Garrett v. TP-Link Research America Corporation

District Court, N.D. California·Decided November 23, 2020·No. 3:20-cv-03491·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 6 7 ANTONIO GARRETT, Case No. 20-cv-03491-SI

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT CORPORATION, Re: Dkt. No. 35 11 Defendant. 12 13 14 Now before the Court is defendant’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. Dkt. 15 No. 35. This matter came on for videoconference hearing on November 13, 2020. For the reasons 16 set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss. 17 19 On May 22, 2020, plaintiff Antonio Garrett (“Garrett”) filed this patent infringement 20 action against defendant TP-Link Research America Corporation (“TPRA”) and its “line of Kasa® 21 security cameras.” Dkt. No. 1 (Complaint). On September 14, 2020, this Court granted TPRA’s 22 motion to dismiss Garrett’s original complaint, with leave to amend. Dkt. No. 32 (Order on First 23 Motion to Dismiss). On September 25, 2020, Garrett filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 24 Dkt. No. 34. The FAC contains several new allegations. Most notably, the new allegations map 25 the accused products to the claim limitations. See id. ¶¶ 35-40, 42-45. The FAC also alleges that 26 “[t]he Kasa® surveillance system products cannot be used, tested, or demonstrated without a 27 mobile device on which to install the Kasa® mobile application.” Id. ¶ 18. Moreover, the FAC 1 The FAC alleges direct and indirect infringement of two patents held by Garrett: U.S. 2 Patent Nos. 9,854,207 (“the ’207 patent”) and 10,511,809 (“the ’809 patent”). Specifically, 3 Garrett alleges TPRA directly infringes the system claims of the ’207 patent, see id. ¶¶ 33, 51, and 4 that TPRA indirectly infringes the system and method claims of both the ’207 patent and the ’809 5 patent, id. ¶¶ 20-21.1 The patents-at-issue generally relate to systems and methods for mobile 6 surveillance. See id. ¶ 8. These inventions include “a camera for monitoring a surveillance area 7 and a mobile device for receiving surveillance information from the camera.” Id. 8 On December 26, 2017, the ’207 patent was duly and legally issued by the U.S. Patent and 9 Trademark Office. Id. ¶ 10. The ’207 patent contains four independent claims, which include 10 both system and method claims. Dkt. No. 34-1 (the ’207 patent). Claims 1, 10, and 18 require a 11 “server,” a “mobile device,” and a “camera.” Id. Claim 19, a system claim, requires only a 12 “mobile device” and a “camera.” Id. Independent claim 19 is alleged as representative of the 13 claims recited in the ’207 patent. FAC ¶ 13. This claim states: 14 A mobile surveillance system, comprising: a mobile device configured to communicate with at least one camera positioned at a 15 surveillance area, wherein the at least one camera captures surveillance data of the 16 surveillance area; and the mobile device is configured to control activation of the mobile surveillance 17 system, and control start and stop of the capture of the surveillance data, and 18 transfer of the surveillance data, wherein, the surveillance data is wirelessly communicated directly from a transmitter linked to the camera to the mobile 19 device; and 20 the mobile device is further configured to activate upon detection of motion at the surveillance area, 21 wherein the detection of motion detects variations in motion measurements at the 22 surveillance area; and wherein the mobile device activates when the motion measurements exceeds a 23 determined threshold. 24 Dkt. No. 34-1 at 13 (the ’207 patent).2 25 On December 17, 2019, the ’809 patent was duly and legally issued by the U.S. Patent and 26 1 Garrett has dropped his claims for direct infringement of the ’809 patent and for willful 27 infringement. 1 Trademark Office. FAC ¶ 11. The ’809 patent contains three independent claims, all of which are 2 method claims. Dkt. No. 34-2 (the ’809 patent). Claim 1 requires a “server,” a “mobile device,” 3 and a “camera.” Id. Claims 10 and 18 require only a “mobile device” and a “camera.” Id. 4 Independent claim 10 is alleged as representative of the claims recited in the ’809 patent. FAC 5 ¶ 14. This claim states: 6 A method for conducting surveillance, comprising: receiving an instruction from a mobile device to control start and stop of capture of 7 surveillance data at a surveillance area; 8 capturing the surveillance data by a camera at the surveillance area, wherein the camera is operably engaged to a motion detection mechanism for detecting 9 variations in motion measurements at the surveillance area; and 10 transferring said surveillance data to the mobile device when the motion detection mechanism obtains a motion detection measurement that exceeds a predetermined 11 threshold indicating the surveillance area is unsecure, 12 wherein the mobile device displays a datebook comprising days of the week and times of day that can be synchronized with an application of the user device to 13 schedule the transferring of surveillance data. 14 Dkt. No. 34-2 at 13 (the ’809 patent). 15 On October 9, 2020, TPRA filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the FAC 16 should be dismissed in its entirety because it fails to recite a plausible claim of patent 17 infringement. Dkt. No. 35. In his Opposition filed October 23, 2020, Garrett argued that he 18 sufficiently amended his complaint to plead infringement by TPRA. Dkt. No. 37. TPRA filed a 19 Reply on October 30, 2020. Dkt. No. 38. 20 22 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 23 if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 24 dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 25 face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard 26 requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 27 has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While courts do not require 1 relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and 2 conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 3 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 4 ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 5 557). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported 6 by factual allegations.” Id. 7 In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must accept as true all facts alleged in 8 the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Usher v. City of Los 9 Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, a district court is not required to accept as 10 true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 11 inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 12 14 I. Direct Infringement by TPRA 15 Garrett alleges that TPRA directly infringes the system claims of the ’207 patent, arguing 16 that TPRA “makes and uses the patented system by combining each and every element of system 17 claims recited in the asserted patents[.]” FAC ¶ 32.

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25 B. The New Allegations Are Not Conclusory, and Any Contradictory Allegations Are Not Fatal. 26 TPRA also argues that the FAC “only adds legal conclusions couched as factual 27 allegations that should be given no weight” or allegations that are “rank speculation and plainly 1 incorrect.” Dkt. No. 35 at 11-12. 2 The Court disagrees that the FAC only adds conclusory allegations. As described earlier, 3 the FAC adds several allegations which map specific uses of the accused products to the claim 4 limitations. See FAC ¶¶ 35-40, 42-45. Additionally, Garrett now alleges that “[t]he Kasa® 5 surveillance system products cannot be used, tested, or demonstrated without a mobile device on 6 which to install the Kasa® mobile application.” Id. ¶ 18. This is supported by statements on 7 TPRA’s website, which Garrett cites in the FAC, see id. (“All Kasa Cams require and only work 8 with the Kasa for Mobile App.”), as well as by the user manuals attached in Exhibit C, see, e.g., 9 Dkt. No. 34-3 at 14 (instructing users how to set up the surveillance system using the mobile 10 application). These allegations are not conclusory. 11 TPRA also takes issue with the new allegation from the FAC that states, “. . . TP-Link also 12 made and/or used each and every element of the patented system during each Kasa® product’s 13 development and/or testing, and TP-Link continues to make and use the entire patented system 14 each time it tests or demonstrates its Kasa® products or a feature thereof.” Dkt. No. 35 at 12 15 (quoting FAC ¶ 46). In its motion, TPRA argues that “Garrett focuses on combining the 16 application with a mobile device during testing, but he ignores the combination’s non-infringing 17 uses.” Id. In its reply brief, TPRA somewhat re-frames this argument, taking the position that this 18 allegation contradicts the evidence Garrett relies on, namely the video referenced in the FAC, see 19 FAC ¶¶ 43-35. TPRA states this video was “a staged commercial,” showing a blank screen, that 20 contradicts the allegation that TPRA “make[s] and use[s] the entire patented system each time it 21 tests or demonstrates its Kasa® products or a feature thereof.” Dkt. No. 38 at 8; FAC ¶ 46. 22 Even if TPRA is correct that some of Garrett’s allegations contradict other allegations or 23 the exhibits, such contradictions are not fatal at this stage of the case. The cases on which TPRA 24 relies do not mandate dismissal of the action but rather stand for the proposition that inconsistent 25 allegations in a complaint may be disregarded or read in light of the other allegations (even if from 26 previous complaints in the same matter). See Dkt. No. 38 at 12 (citing J. Edwards Jewelry 27 Distrib., LLC. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 18-CV-03886, 2019 WL 2329248, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 1 at *1 n.5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2012); Stanislaus Food Prod. Co. v. USS-POSCO Indus., 782 F. 2 Supp. 2d 1059, 1076–77 (E.D. Cal. 2011)). For instance, in Schneidereit, the district court found 3 that “the Court may consider Plaintiffs’ prior allegations in determining the plausibility of their 4 allegations in the TAC.” 2012 WL 12884908, at *1 n.5 (emphasis in original). “In light of 5 Plaintiffs repeatedly admitting in prior pleadings that they defaulted,” the district court found that 6 “their new, unsupported, and contradictory allegation” that Plaintiffs did not default was 7 implausible. Id. And in J. Edwards Jewelry, the district court simply found that eliminating 8 allegations and exhibits in an amended complaint did not change the court’s analysis because the 9 court could still “consider the prior allegations [from earlier complaints] as part of its ‘context- 10 specific’ inquiry.” 2019 WL 2329248, at *4 (quoting Cole v. Sunnyvale, No. C-09-05017 RMW, 11 2010 WL 532428, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010)). 12 At this stage, and based on the pleadings and exhibits on file, the Court will not find that 13 any contradictory allegations warrant dismissal. In light of the other allegations, it is reasonable to 14 read the allegation in question, ¶ 46, as alleging that TPRA infringes during its product 15 development and testing of the accused products or certain features thereof, at least insofar as 16 TPRA “makes” or “uses” the accused products or certain features thereof in the manner described 17 in the other allegations. Under a reasonable reading of the FAC, Garrett is alleging that TPRA 18 makes and uses the entire patented system when it tests or demonstrates its Kasa® products or a 19 feature thereof. The Court will not dismiss the FAC based on contradictory allegations. 20 21 C. Garrett Alleges a Plausible Claim of Infringing “Use.” 22 TPRA argues that “the mere demonstration or display of an accused product, even in an 23 obviously commercial atmosphere[,] is not an act of infringement for purposes of [35 U.S.C.] 24 § 271(a),” and therefore TPRA’s promotional demonstrations cannot amount to infringing “uses.” 25 Dkt. No. 35 at 9-10 (quoting Med. Sols., Inc. v. C Change Surgical LLC, 541 F.3d 1136, 1140 26 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Garrett argues that TPRA’s reliance on Medical Solutions is misplaced because 27 “[w]hile the mere display of an accused product is not a ‘use’ under § 271(a), putting the product 1 cases that have “confirm[ed] that a demonstration can, in fact, be an infringing use.” Id. at 12 2 (citing Marposs Societá Per Azioni v. Jenoptik Auto. N. Am., 262 F. Supp. 3d 611 (N.D. Ill. 2017); 3 Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 4 The Court is not persuaded by either party’s position. TPRA is correct that some courts 5 have routinely held that the “mere demonstration or display of an accused product, even in a[n] 6 obviously commercial atmosphere, does not constitute an infringing use.” See, e.g., Intermedics, 7 Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1286 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 8 1993); see also L.A. Gear, Inc. v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1994); 9 EBS Auto. Servs. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., No. 09-CV-996 JLS (MDD), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10 102163, at *46 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2011); Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am. v. Applied 11 Materials, Inc., No. C-93-20853 RMW, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22123, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 12 1995). However, those cases were decided before or did not grapple with the standard announced 13 in Centillion, where the Federal Circuit defined “use” as “put[ting] the system into service, i.e., . . . 14 exercis[ing] control over, and benefit[ting] from, the system’s application.” See Centillion Data 15 Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting NTP, Inc. 16 v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) (emphasis added). It is 17 conceivable that under certain circumstances a demonstration could result in a “benefit” to the 18 alleged infringer similar to how the invention would “benefit” consumers when “used” for its 19 intended purpose. Nevertheless, this Court is not convinced that the Federal Circuit has overruled 20 prior decisions finding that a demonstration did not amount to an infringing use. In Medical 21 Solutions, the court simply expressly did not reach the question of whether a demonstration could 22 ever constitute an infringing “use.” 541 F.3d at 1141 (“In this case we need not (and do not) 23 decide whether the demonstration of a product at a trade show could ever be sufficient to establish 24 an infringing use”). 25 This Court need not resolve this issue today because the FAC pleads more than a “mere 26 demonstration” to constitute an infringing “use,” such as through TPRA’s product development 27 and testing of the accused products. The Federal Circuit “has established that testing is a use of 1 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. 2 Cir. 1984)). “Nevertheless, the infringer must use the ‘patented invention.’” Id. It is hard to 3 imagine a scenario where, prior to discovery, a plaintiff can sufficiently uncover evidence of 4 internal business practices—like in-house testing—for purposes of supporting the allegations of a 5 complaint. At some point, a plaintiff must rely on reasonable inferences drawn from the other 6 available evidence at its disposal. Garrett asserts that the allegations regarding testing are “based 7 on a reasonable inference made from available evidence.” Dkt. No. 37 at 16. And courts are 8 required to “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” See Usher, 828 F.2d at 561. 9 So, the question is whether Garrett’s inferences are reasonable. 10 As discussed above, even if it is implausible that TPRA infringes “each time” it conducts a 11 test of the accused systems, see FAC ¶ 46, there is sufficient support for the allegation that some 12 testing has resulted in an infringing “use” by TPRA. Specifically, Garrett alleges that “[t]he 13 Kasa® surveillance system products cannot be used, tested, or demonstrated without a mobile 14 device on which to install the Kasa® mobile application.” Id. ¶ 18. Garrett also describes how the 15 accused products work, see id. ¶¶ 19-26, and maps specific uses of the products to the patent 16 claims, see id. ¶¶ 42-45. Moreover, Garrett created two claims charts which map the evidence to 17 specific claim limitations. See generally Dkt. Nos. 34-4, 34-5. This evidence of TPRA instructing 18 customers on how to use the accused products in an infringing manner, as well as evidence of 19 TPRA actually using the products in a manner that plausibly meets each of the claim limitations, 20 constitutes sufficient circumstantial evidence at the pleading stage to support Garrett’s claim that 21 TPRA used the accused products in an infringing manner during product development and testing. 22 See EBS Auto. Servs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102163, at *47-48 (“Plaintiffs contend that ITW’s 23 internal documents, training materials, and advertisements illustrate that ITW trains users on and 24 tests the BrakeTech. This circumstantial evidence of use is sufficient to justify a jury verdict in 25 Plaintiffs’ favor.”); Nat’l Instruments Corp. v. The MathWorks, Inc., 113 F. App’x 895, 898 (Fed. 26 Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“The evidence of MathWorks’ training materials, which teach how to use 27 Simulink to perform the infringing methods, and the evidence presented that Simulink was 1 direct or induced infringement.”). 2 Tthe Court finds that Garrett has sufficiently pled a plausible claim that TPRA “uses” the 3 accused products in an infringing manner. 4 5 D. Garrett’s “Make” Claims are Plausible. 6 In the first motion to dismiss, this Court held that Garrett had not sufficiently pled a claim 7 of direct infringement for a “make” claim. Dkt. No. 32 at 5. In reaching that decision, the Court 8 found that “Garrett ha[d] not alleged that TPRA manufactures . . . mobile devices as part of the 9 accused products.” Id. And, while TPRA could have combined a third-party mobile device with 10 the accused products to constitute a “make” claim, this Court also found that the original 11 complaint merely alleged that the accused products could be combined in an infringing manner but 12 not that TPRA actually combined the system in an infringing manner. Id. at 6 (“Garrett alleges in 13 the Complaint that the infringing products can be used in an infringing manner but does not allege 14 that TPRA has ever . . . assembled the system with a ‘mobile device’ in an infringing manner.”). 15 “In order to ‘make’ the system under § 271(a), [the direct infringer] would need to 16 combine all of the claim elements.” Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1288. A direct infringer does not need 17 to manufacture each individual component; instead, that infringer need only assemble the 18 infringing components together such that the combination is infringing. See Lifetime Indus., Inc. 19 v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Although Lifetime did not allege that 20 Trim-Lok made the RV onto which it installed the seal, Lifetime did allege that Trim-Lok 21 installed the seal onto the RV; that is, Lifetime alleged that Trim-Lok made an infringing seal-RV 22 combination.”).3 23 Here, Garrett alleges that a mobile device is required for the accused products to operate. 24 FAC ¶ 18. Further, as described in section I.C above, Garrett describes how the accused products 25 are made to infringe, see id. ¶¶ 19-26, and maps specific uses of the products to the patent claims, 26

27 3 To the extent that the Court’s prior order implied that Garrett must allege that TPRA 1 see id. ¶¶ 42-45. Because the system must be assembled before it can be used, there are sufficient 2 allegations in the FAC that TPRA “makes” the accused products in an infringing manner. 3 Accordingly, the Court DENIES TPRA’s motion to dismiss Garrett’s claims of direct 4 infringement because there are plausible allegations that TPRA “makes” and “uses” the accused 5 products in an infringing manner. 6 7 II. Direct Infringement by End Users 8 Because the Court previously ruled on the other indirect infringement elements and TPRA 9 does not raise challenges to those previously decided issues, the only remaining issue in dispute is 10 whether there are sufficient allegations of direct infringement of the ’207 patent and the ’809 11 patent by end users. TPRA argues that the FAC should be dismissed because the allegations of 12 infringement by the end users are essentially the same as those against TPRA, the pleading 13 language is merely a recitation of the claim language, and the only factual allegations are plainly 14 incorrect based on the FAC, itself. Dkt. No. 35 at 13-14. TPRA also argues that “Garrett does not 15 allege how an end user could perform each step that is required to be performed by a mobile 16 device processor (as opposed to a mobile device operated by a user)” and “Garrett does not allege 17 how a user could perform each step of a method that requires performing a step on a request by the 18 same end user.” Id. at 14-15. Garrett counters that the allegations against the end users are amply 19 supported in the FAC, Dkt. No. 37 at 17-18, and, “like in Centillion, all of the asserted method 20 steps are performed by devices under the end user’s control and for the user’s benefit, and would 21 not occur but for the user’s actions in assembling the system,” id. at 19-20 (citing Centillion, 631 22 F.3d at 1285). The Court agrees with Garrett. 23 First, Garrett is correct that Centillion is controlling. There, the Federal Circuit found that 24 functions performed by geographically remote, back-end servers were still attributable to the end 25 user because “it is the customer initiated demand for the service which causes the back-end system 26 to generate the requisite reports. This is ‘use’ because, but for the customer’s actions, the entire 27 system would never have been put into service.” See Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1285. 1 “control” the system and “put it into service.” As Garrett alleges, the accused products cannot 2 function without a mobile device on which the mobile application is installed. FAC ¶ 18. 3 Therefore, at this stage of the case, it is reasonable to infer that any actions that occur through 4 components of the mobile device or the surveillance system hardware are “put into service” by the 5 user during the setup and operation of the system. 6 Second, as described above, there is evidence of TPRA instructing its users on how to 7 assemble and use the accused products in a manner which would infringe the ’207 patent. Dkt. 8 No. 34-3 at 14-18. There are also allegations of TPRA promoting specific uses of the accused 9 products that, at this stage, plausibly could be infringing. FAC ¶¶ 42-45. As such, Garrett has 10 sufficiently pled the claims of indirect infringement for the ’207 patent. See also Nat’l 11 Instruments, 113 F. App’x 895, 898 (“The evidence of MathWorks’ training materials, which 12 teach how to use Simulink to perform the infringing methods, and the evidence presented that 13 Simulink was designed to infringe during its normal use presents substantial evidence for the jury 14 to find either direct or induced infringement.”). 15 As to the ’809 patent, the only additional claim limitation requires a “datebook comprising 16 days of the week and times of day that can be synchronized with an application of the user device 17 to schedule the transferring of surveillance data.” Dkt No. 34-2 at 13 (emphasis added). The FAC 18 alleges that end users use the mobile application of the accused products “to schedule the transfer 19 of the surveillance data using a datebook that includes days of the week and times of day.” FAC 20 ¶ 26. The instruction manuals and user guides instruct end users how to use the “datebook” to 21 schedule when the camera will automatically turn On/Off. See Dkt. No. 34-3 at 17. 22 TPRA argues that turning the camera On/Off is not the same as “scheduling the transfer of 23 surveillance data.” Dkt. No. 38 at 17. But TPRA acknowledges that “a camera cannot capture 24 video unless it is on,” and whether “a camera is surveilling may affect what motion is detected.” 25 Id. Therefore, it is possible that turning the camera On/Off could schedule the transfer of 26 surveillance data because surveillance data cannot be received (and thereby transferred) when it is 27 off. At this stage of the case and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Garrett, a 1 transferring of surveillance data insofar as no surveillance data can be transferred while the camera 2 is off, but surveillance data can be transferred while the camera is on. 3 Accordingly, the Court finds that Garrett has plausibly alleged that TPRA indirectly 4 infringed. Therefore, the Court DENIES TPRA’s motion to dismiss Garrett’s claims for indirect 5 infringement. 6 7 III. Other Arguments 8 Finally, TPRA moves to dismiss all claims of patent infringement for failure to allege 9 sufficient facts showing that certain claim limitations are met by the accused products. Dkt. No. 10 35 at 15. First, TPRA moves to dismiss all independent claims (except claim 19 of the ’207 11 patent) “[b]ecause the transferring of video to the mobile device is caused by the user selecting the 12 video in the application,” and, therefore, “it is not caused by the motion detection mechanism as 13 required by the asserted claims.” Id. at 16 (emphasis in original). Specifically, TPRA points to 14 the claim language that requires the transfer of surveillance data “when” motion is detected past a 15 certain threshold. Id. Second, TPRA argues that for each claim of the ’809 patent, “Garrett reads 16 out the limitation ‘synchronized with an application of the user device,’ which then permits him to 17 argue that the datebook from the Kasa application (not a datebook from the mobile device) meets 18 the recited ‘datebook’ limitation.” Id. at 17. Third, TPRA argues that “Garrett’s allegation that 19 the notification from the Kasa application ‘activates’ the mobile device is not plausible because 20 the notification is coming from the server and not the mobile device processor. Indeed, because a 21 user may be using his/her mobile device when receiving the notification, it will not always 22 ‘activate’ upon receipt of the notification because it may already be ‘active.’” Id. 23 Each of TPRA’s arguments is essentially a claim construction argument couched in terms 24 of a non-infringement argument. As such, the Court finds that these issues are more appropriate 25 for resolution at the claim construction stage and will not dismiss the FAC on these grounds. 26 1 motion to dismiss Garrett’s First Amended Complaint. 2 4 || Dated: November 23, 2020 Stn 5 ee es ll SUSAN ILLSTON 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12

15 16

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Garrett v. TP-Link Research America Corporation, (N.D. Cal. 2020).

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Garrett v. TP-Link Research America Corporation (Garrett v. TP-Link Research America Corporation) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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