1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Gary L. Wagoner, No. CV-25-03701-PHX-MTL
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 FirstFleet Incorporated,
13 Defendant. 14 15 The matter before the Court is Defendant FirstFleet Incorporated’s (“FirstFleet”) 16 Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. (Doc. 35.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court 17 grants FirstFleet’s motion and sanctions pro se Plaintiff Gary Wagoner under the Court’s 18 inherent authority in the amount of $15,723.04, consisting of $14,560.40 in attorneys’ fees 19 and $1,162.64 in costs, to be paid by Wagoner to FirstFleet. 20 I 21 The Court set out the background of this case and Wagoner’s previous litigation 22 against FirstFleet in its order dismissing Wagoner’s claims. (See Doc. 30.) In short, 23 Wagoner has brought five lawsuits against FirstFleet: 24 The first lawsuit was adjudicated to finality by Senior District Judge James A. Teilborg, resulting in a judgment of dismissal for [FirstFleet]. See 25 Order of Dismissal and Judgment of Dismissal, Wagoner v. First Fleet Inc., 26 No. CV-22-00990-PHX-JAT (D. Ariz. Jan 19, 2023) (Doc. 18, 19) (hereinafter “Wagoner I”). 27 28 After voluntarily dismissing two other cases in this District, [Wagoner] filed a fourth lawsuit against FirstFleet concerning the [same] 1 claim. District Judge Diane J. Humetewa granted FirstFleet’s motion to dismiss for res judicata and, as a sanction, invited [FirstFleet] to file a motion 2 for attorneys’ fees. Order of Dismissal, Wagoner v. FirstFleet Inc., No. CV- 3 25-02349-DJH (D. Ariz. Nov. 14, 2025) (Doc. 41) (hereinafter “Wagoner IV”). 4 5 (Doc. 30 at 2.) 6 This is Wagoner’s fifth lawsuit. (Id.) This time, Wagoner brought suit on behalf of 7 a trust, which the Court found was Wagoner’s “attempt[] to circumvent [the identical 8 parties] factor [of res judicata].” (See id. at 3.) The Court granted FirstFleet’s motion to 9 dismiss, finding that all elements of res judicata were met and barred Wagoner’s claims. 10 (Id.) The Court further ordered that FirstFleet could move for attorneys’ fees and related 11 non-taxable expenses pursuant to LRCiv 54.2. (Id.) 12 FirstFleet filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 13 LRCiv 54.2, and the Court’s inherent authority. (Doc. 35.) FirstFleet seeks an award of 14 $25,407.74 in attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 1.) In his response, Wagoner opposes 15 FirstFleet’s request for fees and counter-requests fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132. (Doc. 36.) 16 Wagoner argues that his actions were not in bad faith because “[t]his suit presents fresh 17 evidence of ongoing breaches . . . proving it’s not frivolous.” (Id. at 2.) He also argues he 18 lacks the ability to pay any fee award. (Id. at 2-3.) 19 The Court set a hearing on FirstFleet’s motion. (Doc. 43.) Wagoner filed a motion 20 to continue the hearing, arguing that he was required to work on the day of the hearing to 21 meet his living expenses and attending the hearing would “create significant additional 22 financial hardship.” (Doc. 44.) The Court granted Wagoner’s motion and ordered him to 23 confer with FirstFleet as to availability to reschedule the hearing. (Doc. 45.) Wagoner 24 conferred with FirstFleet and informed the Court that both parties were available to attend 25 a hearing on the afternoon of June 9, 2026 or at any time on June 10, 2026. (Doc. 47.) 26 The Court thereafter rescheduled the hearing for June 9, 2026 at 1:30 p.m. (Doc. 27 48.) FirstFleet attended the hearing but Wagoner did not, despite informing the Court that 28 he would be available and having notice of the hearing. (See Doc. 49.) 1 II 2 A. 3 The Court first considers whether Wagoner should be sanctioned pursuant to 28 4 U.S.C. § 1927. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to 5 conduct cases in any court of the United States . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in 6 any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally 7 the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such 8 conduct.” An order of § 1927 sanctions “may be imposed upon a pro se plaintiff.” Wages 9 v. I.R.S., 915 F.2d 1230, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1990). To impose sanctions under § 1927, the 10 court must make a finding of bad faith, In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 11 436 (9th Cir. 1996), which occurs when a litigant “knowingly or recklessly raises a 12 frivolous argument or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an 13 opponent,” Est. of Blas v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 14 FirstFleet argues the Court should award fees under § 1927 because Wagoner, 15 “[r]ather than accept[ing] the rulings in Wagoner I and Wagoner III, [he] filed yet more 16 complaints, each of which FirstFleet had to remove to this Court and then defend.” (Doc. 17 35 at 5.) It further argues that “[e]ach successive filing has compounded the burden on both 18 FirstFleet and the Court.” (Id.) In essence, FirstFleet argues that Wagoner should be 19 sanctioned under § 1927 for bringing this action in the first place, but “sanctions under 28 20 U.S.C. § 1927 do not apply to complaints or initial pleadings.” De Dios v. Int’l Realty & 21 Invs., 641 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011). FirstFleet does not tie its request for sanctions 22 under § 1927 to any other filing by Wagoner in this action, nor does it argue that Wagoner 23 otherwise unreasonably litigated this action after it was filed. Because § 1927 does not 24 permit an award of fees for bringing an action—no matter how frivolous that action may 25 be—the Court may not award fees to FirstFleet under § 1927. See Keegan Mgmt., 78 F.3d 26 at 435 (“Because the section authorizes sanctions only for the multipli[cation of] 27 proceedings, it applies only to unnecessary filings and tactics once a lawsuit has begun. . . . 28 [Section] 1927 cannot be applied to an initial pleading.” (first alteration in original) 1 (quotation marks omitted)).1 2 B. 3 Although the Court may not award fees under § 1927, the Court finds that an award 4 of fees under its inherent authority is warranted in this action. See Keegan Mgmt., 78 F.3d 5 at 435 (“The filing of a complaint may be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 or a court’s 6 inherent power . . . .”). “Federal courts possess certain inherent powers, not conferred by 7 rule or statute, to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious 8 disposition of cases.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107 (2017) 9 (quotation marks omitted). To be sanctioned under the Court’s inherent authority “requires 10 a finding of bad faith.” In re DeVille, 361 F.3d 539, 548 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 11 “A finding of bad faith is warranted where [a party] knowingly or recklessly raises a 12 frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an 13 opponent.” Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 1997) 14 (quotation marks omitted). That other rules and statutes may support sanctions does not 15 “displace[] the inherent power to impose sanctions for bad faith conduct.” DeVille, 361 16 F.3d at 551. This inherent authority permits the Court to “fashion an appropriate sanction 17 for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Goodyear Tire, 581 U.S. at 107 (citation 18 omitted). Such an appropriate sanction may include attorneys’ fees. Am. Unites for Kids v. 19 Rousseau, 985 F.3d 1075, 1088 (9th Cir. 2021). 20 But this sanction “must be compensatory rather than punitive in nature,” so a “fee 21 award may go no further than to redress the wronged party for losses sustained.” Goodyear 22 Tire, 581 U.S. at 108 (quotation marks omitted). The Court may therefore “shift only those 23 attorney’s fees incurred because of the misconduct at issue,” so there must be a “causal
24 1 FirstFleet briefly mentions the amended complaint (Doc. 35 at 5), but it does not only request fees incurred due to or after Wagoner filed the amended complaint (see Doc. 35-1 25 at 4), which indicates to the Court that FirstFleet does not base its § 1927 request on the proceedings arising after the amended complaint was filed. Because “the conduct in 26 question must be sanctionable under the authority relied on,” Keegan Mgmt., 78 F.3d at 435 (citation omitted), and because FirstFleet did not indicate which fees and costs it 27 requested were traceable to the amended complaint specifically, see Rowland v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 142 F.4th 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2025), the 28 Court declines to award fees under § 1927 based on the proceedings arising out of the amended complaint. 1 link[] between the litigant’s misbehavior and legal fees paid by the opposing party.” Id. 2 Accordingly, if a defendant “would have incurred an expense in any event, he has suffered 3 no incremental harm from the frivolous claim, and so the court lacks a basis for shifting 4 the expense.” Id. at 109 (citation modified). That said, “[i]n exceptional cases, the but-for 5 standard even permits a trial court to shift all of a party’s fees, from either the start or some 6 midpoint of a suit, in one fell swoop.” Id. at 110. One such example is if “a plaintiff initiates 7 a case in complete bad faith, so that every cost of defense is attributable only to sanctioned 8 behavior, the court may . . . make a blanket award.” Id. 9 Here, the Court finds that this is an exceptional case warranting fees from the start 10 of the lawsuit because FirstFleet’s fees “would not have been incurred except for the 11 misconduct” of Wagoner filing this lawsuit. Id. at 111; see also Lu v. United States, 921 12 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2019) (“This exceptional case rule is consistent with . . . prior cases 13 holding that where the entirety of the action is attributable to bad faith abuse of the judicial 14 process, a district court can award fees for the entire course of litigation, so long as all fees 15 are in some way traceable to bad faith activity.” (quotation marks omitted)). The Court 16 finds that Wagoner brought this lawsuit in bad faith because he recklessly (if not 17 knowingly) brought these claims that had already been dismissed with prejudice and 18 therefore were subject to claim preclusion. In Wagoner IV, FirstFleet argued in its motion 19 to dismiss—which was filed before Wagoner brought this suit—that his claims were barred 20 by claim preclusion. See Doc. 5, Wagoner IV, at 6-8 (D. Ariz. July 11, 2025). Even if 21 Wagoner reasonably thought that his claims in that case were meritorious, a reasonable 22 litigant would have taken notice of the concept of claim preclusion and conducted a careful 23 analysis of any future claims brought to redress the same or similar conduct to determine 24 whether claim preclusion would apply to bar those claims. As the Court determined, 25 Wagoner’s claims in this action were precluded (Doc. 30 at 3), and the Court concludes 26 that in light of the circumstances and his previous case history, such claims were frivolous 27 and in the very least recklessly brought. See Zone Sports Ctr. Inc. v. Red Head, Inc., No. 28 11-cv-00634-JST, 2013 WL 2252016, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (“Courts in this 1 circuit routinely hold that a claim that is barred by res judicata is frivolous.”). 2 But the Court notes that the record suggests that Wagoner brought these claims 3 knowing they were precluded; as the Court noted, Wagoner “attempted to circumvent” 4 claim preclusion by “asserting claims on behalf of a trust as well as himself.” (Doc. 30 at 5 3; see also Doc. 18 at 2 (“Naming the Trust as the real party in interest seems to have been 6 intentional to avoid the claim preclusion arguments made by FirstFleet in its motion to 7 dismiss.”).) Once the Court required Wagoner to file an amended complaint to reframe the 8 complaint to disclose the real party in interest and substitute the trustee for the trust if the 9 claims belonged to the trust as alleged (see Doc. 18 at 2-3), Wagoner dropped the trust as 10 a party and alleged that the suit was “an individual action brought by [himself]” (see Doc. 11 19 at 1-2). This history indicates to the Court that Wagoner knew his claims were precluded 12 and frivolously named a trust as plaintiff to get around claim preclusion, even though he 13 ultimately conceded that the claims belonged to him, not a trust. (Compare Doc. 1-1 at 7 14 (naming as the plaintiff “STARBOARD ATTITUDE TRUST, by and through Gary L. 15 Wagoner”), with Doc. 16 at 1 (stating that the claims were brought by Wagoner and he did 16 not “intend to represent or litigate on behalf of” the trust); id. at 2 (stating that Wagoner is 17 “the real party in interest”); id. at 3 (“confirm[ing]” that Wagoner was appearing “as an 18 individual asserting his own rights”).)2 19 Wagoner argues that his suit was “good-faith, supported by over 245 exhibits of 20 systemic misconduct” (Doc. 36 at 1), but even if Wagoner were correct that his claims were 21 meritorious, his conduct leading up to this lawsuit indicates to the Court that the claims 22 were brought to harass FirstFleet and would still be sanctionable. Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., 23 115 F.3d at 649. Before Wagoner brought this lawsuit, he made the following statements 24 in a letter to FirstFleet: (1) “I’ve been at this for four years,” “I will not go away,” “[a]nd I 25 will not let FirstFleet off the hook”; (2) “You’re fighting four claims now,” but “I have 26 twenty-seven more . . . each built on the same defects,” and “[y]ou will not win them all”;
27 2 Wagoner argues that his claims were not frivolous because they “present[ed] fresh evidence of ongoing breaches” (Doc. 36 at 2), but as FirstFleet notes (Doc. 37 at 3), 28 Wagoner’s cited exhibits were dated before he brought his first complaint. (Compare Docs. 36-2, 36-3), with Doc. 1-3, Wagoner I, at 5 (D. Ariz. June 7, 2022). 1 (3) “[a]ny case dismissed without prejudice will be refiled immediately” and “[y]ou will 2 see me again and again until this is resolved”; and (4) “I am not going away,” “I have more 3 claims, more documentation, and more patience than your attorneys planned for,” and if 4 FirstFleet would not settle, “discovery will not just consume your vendors—it will 5 consume FirstFleet itself.” (Doc. 20-1 at 2-4.) The logical inference from such statements 6 is that Wagoner intended to bring whatever claim he could, in whatever format or framing, 7 to bury FirstFleet in lawsuits or bring it to financial ruin if it would not settle. The Court 8 also agrees with Judge Humetewa that Wagoner’s filing of multiple actions “must be 9 intended to harass” FirstFleet because, “[i]f [his] sole aim was to recover the funds he 10 believes are owed to him, then there would be no need to file two more actions before [one] 11 matter’s resolution.” See Dismissal Order, Wagoner IV, at 13. Accordingly, even if 12 Wagoner’s claims were meritorious, the Court would still find that Wagoner brought his 13 claims to harass FirstFleet and that the circumstances made this an exceptional case 14 warranting a blanket award of fees. See Lu, 921 F.3d at 863 (noting that a court may 15 consider prelitigation conduct in deciding whether an action is an “exceptional case”). 16 The Court is mindful that its inherent powers “must be exercised with restraint and 17 discretion.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). That Wagoner has 18 continued to bring these claims in spite of previous adverse judgments to harass FirstFleet, 19 however, is an abuse of the legal system and has imposed significant costs on both the 20 Court and FirstFleet. FirstFleet was forced to incur fees and spend time to defend against 21 his baseless lawsuit, including to file a successful motion to dismiss. As for the Court, it 22 was required to spend precious time and resources addressing claims that should never 23 have been brought, taking its time and attention away from cases with meritorious claims. 24 See Maxwell v. MOAB Inv. Grp., LLC, No. 14-cv-03095-WHO, 2014 WL 4757429, at *6 25 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 24, 2014) (stating that plaintiffs “placed [an] unnecessary burden on the 26 courts by forcing them to address claims that were previously and conclusively decided in 27 other tribunals”). In light of these circumstances, and for the reasons explained, the Court 28 finds that this is an exceptional case in which all of FirstFleet’s requested attorneys’ fees 1 and costs were incurred because of Wagoner’s bad faith in bringing this lawsuit. 2 Finally, the Court finds that Wagoner has been provided with sufficient process 3 regarding the imposition of sanctions under the Court’s inherent authority. See In re 4 Lehtinen, 564 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen using the inherent sanction power, 5 due process is accorded as long as the sanctionee is provided with sufficient, advance notice 6 of exactly which conduct was alleged to be sanctionable, and [was] furthermore aware that 7 [he] stood accused of having acted in bad faith.” (second and third alterations in original) 8 (quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds as stated in In re Gugliuzza, 852 9 F.3d 884, 898 (9th Cir. 2017). FirstFleet outlined in its motion what it believed constituted 10 sanctionable conduct (Doc. 35); Wagoner was given an opportunity to provide a written 11 response, and he did so (Doc. 36); and the Court held a hearing at which Wagoner was 12 given an opportunity to be further heard (although he did not avail himself of that 13 opportunity).3 14 III 15 Having determined that an award of attorneys’ fees is warranted under the Court’s 16 inherent authority, the Court must determine an appropriate award. A party requesting 17 attorney’s fees pursuant to a sanction order must ensure their request is reasonable. To 18 determine the reasonableness of a requested fee award, the Court uses the lodestar 19 approach. Coe v. Hirsch, No. CV-21-00478-PHX-SMM (MTM), 2022 WL 508841, at *1 20 (D. Ariz. Jan. 21, 2022); see also Pelayo v. Platinum Limousine Servs., Inc., 804 F. App’x 21 522, 523-24 (9th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). “Under this approach, a ‘presumptively 22 reasonable’ fee award ‘is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation 23 multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’” Coe, 2022 WL 508841, at *1 (quoting Camacho 24 v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 982 (9th Cir. 2008)). In his response to FirstFleet’s 25 motion, Wagoner did not object to the hourly rates, billing entries, or costs set out in
26 3 The Court rejects as meritless Wagoner’s request for fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132. That statute provides that “the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and 27 costs . . . to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). A claimant must show “some degree of success on the merits” before attorney’s fees may be awarded. See Hardt v. Reliance 28 Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 255 (2010) (citation omitted). Wagoner has not obtained any degree of success on the merits; his claims have been dismissed. 1 FirstFleet’s motion. (See Doc. 36.) The Court nevertheless conducts an independent review 2 of FirstFleet’s requested fees and costs in exercising its discretion to impose a sanction. 3 A 4 The reasonableness of an hourly rate depends on “the rate prevailing in the 5 community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and 6 reputation.” Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 1995) 7 (citation omitted). “The ‘relevant community’ for the purposes of determining the 8 reasonable hourly rate is the district in which the lawsuit proceeds.” J&J Sports Prods., 9 Inc. v. Marini, No. 1:16-cv-0477-AWI-JLT, 2018 WL 2155710, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 10 2018); see also Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, 11 the claimed hourly rate must be compared against attorneys practicing in the Phoenix 12 Division for the District of Arizona. Further, the Court must use the prevailing rates in the 13 market that were in effect within two years of the services being performed. Bell v. 14 Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858, 869 (9th Cir. 2003). 15 FirstFleet’s counsel seeks a $769.50 hourly rate for a shareholder, a $508.50 hourly 16 rate for a senior associate, and a $486.00 hourly rate for an associate. (Doc. 35-1 at 2-3.) 17 The Court finds that these rates are excessive for the Phoenix legal market for this kind of 18 work, especially considering that the dispositive issue in this case was whether Wagoner’s 19 claims were barred by claim preclusion, which is not a complex or novel issue. The 2025 20 Economics of Law Practice in Arizona report published by the State Bar provides that the 21 average hourly rate is $423.00 and the median hourly rate is $397.00 for an attorney with 22 the same number of years in practice as FirstFleet’s shareholder counsel. This report also 23 provides that the average hourly rate is $385.00 and the median hourly rate is $393.00 for 24 an attorney with the same number of years in practice as FirstFleet’s senior associate and 25 associate counsel. The Court nevertheless acknowledges that, although it ruled on claim 26 preclusion grounds, FirstFleet also raised the more complicated issues of the statute of 27 limitations under ERISA and ERISA preemption. (See Doc. 6 at 9-11; Doc. 20 at 9-11.) 28 And although not as current as the 2025 report, the Court notes that courts in this District 1 have found hourly rates of $450.00 to $550.00 reasonable in ERISA cases for “attorneys 2 with seventeen to twenty years of experience.” Koch v. Desert States Emps. & UFCW 3 Unions Pension Plan, No. CV-20-02187-PHX-DJH, 2021 WL 6063534, at *6 (D. Ariz. 4 Dec. 22, 2021). 5 Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that a reasonable hourly 6 rate is $450.00 for the shareholder counsel, $390.00 for the senior associate counsel, and 7 $385.00 for the associate counsel.4 8 B 9 The lodestar figure requires the determination of a reasonable number of 10 compensable hours. See Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202. The Court must thus review the billing 11 records submitted by the requesting party and “exclude those hours for which it would be 12 unreasonable to compensate.” Id. at 1203. The Court should also exclude any time that is 13 “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 14 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 15 There are several entries that the Court determines would be unreasonable for 16 FirstFleet to be compensated, including the time spent to prepare a notice of errata (Doc. 17 35-1 at 9) and the time spent to review the Court’s docket (id. at 10); the Court will 18 accordingly reduce the requested fee award by 1.2 hours. See Moore v. Chase, Inc., 2016 19 WL 3648949, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2016). The Court also declines to award fees for time 20 spent in which the Court cannot determine what was done and whether the task was 21 reasonable, including a drafted “notice” in support of a request for sanctions before the 22 action was removed to this Court (Doc. 35-1 at 9); the Court will accordingly reduce the 23 requested fee award by an additional 1.2 hours. The Court will also reduce by 20% entries 24 that involved more than one task but did not indicate how long each task took, so the Court 25 was not able to determine whether the time spent on each task was reasonable. (See id. at 26 10 (October 28, 2025 entry for drafting an opposition and “Wagoner opposition to
27 4 Although the associate counsel has been practicing law longer than the senior associate counsel, the Court finds that these hourly rates are reasonable because the senior associate 28 counsel has been practicing in the relevant practice area for longer than the associate counsel. (See Doc. 35-1 at 3.) 1 motion”); id. at 20 (December 9, 2025 entry for finalizing motion to dismiss and motion 2 for extension of time).) Finally, the Court finds that the time spent on preparing and filing 3 the motion to dismiss the amended complaint is excessive considering that FirstFleet made 4 mostly the same arguments as it made in its first motion to dismiss. (Compare Doc. 20, 5 with Doc. 6.) The Court will therefore reduce the time spent on preparing the motion to 6 dismiss the amended complaint by 40%. (See Doc. 35-1 at 20 (billing entries on December 7 2, 2025 and December 3, 2025).)5 The Court has reviewed the remainder of the billing 8 entries and finds them reasonable. 9 Multiplying the reasonable hourly rate determined by the Court by the reasonable 10 number of compensable hours, the Court calculates the lodestar to be the following: 11 Attorney Hourly Rate Number of Total Fees 12 Compensable Hours Awarded 13 SBF $450.00 13.86 $6,237.00 14 SW $390.00 19.96 $7,784.40 15 AMB $385.00 1.4 $539.00 16 $14,560.40 17 18 C 19 FirstFleet also requests $1,162.64 in costs, consisting of $656.64 in computer 20 research, $405.00 for the filing fee to remove to this Court, $50.50 for “Research Service 21 on Dreamy Draw Justice Court,” and $50.50 for a filing fee in Dreamy Draw Justice Court. 22 (Id. at 10, 16.) The Court finds these costs reasonable and will award FirstFleet its requested 23 $1,162.64 in costs. 24 The Court will therefore award FirstFleet its fees in the amount of $14,560.40 and 25 costs in the amount of $1,162.64, which the Court finds is reasonable, will compensate 26 FirstFleet for Wagoner’s bad faith conduct in bringing this action, and will deter Wagoner 27
28 5 Because the December 9, 2025 billing entry is already being reduced by 20%, the Court finds it is not necessary to reduce it further. 1|| from repeating this conduct in the future without being punitive.°® 2 IV 3 Accordingly, 4 IT IS ORDERED that FirstFleet’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 35) is 5|| granted. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Wagoner is sanctioned under the Court’s 7|| inherent authority in the amount of $15,723.04, consisting of $14,560.40 in attorneys’ fees || and $1,162.64 in costs. 9 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Wagoner must make payment to FirstFleet no later than July 27, 2026. Wagoner must file a notice of compliance within one week of 11 || payment. 12 Dated this 10th day of June, 2026. 13 14 W 4 ‘| 15 Michael T. Liburdi 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 6 Although “the ability of a party to pay is one factor a court should consider when imposing 23|| sanctions,” Gaskell v. Weir, 10 F.3d 626, 629 (9th Cir. 1993), the Court finds that the circumstances in this case do not warrant a further reduction of sanctions based on 24 Wagoner’s alleged inability to pay. AS explained, this action was brought in bad faith, and Wagoner was on notice from the outset that FirstFleet would seek its attorneys’ fees and 25|| costs if it prevailed (see Doc. 6 at 12-14 (arguing for sanctions under the Court’s inherent authority)). “It would be unjust to allow [Wagoner] to further drive up the costs of this 26 litigation .. . despite [FirstF ects] tip-off that [Wagoner could] be held accountable for them, and then to allow him to dodge those attorneys’ fees by claiming financial hardship.” 27|| Edwards v. Vemma Nutrition, No. CV-17-02133-PHX-DWL, 2019 WL 5684192, at *16 (D. Ariz. Nov. 1, 2019). Additionally, the Court has already reduced FirstFleet’s requested 28 ees in its discretion, even though Wagoner did not contest counsel’s hourly rates or billing entries and did not attend the hearing on the motion.
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