Gary S. Blatt v. Department of the Army

2014 MSPB 65
CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 19, 2014
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2014 MSPB 65 (Gary S. Blatt v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gary S. Blatt v. Department of the Army, 2014 MSPB 65 (Miss. 2014).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 2014 MSPB 65

Docket No. AT-0752-13-7245-I-1

Gary S. Blatt, Appellant, v. Department of the Army, Agency. August 19, 2014

Gary S. Blatt, Columbia, South Carolina, pro se.

Eric J. Teegarden, Esquire, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman Mark A. Robbins, Member

OPINION AND ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision which sustained his removal. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and REVERSE the initial decision. The removal is NOT SUSTAINED.

BACKGROUND ¶2 The appellant was formerly employed as a GS-9 Physical Security Compliance Inspector, a position which required him to obtain and maintain a security clearance. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 59-65. By memorandum 2

of April 22, 2013, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DoDCAF or CAF), Army Division, notified the appellant of its intent to revoke his security clearance. Id. at 45-46. With the notice, the DoDCAF provided instructions for responding to the memorandum and a statement of reasons explaining the basis for the proposed revocation, 1 id. at 47-58, to which the appellant responded, id. at 32-44. On July 12, 2013, the DoDCAF advised the appellant that, although several matters at issue related to his personal conduct were mitigated by his response, he still posed a security concern and that his security clearance had been revoked. Id. at 28. On July 25, 2013, the agency proposed to remove the appellant for failure to maintain a condition of employment, specifically, a security clearance. Id. at 25-26. On August 22, 2013, the agency issued a decision that upheld the proposal, warranting the appellant’s removal, effective August 30, 2013. Id. at 16-17. The appellant elected to voluntarily retire that same day. Id. at 15. ¶3 On appeal, 2 the appellant challenged the removal on the basis that the agency had not yet made a final determination on his security clearance and that the matter was still under reconsideration. Id., Tab 1 at 5, 8. He requested a hearing. Id. at 2. Thereafter, the administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming the agency’s action. Id., Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 6. He found that: the agency had proven the charge, it had complied with the procedural requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) in implementing the action, and, in the absence of any evidence of an official agency policy regarding

1 The stated reasons were that, on a Standard Form 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, the appellant had answered “no” to questions regarding his financial record but he had delinquent debt. IAF, Tab 4 at 47. 2 Because the agency had already issued its decision to remove the appellant, the Board retained jurisdiction over that action, despite the appellant’s retirement. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(j); Mays v. Department of Transportation, 27 F.3d 1577, 1579-81 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 3

reassignment, the Board lacked authority to review the agency’s efforts, or lack thereof, to reassign the appellant. ID at 4. The administrative judge considered the appellant’s claim that the agency committed harmful error by not allowing him to pursue or complete additional agency processes to contest his security clearance revocation but found that he did not show that the agency erred or that any such error caused substantial prejudice to his rights. ID at 4 n.2. ¶4 On petition for review, the appellant argues that the agency failed to comply with its own procedures in effecting the action. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 6-10. The agency has responded in opposition to the appellant’s petition. Id., Tab 3.

ANALYSIS The appellant has shown good cause for the untimely filing of his petition for review. ¶5 The finality date of the initial decision was February 12, 2014. ID at 6. The appellant filed his petition for review on March 14, 2014. PFR File, Tab 1; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(l). He acknowledged its untimeliness but stated that he did not receive the January 8, 2013 initial decision until March 12, 2014, PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, explaining that the Board had sent it to an email account that is no longer in existence, that he only learned of it from a third party in the course of another matter, that he “frantically” called the regional office, that an employee mailed him a copy of the decision, and that, upon its receipt, he promptly filed the petition for review, id. at 1. The appellant provided evidence to show that, during the proceeding below, the administrative judge, in summarizing a telephonic status conference, noted the appellant’s statement that he had not received either of the Board’s orders due to his having erroneously registered as an e-filer using his former agency email address and that he wished to convert to being served by regular mail. The administrative judge granted the request. Id. at 2; IAF, Tab 8. Notwithstanding, the record reflects that the initial decision was served on the appellant by electronic mail. IAF, Tab 16. Under the circumstances, we find that 4

the appellant, who has at all times appeared pro se before the Board, acted with due diligence upon his actually receiving the initial decision, and that he has established good cause for the untimely filing of his petition for review. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(f); see Miller v. Department of the Army, 112 M.S.P.R. 689, ¶ 13 (2009).

The appellant has established harmful error by the agency in the application of its procedures. ¶6 Generally, in an appeal of an adverse action based on the denial or revocation of a security clearance, the Board may only review whether: (1) the employee’s position required a security clearance; (2) the clearance was denied or revoked; and (3) the employee was provided with the procedural protections specified in 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Hesse v. Department of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530-31 (1988)). Here, it is undisputed that the appellant’s position required a security clearance, that his clearance was revoked, and that the agency provided him the procedural protections required by statute. ¶7 However, section 7513 is not the only source of procedural protections for employees subject to adverse actions; agencies must also comply with the procedures set forth in their own regulations. Romero v. Department of Defense, 527 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under 5 U.S.C. § 7701

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Gary S. Blatt v. Department of the Army
2014 MSPB 65 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2014)

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2014 MSPB 65, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gary-s-blatt-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2014.