of ninety-seven degrees, and that in constructing the same an embankment was made about five feet above the established grade of Franklin street. That in constructing a crossing over said embankment, for the travel on Franklin street, the defendant filled in along said street in front of the plaintiff’s property for a distance of about fifty-four feet, thus forming an incline in front of plaintiff’s property from the grade of the street to about four feet above. That, while no part of the railroad or the embankments or fills touch upon the plaintiff’s property, nor does said property abut upon any part of Franklin street covered' by the upper portions of the embankment and the ties and rails thereon, it does abut upon that part of Franklin street that would have been covered by the lower part of the embankment had it been constructed without an approach, and of the usual width, and does abut upon that part of Franklin street covered by the foot of the embankment and the fill for the crossing as constructed. The plaintiff alleges that because of such location and construction and the operation of the railroad he is damaged, and that the defendant did not [525]*525cause the injuryto.be compensated, wherefore he asks to recover. The grounds of demurrer are that the facts stated do not constitute a cause of action against the defendant, and for the reason that the law made it incumbent upon the defendant to construct the crossing.

I. It is claimed in support of the demurrer that under section 1262 of the Code the railroad may be constructed ' wJupati’.n of cm^ing: damage». across a street without the consent of the city or town, and without becoming liable to abutting lot-owners under section 454 Section 464 of the Code declares that cities “shall have the power to authorize or forbid the location or laying down of tracks for railways or street railways on all streets, alleys and public places; but no railway track can thus be located and laid down until after the injury to the property abutting upon the street, alley or public places upon which said railroad is proposed to be located has been ascertained and compensated ” in the manner provided by law. Code, section 1262, provides that any railroad company “may raise or lower any highway for the purpose of having its railway cross over or under the same.” It will be noticed that compensation is only provided for injury to the property that abuts upon the street upon which the railroad track has been or is proposed to be located. In Morgan v. Railroad, 64 Iowa, 589, it was held that this provision only applies to property that abuts upon the portion of the street occupied by the track. The evident purpose of section 464 is to give to towns and cities the control of their streets, as against the occupation thereof by railroad tracks longitudinally thereon, and to provide compensation to owners of jjroperty abutting upon the part of a street, etc., that has been or is to be occupied by a railroad track to the damage of the property. Ordinarily a track crossing a street does not occupy any part of that street in front of property abutting upon it, and in such case there is clearly no liability. It is equally clear that when the track occupies the street longitudinally there is abutting property and liability for damage [526]*526thereto. If the track crosses the street at such an angle as that property does not abut upon it, there is no liability; but if it crosses at such an angle as to occupy any part of the street in front of property abutting upon it, this is an occupation longitudinally. Enos v. Railroad, 78 Iowa, 28. We are clearly of the opinion that the city or town may authorize or forbid such a crossing, and that the company is liable for damages to abutting property. Whether cities and towns may forbid a crossing made at such an angle as that there is no abutting property we do not determine, as the question is not necessarily involved in this case.

II. Section 1262 of the Code provides that any railroad company “may raise and lower any * * * highway for the purpose of having its railroad cross over or under the same ; and in such cases said corporation shall put such highway, as soon as may be, in as good repair and condition as before such alteration.” The appellee contends that under this authority it may locate and lay down its track across streets, etc., without permission from the city or town. As said in Enos v. Railroad, supra, the necessity for giving the cities and towns power to prevent the occupation of their streets longitudinally is obvious. Those reasons, however, do not apply with equal force to the crossing of streets in a way that does not occupy in front of property abutting upon them. It is a well-known fact that to occupy a street longitudinally does interfere with public travel, even to the extent sometimes of totally preventing it, and that the railroad crossing does not hinder travel to such an extent. Considering these two sections together as they now stand, their amendment by the same general assembly, and the reasons for the amendments and for the law as it now is, we are led to the conclusion that cities and incorporated towns have not the power to forbid the location and laying down of railroad tracks across their streets, but may forbid the location and laying down of such tracks when they occupy the street in front of property abutting thereon to the damage of the property. To hold that [527]*527cities and towns may forbid any crossing of their streets with railroad tracks would put it in their power to prevent the construction of railroads into or through their limits. With the right to cross streets so as not to occupy them in front of property abutting thereon a railroad company may, by acquiring right of way between streets to be crossed, construct its road into or through a city without its permission. If it may not cross streets without permission, then it may be entirely barred from entering or passing through the city, to the prejudice of other parts of the country. Surely such a power was never intended. It is said this may be safely left fco cities, and that their anxiety for railroads win prevent any abuse of the power ; but this does not argue against the unreasonableness of such a power, nor put words into the statute that would confer it.

III. According to the petition, the track crosses Franklin street at an angle of ninety-seven degrees,— an angle varying but seven degrees from a right angle. It cannot be said from the angle alone that the track occupies any part of the street abutted by plaintiff’s property. It does appear that the embankment upon which the ties and rails are laid does occupy a part of Franklin street, upon which plaintiff’s property abuts. Question is made whether the embankment is included in the words “ railway track,” as used in section 464. The damage allowed is not that- caused by the laying down of the rails and ties, but for the location and construction of the railroad.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Irwin v. Smith
1975 OK CIV APP 6 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 1975)
New York Central Railroad v. Verpleatse
59 N.E.2d 916 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1945)
Interurban Railway Co. v. City of Des Moines
197 Iowa 1398 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1922)
Durham v. . Public Service Co.
109 S.E. 40 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1921)
City of Durham v. Durham Public Service Co.
182 N.C. 333 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1921)
Wulke v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co.
189 Iowa 722 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1920)
White v. Chicago G. W. R.
246 F. 427 (Eighth Circuit, 1917)
Attorney General ex rel. Brotherton v. Common Council
148 Mich. 71 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1907)
Mattice v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co.
107 N.W. 949 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1906)
Middleton v. Mason City & Fort Dodge Railroad
103 N.W. 364 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1905)
Morgan v. Des Moines Union Railway Co.
85 N.W. 902 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1901)
Dairy v. Iowa Central Railway Co.
84 N.W. 688 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1900)
Hitchcock v. Chicago, St. Paul & Kansas City Railway Co.
55 N.W. 337 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1893)
City of Fort Dodge v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co.
87 Iowa 389 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1893)
Nicks v. Chicago, St. Paul & Kansas City Railway Co.
50 N.W. 222 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1891)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
48 N.W. 1040, 82 Iowa 518, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gates-v-chicago-st-paul-kansas-city-railway-co-iowa-1891.