Gaspard v. United States

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedFebruary 14, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-01206
StatusUnknown

This text of Gaspard v. United States (Gaspard v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gaspard v. United States, (W.D. La. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

ALTUS GASPARD CASE NO. 2:19-CV-01206

VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

MEMORANDUM RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is a “Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404” (Rec. 17) wherein Defendants, James Wesley Richey, M.D. (“Dr. Richey”) and Alexandria Urology Associates, L.L. P. (“AUA”) move to transfer this lawsuit to the Alexandria Divison. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied. This lawsuit is brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff, Altus Gaspard is seeking to recover money damages allegedly cause by medical malpractice committed by employees of the United States of America, Department of Veterans Affairs, and Dr. Richey and Alexandria Urology Associates, L.L.P.1 Dr. Richey and AUA maintain that venue based on Mr. Gaspard’s residency is not proper citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).2 Dr. Richey and AUA argue that the lawsuit should be transferred to the Alexandria Division because it would be more convenient for the parties.

1 First Amended Complaint, Rec. 9. 2 (b) Venue in general.—A civil action may be brought in - - (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all the defendants are the residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. Dr. Richey and AUA are both domiciled in Rapides Parish, which sits in the Alexandria Division. Dr. Richey and AUA submit that the alleged acts of medical malpractice occurred

in Rapides Parish, thus an intradistrict transfer to the Alexandria Division is proper. Dr. Richey and AUA submit that pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), the Alexandria Division is proper because Mr. Gaspard’s alleged acts, event and omissions arise out of the medical treatment rendered by Dr. Richey and AUA. Dr. Richey and AUA also point out that the alleged acts of malpractice against the United States through the Veteran Affairs (“VA”) as well as Dr. Sudha Pillarisetti with the VA

also occurred in Rapides Parish at the Alexandria Veteran’s Affairs Health Care System located in Pineville, Louisiana. Dr. Richey and AUA rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) as authorization for the transfer. The venue transfer statute provides: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or

division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), venue may be transferred if the movant shows “good cause,” which means that a moving party, in order to support its claim for a transfer, must satisfy the statutory requirements and clearly demonstrate that a transfer is ‘[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.’ Thus, when the transferee venue is not clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s choice should be respected. In re Volkswagen of America, Inc. 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Section 1404 (b) authorizes transfer of a civil action to a different division within the same district

“in the discretion of the court” upon motion by a party. Mr. Gaspard, who opposes the motion to transfer, maintains that the Alexandria Division of the Western District is not “clearly more convenient” than the Lake Charles Division, noting that a majority of the witnesses either reside within or closer to the Lake Charles Division, than to the Alexandria Division. Mr. Gaspard remarks that the Fifth circuit has established a 100-mile threshold with respect to determining if the proposed

transferee venue is more convenient than the existing venue. “When the distance between an existing venue for trial of a matter and a proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more than 100 miles, the factor of inconvenience to witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional distance to be traveled.” In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d at 317. Mr. Gaspard informs the Court that Dr. Richey and AUA have conceded that their

office is located less than 100 miles from the federal courthouse in Lake Charles. Courts have refused to consider transfer where the is only a relatively short distance between the original forum and the proposed transferee forum. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 880 (3rd Cir. 1994) (citing 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER § 3854, at 470). Mr. Gaspard submits that his original primary care physician, Dr. Martha Hoag,

treated him at the VA hospital in Jennings, Louisiana; she subsequently referred him to Dr. Richey. The surgery (penectomy) to treat the undiagnosed cancer was performed in Houston, Texas. Mr. Gaspard remarks that Dr. Richey and AUA are the only defendant parties who complain of traveling to Lake Charles to try this case. Mr. Gaspard submits an affidavit to inform the Court of the witnesses, parties and their location in this matter: (1) Mr. Gaspard lives in Pitkin, Louisiana (Lake Charles, Division);3 (2) Ms. Gaspard, who takes care of Mr. Gaspard, lives in Pitkin (Lake Charles Division); (3) Dr. Hoag treated Mr. Gaspard at the Jennings VA Clinic (Lake Charles Division); (4) Dr. Navedo, who allegedly committed malpractice, treated Mr. Gaspard at the Fort Polk VA Clinic in Vernon Parish (Lake Charles Division); (5) Dr. Mejias-Velazquez treated Mr. Gaspard at the Folk Polk VA Clinic (Lake Charles Division); (6) Dr. Swain currently treats Mr. Gaspard at the Fort Polk VA Clinic (Lake Charles Division); (7) Dr. Hayes is a treating psychiatrist in Lake Charles, Louisiana (Lake Charles Division; (8) Dr. Taylor, Dr. Pan, Dr Rai, Dr. Norris, Dr. Gimeniz and Dr. Giridharan participated in the Mr. Gaspard’s surgery in Houston, Texas;4 (9) Mr. Gaspard continues to be treated with follow-up care at the VA Hospital in Houston, Texas.

Mr. Gaspard remarks that only Dr. Richey and Dr. Pillarisetti will benefit from a transfer to the Alexandria Division, noting that Dr. Pillarisetti is an employee of the United States, a party that has not objected to the Lake Charles Division venue. Thus, Mr. Gaspard argues that Dr. Richey and AUA have failed to establish that the Alexandria Division is “clearly more convenient” to the parties and the witnesses than the Lake Charles Division. Dr. Richey and AUA complain that Mr. Gaspard has failed to consider the complete analysis for venue transfer under Fifth Circuit precedent. Dr.

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Gaspard v. United States, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gaspard-v-united-states-lawd-2020.