BAUER, Chief Judge.
The petitioner, Gary Eagan, appeals from the district court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We reverse and remand.
I.
The petitioner was tried and convicted by a Lake County, Indiana jury of attempted murder for stabbing a woman nine times after she refused to have sexual relations with him.
According to the evidence introduced at trial, Eagan and several companions picked up the woman as they drove through Chicago late on the evening of May 16, 1982. Sometime thereafter, Eagan, his friends and the woman met with several other men, all of whom drove together to Indiana and parked on a beach along the Lake Michigan shoreline. The woman then had sexual relations with several of the men in the group, although it is not clear from the record whether she was coerced into the sexual activities or consented upon the payment of money. Eagan, his original companions, and the woman then separated from the larger group. Shortly thereafter, they returned to the same Lake Michigan beach where Eagan and his companions apparently desired to continue their sexual activities with the woman. She refused. A struggle ensued, which ended with Ea-gan stabbing the woman nine times and then fleeing.
Eagan and his companions returned to Chicago where Eagan called a Chicago policeman he knew to report that he had seen the naked body of a dead woman lying on the beach along the shores of Lake Michigan. Eagan subsequently led the Chicago police to the woman. The police found the woman screaming for help, and upon seeing Eagan, the woman asked him in the presence of the police why he had stabbed her. Eagan explained to the police that he had been with the woman earlier that evening but had been attacked by several men who abducted the woman. The Chicago police turned the matter over to the Hammond, Indiana police, who requested that Eagan accompany them to the Hammond police station for questioning.
At approximately 11:00 a.m. the following morning, May 17, 1982, detectives from the Hammond Police Department questioned Eagan. Before questioning, Hammond police detectives read to Eagan, and asked him to sign, a waiver form which provided:
YOUR RIGHTS
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer but one [1556]*1556will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you’ve talked to a lawyer.1
(Emphasis added.) During the ensuing interview, Eagan gave an exculpatory recitation of his activities the night of the crime.
At approximately 4:00 p.m. the following day, May 18th, the Hammond police interviewed Eagan for a second time. Before this interrogation, Eagan signed another waiver form which stated:
1. Before making this statement, I was advised that I have the right to remain silent and that anything I might say may or will be used against me in a court of law.
2. That I have the right to consult with an attorney of my own choice before saying anything, and that an attorney may be present while I am making any statement or throughout the course of any conversation with any police officer if I so choose.
3. That I can stop and request an attorney at any time during the course of the taking of any statement or during the course of any such conversation.
4. That in the course of any conversation I can refuse to answer any further questions and remain silent, thereby ter.minating the conversation.
5. That if I do not hire an attorney, one will be provided for me.
After reading and signing this waiver form, Eagan admitted that he had stabbed the woman and then led police to the area along the Lake Michigan shoreline where he had discarded the knife used in the stabbing as well as several items of clothing. At trial, the state court admitted Ea-gan’s confession, the knife, and the clothing. The jury found Eagan guilty of attempted murder but acquitted him of rape. The court sentenced him to 35 years imprisonment.
II.
Eagan argues that the police obtained his confession in violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because the first waiver form he signed failed to apprise him adequately of his right to a lawyer, if he so desired, before the police questioned him. Specifically, Eagan claims that the “if and when you go to court” passage in the sixth sentence of the waiver form was confusing and misleading and that he did not understand that the court would appoint him counsel before police interrogation.
In United States ex rel. William v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.1972), this court confronted a warning identical to the one issued to Eagan. In Twomey, the warning given by an Indiana State Trooper stated that the habeas corpus petitioner, Williams, had the “right to the advice and presence of an attorney whether you can afford to hire one or not. We have no way of furnishing you with an attorney, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court.” Id. at 1249-1250 n. 1. We stated that
the warning given here was not an “effective and express explanation;” to the contrary, it was equivocal and ambiguous. In one breath appellant [Williams] [1557]*1557was informed that he had the right to appointed counsel during questioning. In the next breath, he was told that counsel could not be provided until later. In other words, the statement that no lawyer can be provided at the moment and can only be obtained if and when the accused reaches court substantially restricts the absolute right to counsel previously stated; it conveys the contradictory message that an indigent is first entitled to counsel upon an appearance in court at some unknown, future time. The entire warning is therefore, at best, misleading and confusing and, at worst, constitutes a subtle temptation to the unsophisticated, indigent accused to fore-go the right to counsel at this critical moment.
Id. at 1250.
Although over fifteen years have passed since this court rendered Twomey, it remains the “seminal case in this circuit dealing with the issue of ambiguously worded Miranda warnings,” Emler v. Duckworth, 549 F.Supp. 379, 381 (N.D.Indiana, 1982). We see no reason to stray from its teachings now. The “internal inconsisten[cies]”, United States ex rel. Placek v. State of Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298, 1300 (7th Cir.1976), inherent in this type of warning are no less ambiguous and misleading today than they were fifteen years ago. The “if and when” language limits and conditions an indigent’s right to counsel on a future event.
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BAUER, Chief Judge.
The petitioner, Gary Eagan, appeals from the district court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We reverse and remand.
I.
The petitioner was tried and convicted by a Lake County, Indiana jury of attempted murder for stabbing a woman nine times after she refused to have sexual relations with him.
According to the evidence introduced at trial, Eagan and several companions picked up the woman as they drove through Chicago late on the evening of May 16, 1982. Sometime thereafter, Eagan, his friends and the woman met with several other men, all of whom drove together to Indiana and parked on a beach along the Lake Michigan shoreline. The woman then had sexual relations with several of the men in the group, although it is not clear from the record whether she was coerced into the sexual activities or consented upon the payment of money. Eagan, his original companions, and the woman then separated from the larger group. Shortly thereafter, they returned to the same Lake Michigan beach where Eagan and his companions apparently desired to continue their sexual activities with the woman. She refused. A struggle ensued, which ended with Ea-gan stabbing the woman nine times and then fleeing.
Eagan and his companions returned to Chicago where Eagan called a Chicago policeman he knew to report that he had seen the naked body of a dead woman lying on the beach along the shores of Lake Michigan. Eagan subsequently led the Chicago police to the woman. The police found the woman screaming for help, and upon seeing Eagan, the woman asked him in the presence of the police why he had stabbed her. Eagan explained to the police that he had been with the woman earlier that evening but had been attacked by several men who abducted the woman. The Chicago police turned the matter over to the Hammond, Indiana police, who requested that Eagan accompany them to the Hammond police station for questioning.
At approximately 11:00 a.m. the following morning, May 17, 1982, detectives from the Hammond Police Department questioned Eagan. Before questioning, Hammond police detectives read to Eagan, and asked him to sign, a waiver form which provided:
YOUR RIGHTS
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer but one [1556]*1556will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you’ve talked to a lawyer.1
(Emphasis added.) During the ensuing interview, Eagan gave an exculpatory recitation of his activities the night of the crime.
At approximately 4:00 p.m. the following day, May 18th, the Hammond police interviewed Eagan for a second time. Before this interrogation, Eagan signed another waiver form which stated:
1. Before making this statement, I was advised that I have the right to remain silent and that anything I might say may or will be used against me in a court of law.
2. That I have the right to consult with an attorney of my own choice before saying anything, and that an attorney may be present while I am making any statement or throughout the course of any conversation with any police officer if I so choose.
3. That I can stop and request an attorney at any time during the course of the taking of any statement or during the course of any such conversation.
4. That in the course of any conversation I can refuse to answer any further questions and remain silent, thereby ter.minating the conversation.
5. That if I do not hire an attorney, one will be provided for me.
After reading and signing this waiver form, Eagan admitted that he had stabbed the woman and then led police to the area along the Lake Michigan shoreline where he had discarded the knife used in the stabbing as well as several items of clothing. At trial, the state court admitted Ea-gan’s confession, the knife, and the clothing. The jury found Eagan guilty of attempted murder but acquitted him of rape. The court sentenced him to 35 years imprisonment.
II.
Eagan argues that the police obtained his confession in violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because the first waiver form he signed failed to apprise him adequately of his right to a lawyer, if he so desired, before the police questioned him. Specifically, Eagan claims that the “if and when you go to court” passage in the sixth sentence of the waiver form was confusing and misleading and that he did not understand that the court would appoint him counsel before police interrogation.
In United States ex rel. William v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.1972), this court confronted a warning identical to the one issued to Eagan. In Twomey, the warning given by an Indiana State Trooper stated that the habeas corpus petitioner, Williams, had the “right to the advice and presence of an attorney whether you can afford to hire one or not. We have no way of furnishing you with an attorney, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court.” Id. at 1249-1250 n. 1. We stated that
the warning given here was not an “effective and express explanation;” to the contrary, it was equivocal and ambiguous. In one breath appellant [Williams] [1557]*1557was informed that he had the right to appointed counsel during questioning. In the next breath, he was told that counsel could not be provided until later. In other words, the statement that no lawyer can be provided at the moment and can only be obtained if and when the accused reaches court substantially restricts the absolute right to counsel previously stated; it conveys the contradictory message that an indigent is first entitled to counsel upon an appearance in court at some unknown, future time. The entire warning is therefore, at best, misleading and confusing and, at worst, constitutes a subtle temptation to the unsophisticated, indigent accused to fore-go the right to counsel at this critical moment.
Id. at 1250.
Although over fifteen years have passed since this court rendered Twomey, it remains the “seminal case in this circuit dealing with the issue of ambiguously worded Miranda warnings,” Emler v. Duckworth, 549 F.Supp. 379, 381 (N.D.Indiana, 1982). We see no reason to stray from its teachings now. The “internal inconsisten[cies]”, United States ex rel. Placek v. State of Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298, 1300 (7th Cir.1976), inherent in this type of warning are no less ambiguous and misleading today than they were fifteen years ago. The “if and when” language limits and conditions an indigent’s right to counsel on a future event. The warning suggests erroneously that only those accused who can afford an attorney have the right to have one present before answering any questions; those who are not so fortunate must wait. This language further implies that if the accused does not “go to court,” i.e. the government does not file charges, the accused is not entitled to an attorney at all.
Thus, this warning is constitutionally defective because it denies an accused indigent a clear and unequivocal warning of the right to appointed counsel before any interrogation. Twomey, 467 F.2d at 1250. We caution that our holding does not require that the police furnish an accused with counsel immediately. See, e.g., Placek, 546 F.2d at 1300. Nor do we urge police officers to make this appointment. The problem with the warning given Eagan is not its lack of immediacy but its confusing linkage of an indigent’s right to counsel before interrogation with a future event. This potential misunderstanding violates Miranda. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 360, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 2809, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981).2
III.
Under Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), Eagan’s second statement was not necessarily tainted by the initial infirm warning. This conclusion, however, does not obviate our responsibility to determine whether Ea-gan’s waiver of rights before the second statement was knowing and intelligent— the defendant’s main argument on appeal. Although Eagan’s second statement was made voluntarily, this conclusion does not end our inquiry. In addition to being voluntary, a “waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986).
Eagan argues that his second waiver was not knowingly and intelligently given because of the misapprehension caused by the initial warning, and the failure of the second warning to correct that misapprehension. This argument is not defeated by a determination that the second statement probably was not tainted by the improper warnings given prior to the first statement. When a defendant gives a statement while in custody, the government has the burden of showing that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir.1972). Whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent is a [1558]*1558question of fact, Perri v. Director, Department of Corrections, 817 F.2d 448, 451 (7th Cir.1987), requiring an evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances. Elstad, 410 U.S. at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1298.
As a result of the first warning, Eagan arguably believed that he could not secure a lawyer during interrogation. The second warning did not explicitly correct this misinformation. Of course, we know very little about the factual circumstances surrounding these events because the state courts did not directly examine this issue. These are not matters for appellate determination and have not been adequately determined below. Accordingly, we remand for a determination of whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to the presence of an attorney during the second interrogation.
Reversed and Remanded.