WINTER, Circuit Judge:
Gary Darrell Allison, a North Carolina prisoner incarcerated under state law, appeals from the summary denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He sought issuance of the writ on the ground, inter alia, that his plea of guilty to attempted safe robbery was involuntary. Because we are persuaded that Allison sufficiently alleged a claim of involuntariness, we reverse the order denying issuance of the writ and remand the case for further proceedings.
I.
In Allison’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he alleged, with regard to the claim that his plea was involuntary, that he was brought to trial on charges of (a) safe robbery, (b) breaking, entering and larceny, and (c) possession of burglary tools. During a recess of the trial, Allison was led to believe by his counsel that counsel
had talked the case over with the Solicitor and the Judge, and that if the petitioner would plead guilty, that he would only get a 10 year sentence of penal servitude.
He alleged further that his conversation with his lawyer was “witnessed” by another person other than Allison and his lawyer, that he entered a plea of guilty to attempted safe robbery because he believed that he would receive only a ten-year sentence, but that after his plea was accepted he was sentenced to a term of seventeen to twenty-one years: In supplementation of his claim, Allison said that he had been “promised by his Attorney, who had consulted presumably with the Judge and Solicitor, that he was only going to get a ten year sentence . (emphasis in original).” He conceded that he was questioned by the trial judge prior to sentencing, and, by implication, that in his answers he denied that any promises had been made to him; but since he thought “he was only going to get ten years, and had been instructed to answer the questions so that the Court would accept the guilty plea,” he was not now precluded from attacking its voluntariness.
In answer, the state asserted that the plea was voluntary. It filed the transcript of Allison’s plea — a printed form setting forth certain questions with Allison’s written answers, signature and verification. The question of whether Allison’s lawyer had made any promise or threat to induce the plea was answered negatively; and the question of whether Allison’s plea was freely, understanding^ and voluntarily made was answered affirmatively.
The district court dismissed Allsion’s petition summarily. It was of the view that the transcript of plea showed that the plea was made voluntarily. Referring to the allegation that Allison’s lawyer “presumably” talked to the court and the prosecutor, the district court held that predictions of counsel as to the duration of a sentence provided no ground for attacking an otherwise valid plea of guilty.
Allison then filed a petition for rehearing. In essence, he argued that an unkept promise of counsel could render a guilty plea involuntary and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to afford him the opportunity to prove that such a promise had been made to him. The petition for rehearing was referred to a magistrate who entered a memorandum order reciting that the burden was on Allison to prove that he was the victim of an unkept promise and directing Allison to file “an affidavit of his witness, and such other proof of his allegation with respect to the promise he maintains was not kept.”
Apparently Allison experienced substantial difficulties in trying to comply with the magistrate’s order. They need not be detailed, nor their sufficiency or accuracy examined. The fact is that the affidavit and other proof were not forthcoming, and the district court denied the petition for rehearing and dismissed the action for noncompliance.
II.
Taken in their entirety, Allison’s allegations are that he was induced to plead [897]*897guilty by his attorney’s promise, which he was led to believe was made after consultation with the prosecutor and the judge, that he would receive a sentence of not more than ten years. That promise, if made, was not kept; and if the promise can be proved, Allison’s plea was not voluntary. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962). Of course, in Maehibroda the promise was made by the prosecutor, but Maehibroda has been extended to the representations by an accused’s counsel that, by prearrangement with the prosecutor or the court, a plea of guilty will not result in greater than a given punishment when, in fact, a greater punishment is imposed. United States v. Hawthorne, 502 F.2d 1183 (3 Cir. 1974); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585 (3 Cir. 1974); Roberts v. United States, 486 F.2d 980 (5 Cir. 1973); Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988 (4 Cir. 1972) (by implication), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1129, 93 S.Ct. 947, 35 L.Ed.2d 262 (1973). Such a representation is far different from a mere prediction by counsel as to the length of sentence which is likely to result from a guilty plea.
Although Allison alleged an unkept promise or representation of his attorney, at the time he pleaded he represented that his attorney had made no promises or inducements to get him to plead and that his plea was voluntary. Ordinarily Allison would be held to his statement at the time he entered his plea unless he advanced a reasonable explanation for his inconsistent allegations. Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 347 (4 Cir. 1975). Such an explanation is advanced here. Allison alleges that he answered as he did when he entered his plea because he had been instructed so to answer in order for the trial court to accept his guilty plea. Allison is therefore not foreclosed by the statements he made in order to effect acceptance of his plea from subsequently attacking its voluntariness. Edwards v. Garrison, 529 F.2d 1374 (4 Cir. 1975).
We hold therefore that the district court erroneously denied Allison’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and reconsideration of its denial without conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth of what Allison alleged — both that a promise inducing the plea was made, and that its existence was concealed to effect acceptance of the plea.
III.
We are constrained to add a further word about the procedure followed in the disposition of this case with regard to the magistrate’s order that Allison file an affidavit and proof of his allegations before his petition for reconsideration would be decided on its merits, and the district court’s denial of the petition for reconsideration and dismissal of the action for failure to comply with the magistrate’s order.
Where, as here, an indigent prisoner, proceeding pro se,
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WINTER, Circuit Judge:
Gary Darrell Allison, a North Carolina prisoner incarcerated under state law, appeals from the summary denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He sought issuance of the writ on the ground, inter alia, that his plea of guilty to attempted safe robbery was involuntary. Because we are persuaded that Allison sufficiently alleged a claim of involuntariness, we reverse the order denying issuance of the writ and remand the case for further proceedings.
I.
In Allison’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he alleged, with regard to the claim that his plea was involuntary, that he was brought to trial on charges of (a) safe robbery, (b) breaking, entering and larceny, and (c) possession of burglary tools. During a recess of the trial, Allison was led to believe by his counsel that counsel
had talked the case over with the Solicitor and the Judge, and that if the petitioner would plead guilty, that he would only get a 10 year sentence of penal servitude.
He alleged further that his conversation with his lawyer was “witnessed” by another person other than Allison and his lawyer, that he entered a plea of guilty to attempted safe robbery because he believed that he would receive only a ten-year sentence, but that after his plea was accepted he was sentenced to a term of seventeen to twenty-one years: In supplementation of his claim, Allison said that he had been “promised by his Attorney, who had consulted presumably with the Judge and Solicitor, that he was only going to get a ten year sentence . (emphasis in original).” He conceded that he was questioned by the trial judge prior to sentencing, and, by implication, that in his answers he denied that any promises had been made to him; but since he thought “he was only going to get ten years, and had been instructed to answer the questions so that the Court would accept the guilty plea,” he was not now precluded from attacking its voluntariness.
In answer, the state asserted that the plea was voluntary. It filed the transcript of Allison’s plea — a printed form setting forth certain questions with Allison’s written answers, signature and verification. The question of whether Allison’s lawyer had made any promise or threat to induce the plea was answered negatively; and the question of whether Allison’s plea was freely, understanding^ and voluntarily made was answered affirmatively.
The district court dismissed Allsion’s petition summarily. It was of the view that the transcript of plea showed that the plea was made voluntarily. Referring to the allegation that Allison’s lawyer “presumably” talked to the court and the prosecutor, the district court held that predictions of counsel as to the duration of a sentence provided no ground for attacking an otherwise valid plea of guilty.
Allison then filed a petition for rehearing. In essence, he argued that an unkept promise of counsel could render a guilty plea involuntary and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to afford him the opportunity to prove that such a promise had been made to him. The petition for rehearing was referred to a magistrate who entered a memorandum order reciting that the burden was on Allison to prove that he was the victim of an unkept promise and directing Allison to file “an affidavit of his witness, and such other proof of his allegation with respect to the promise he maintains was not kept.”
Apparently Allison experienced substantial difficulties in trying to comply with the magistrate’s order. They need not be detailed, nor their sufficiency or accuracy examined. The fact is that the affidavit and other proof were not forthcoming, and the district court denied the petition for rehearing and dismissed the action for noncompliance.
II.
Taken in their entirety, Allison’s allegations are that he was induced to plead [897]*897guilty by his attorney’s promise, which he was led to believe was made after consultation with the prosecutor and the judge, that he would receive a sentence of not more than ten years. That promise, if made, was not kept; and if the promise can be proved, Allison’s plea was not voluntary. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962). Of course, in Maehibroda the promise was made by the prosecutor, but Maehibroda has been extended to the representations by an accused’s counsel that, by prearrangement with the prosecutor or the court, a plea of guilty will not result in greater than a given punishment when, in fact, a greater punishment is imposed. United States v. Hawthorne, 502 F.2d 1183 (3 Cir. 1974); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585 (3 Cir. 1974); Roberts v. United States, 486 F.2d 980 (5 Cir. 1973); Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988 (4 Cir. 1972) (by implication), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1129, 93 S.Ct. 947, 35 L.Ed.2d 262 (1973). Such a representation is far different from a mere prediction by counsel as to the length of sentence which is likely to result from a guilty plea.
Although Allison alleged an unkept promise or representation of his attorney, at the time he pleaded he represented that his attorney had made no promises or inducements to get him to plead and that his plea was voluntary. Ordinarily Allison would be held to his statement at the time he entered his plea unless he advanced a reasonable explanation for his inconsistent allegations. Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 347 (4 Cir. 1975). Such an explanation is advanced here. Allison alleges that he answered as he did when he entered his plea because he had been instructed so to answer in order for the trial court to accept his guilty plea. Allison is therefore not foreclosed by the statements he made in order to effect acceptance of his plea from subsequently attacking its voluntariness. Edwards v. Garrison, 529 F.2d 1374 (4 Cir. 1975).
We hold therefore that the district court erroneously denied Allison’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and reconsideration of its denial without conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth of what Allison alleged — both that a promise inducing the plea was made, and that its existence was concealed to effect acceptance of the plea.
III.
We are constrained to add a further word about the procedure followed in the disposition of this case with regard to the magistrate’s order that Allison file an affidavit and proof of his allegations before his petition for reconsideration would be decided on its merits, and the district court’s denial of the petition for reconsideration and dismissal of the action for failure to comply with the magistrate’s order.
Where, as here, an indigent prisoner, proceeding pro se, alleges a cause of action which, if proved, would entitle him to post-conviction relief, we think it improper to require him to document that claim or support it by affidavits of his witnesses before affording him the evidentiary hearing to which he is otherwise entitled. Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775, 783 (5 Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079, 95 S.Ct. 668, 42 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). Of course we do not hold that the summary judgment procedure of Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P., is inapplicable to applications for writs of habeas corpus by state prisoners. If the state moves for summary judgment in such a case and offers affidavits and other proof that the petitioner’s claim is lacking in merit, a pro se petitioner may be required, after being advised of his rights and how to proceed, to offer counteraffidavits or other proof to establish that material facts are genuinely disputed before he is afforded an evidentiary hearing. If, in such a situation, the petitioner fails to respond and offers no reasonable explanation why he cannot respond, summary judgment may properly be entered against him. But the point is that a pro se petitioner is not to be put to a greater burden to obtain an evidentiary hearing when he has alleged a case which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, than [898]*898any other plaintiff in any other type of action.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ADDENDUM
After circulation of the majority opinion and the special concurrence to the nonsitting members of the court, a motion was made within the court to rehear the case in banc and a poll on the motion was requested. The motion failed for want of a majority of those eligible to vote in the poll.