City of Fort Dodge v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co.

87 Iowa 389
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedJanuary 28, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 87 Iowa 389 (City of Fort Dodge v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Fort Dodge v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co., 87 Iowa 389 (iowa 1893).

Opinion

Robinson, C. J.

— The plaintiff is a municipal corporation duly organized under the laws of this state. Mitchell’s subdivision of block 142 of the Town Com[391]*391pany addition to the town of Ft. Dodge was surveyed and platted in the year 1867. One of the streets included in the plat is Warren street. It extends from Bntterworth street, on the east, westward across Lemp street, to Sixth street, and is further north than any other street which extends from east to west in that part of the city. In the year 1881 the defendant, the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company, a corporation, made an excavation across Warren street, from a point north of it, in a direction west of south. The excavation was about sixteen feet in depth, and nearly seventy feet in width, and through it were laid several tracks of the railway company. The plaintiff asked that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue, and that the defendants be required to construct forthwith a safe and sufficient crossing over and across the excavation in Warren street.

On the twenty-eighth day of June, 1888, in an action then pending in the district court of Hennepin county, in the state of Minnesota, which had been brought by Henry Seibert, trustee, for the foreclosure of a mortgage on the property of the railway company, the company was decreed to be insolvent, and W. H. Truesdale was appointed receiver of all its property. On the same day, in an action then pending in the district court of Webster county, in this state, for the foreclosure of the same mortgage, in the name of the same trustee, Truesdale was duly appointed receiver of the property of the company in this state. He qualified and entered upon the discharge of his duties as receiver, and took possession of the railway property of the company, which he has been operating since the thirtieth day of June, 1888. The company and the receiver were made parties defendant. Seibert, as trustee, intervened, and joined the defendants in resisting the- demands of the plaintiff. The district court found that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief [392]*392demanded, and ordered the receiver to - construct a crossing, and to grade the approaches necessary to its use. It also ordered that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue against the defendants, commanding them to perform the requirements of the judgment.

' otS*' I. This action was commenced on the twentieth day of July, 1889. On the seventh day of October, 1890, the defendants filed their answers, and the intervenor his petition. On the next day the receiver filed a motion asking a continuance of the case until the action for the foreclosure of the mortgage, then pending in the same court, should be terminated, and, in case that should be found to be an insufficient ground, that the cause be continued until the deposition of the receiver could be taken, and until certain creditors could intervene. -The motion was overruled. No reason for a continuance until the foreclosure proceedings should be terminated was shown. The duty of the receiver to construct the crossing did not depend upon the decree which was asked for in that case. The fact which the receiver claims his deposition would show was that he had no funds with which to make the desired crossing. The allegation in regard to the creditors whose intervention was desired is to the effect that the receiver had been notified by counsel that they proposed to resist the expenditure which the crossing would make necessary. No reason for the failure to take the deposition in time for use at the trial was given, and the showing in regard to the purpose of the creditors to intervene was-altogether too indefinite and uncertain to require a continuance on that ground, even if it were conceded that they would have had a right to intervene, on the showing made. The motion was properly overruled.

[393]*3932- OTerheadS: cessftyfeví-” donoe. [392]*392II. The existence of Warren street as a public way at the time the excavation was made and the railway through it was constructed, is denied by the [393]*393appellants. The plat of Mitchell’s subdivision was filed for record about fourteen yearg pefore the excavation was made. The evidence justified the court in finding that the street had been dedicated to the public, and accepted and used for several years before that time, and that it was then a public street. The excavation prevents all travel between points east and points west of it on "Warren street. The evidence tends to show that it is a source of much trouble to the public, especially to people living on and near Warren street, and that, if a suitable crossing were made, it would be of great advantage to those people, and to the general public; thatthe amount of travel between the business and other portions of the city south of Warren street, and the country north of it, is large; that the railway crossing on Sixth street is especially dangerous for persons approaching it from the south; that the switching of cars in the vicinity of that crossing causes frequent delays to persons using Sixth street; and that the desired crossing would open a new route, which would enable persons who have occasion to go through that part of the city to avoid the danger and delays incident to the Sixth street crossing. The showing that the crossing is a public necessity fully sustains the finding of the district court to that effect.

It is said, however, that Warren street would not be in condition for travel if the crossing were built, for the reason that there is a steep hill in the east part of it, which is not practicable for loaded teams, and which would prevent a general use of the street until it is properly graded. That objection does not apply to the use of the street by citizens living on it who desire to pass to and from their homes, which are west of the hill and east of the excavation. Moreover, the evidence shows that a bridge has already been built over Soldier creek, opposite the west end of Warren street, with the [394]*394view to the construction of the crossing in question, and that the improvement of the street east of the crossing was suspended after the excavation was made, and because of it. The showing of good faith on the part of the city is ample to justify an order for the crossing before the hill is graded.

_._. isdiouon.3”' III. The petition did not describe the kind of crossing desired, and the appellants contend that the relief granted by the district court was not authorized by the pleadings. It should be remembered, in this connection, that this proceeding, although in form an action of mandamus, was instituted in the court which appointed the receiver for the property of the company ini this state, and which has authority to control his actions, and the property which is in his possession. If the pleadings and the evidence properly submitted show that the plaintiff was in fact entitled to the relief granted, it should not be defeated because the relief might have been obtained in a more summary and less formal manner. The pleadings were sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, and the proof showed that the desired crossing was a public necessity, and within the power of the court to order.

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Bluebook (online)
87 Iowa 389, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-fort-dodge-v-minneapolis-st-louis-railway-co-iowa-1893.