Garot v. County of San Diego

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: November 13, 2019
• Docket: 3:19-cv-01650
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 COLLEEN GAROT, Case No.: 19-cv-01650-H-AGS 12

Plaintiff, 13 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO v. DISMISS SECOND AMENDED 14 COMPLAINT COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; and DOES 15 1-20, [Doc. No. 8.] 16 Defendants. 17

18 On September 13, 2019, Colleen Garot (“Plaintiff”) filed a Second Amended 19 Complaint (the “SAC”) naming the County of San Diego (the “County” or “Defendant”) 20 and Does 1-20 (the “Defendant Does”) as Defendants. (Doc. No. 7.) On September 27, 21 2019, Defendant County of San Diego filed a motion to dismiss the SAC. (Doc. No. 8.) On 22 October 21, 2019, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (Doc. No. 9.) On October 28, 2019, 23 Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. No. 10.) On October 29, 2019, the Court determined the 24 motion was fit for resolution without oral argument and submitted the motion on the papers. 25 (Doc. No. 11.) 26 27 28 1 Background 2 The following facts are taken from the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint. This 3 lawsuit is brought on behalf of Colleen Garot by Thomas Rainey as her court appointed 4 conservator. (Doc. No. 7 ¶ 5.) Plaintiff Garot bring claims against the County of San Diego 5 (“the County”); Sheriff William D. Gore; and twenty Doe defendants employed by the 6 County of San Diego. 7 Plaintiff asserts five causes of action for: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Deliberate 8 Indifference to a Substantial Risk of Harm to Health; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Liability for 9 Unconstitutional Custom, Practice, or Police; (3) Professional Negligence under California 10 Government Code § 844.6(d); (4) Failure to Summon Medical Care under California 11 Government Code § 845.6; and (5) negligence under California law. 12 On April 13, 2018, Sheriff’s deputies employed by the County were dispatched to 13 Colleen Garot’s residence. (Doc. No. 7 ¶ 10.) Upon arrival, the deputies found Plaintiff 14 with “facial and head injuries, including a black left eye and bruising, abrasions” on her 15 forehead. (Id. ¶ 11.) The deputies discovered that Ms. Garot had an outstanding warrant 16 for her arrest. (Id. ¶ 10.) Deputies arrested Ms. Garot and transported her to the county jail. 17 (Id. ¶ 12.) A picture of Ms. Garot taken at the time of her booking into the county jail 18 shows her with a black eye and bruising on her forehead. (Id.) 19 Upon arrival at the county jail Ms. Garot was given a standard medical screening. 20 (Id. ¶ 14.) Twelve hours later, Ms. Garot was seen by another County employee, “who 21 noted the bruising around Ms. Garot’s left eye and on her forehead.” (Id. ¶ 14.) 22 The next morning, April 14, 2018, at about 7:00 a.m. Ms. Garot was evaluated by 23 another County employee and given an ice pack for her black eye. (Id. ¶ 18.) Later that 24 day, Ms. Garot was again seen by another unnamed County employee. (Id. ¶ 19.) 25 The following day, April 15, 2018, Ms. Garot was placed in a safety cell and 26 scheduled to see a psychologist. (Id. ¶ 20.) At 5:00 p.m. that day, a psychologist saw Ms. 27 Garot and noted that she was “low risk” and should be seen again the following day. (Id. ¶ 28 21.) 1 The following morning, April 16, 2018, Ms. Garot was observed “walking around 2 her cell naked” and attempting to “climb the wall.” (Id. ¶ 23.) Later that morning, around 3 11:20 a.m., a county employee found Ms. Garot in her cell “laying on her back with foamy 4 like saliva coming out from her mouth.” (Id. ¶ 24.) At that point, paramedics were called, 5 and Ms. Garot was transported to the emergency room at Sharp Memorial Hospital where 6 she was diagnosed with a left basilar skull fracture, acute hypoxemic respiratory failure, 7 encephalopathy after traumatic brain injury, a subdural hematoma, and seizure. (Id. ¶ 25.) 8 Discussion 9 I. Legal Standards 10 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal 11 sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has 12 failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 13 646 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that 14 a pleading stating a claim for relief containing “a short and plain statement of the claim 15 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The function of this pleading requirement is 16 to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it 17 rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 18 A complaint will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it contains “enough 19 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 20 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 21 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 22 for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that 23 offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 24 will not do.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it 25 tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting 26 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Accordingly, dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper 27 where the claim “lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable 28 1 legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2 2008). 3 In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true 4 all facts alleged in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 5 claimant. See Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 6 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014). But, a court need not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Ashcroft 7 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 8 II. Analysis 9 A. Deliberate Indifference to a Substantial Risk of Harm to Health 10 Plaintiff brings a claim of action which alleges liability for a deliberate indifference 11 to a substantial risk of harm to health against Defendant Does. (Doc. No. 7 at 6.) Defendant 12 County does not move to dismiss the first cause of action for deliberate indifference as only 13 Does are named in the Complaint and not the Defendant County. On the second cause of 14 action, the County argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead their second cause of action for 15 liability for an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy in part because the SAC “does 16 not allege facts to support the claim that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated.” 17 (Doc. No. 8-1, at 8.) Since this argument will depend, in part, on whether Plaintiff has 18 adequately pled her first cause of action, the Court will address whether she has done so 19 now. 20 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that pretrial 21 detainees receive constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care.1 Conn v. City 22 of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. 23 City of Reno, Nev. v. Conn, 563 U.S. 915 (2011), opinion reinstated, 658 F.3d 897 (9th 24 Cir. 2011). That right requires treatment of a “serious” medical need, which exists when 25 “failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary 26

27 1 Plaintiff argues in the alternative that if Ms. Garot is deemed to be a convicted prisoner that her Eight 28 Amendment rights have been violated. (Doc. No. 9. at 5-6.) Based on the facts alleged in the complaint 1 and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 1095 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2 Pretrial detainees also have a due process right to be protected from a substantial risk of 3 serious harm. Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016). Such 4 claims brought by pretrial detainees are evaluated under an objective deliberate 5 indifference standard. Id. Accordingly, a pretrial detainee’s medical care claim against an 6 individual defendant requires: 7 (1) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under 8 which the plaintiff was confined; 9 (2) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; 10 (3) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even 11 though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high 12 degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; 13 and 14 (4) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiffs injuries. 15 Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). 16 As to the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable, 17 which turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Id. Importantly, these 18 claims require proof of “more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something 19 akin to reckless disregard.” Id. Thus, contrary to a prisoner bringing claims under the 20 Eighth Amendment, a pretrial detainee bringing claims under the Fourteenth Amendment 21 “need not prove those subjective elements about the [defendant]’s actual awareness of the 22 level of risk.” Id. at 1125, n. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted.) Further, “[a] court must 23 make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, 24 including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. 25 “[T]he mere lack of due care by a state official does not deprive an individual of life, 26 liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. 27 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that “even though Ms. Garot had obvious head trauma 28 and claimed a neurological disorder, Ms. Garot was not seen or examined by a medical 1 doctor.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff further alleges that “although it was obvious that 2 Ms. Garot needed immediate medical attention, the Sheriff’s deputies did not request an 3 ambulance or paramedic to the scene” at the time of her arrest. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff 4 contends that if Defendants had not acted with “deliberate indifference to Ms. Garot’s 5 obvious, serious health needs and provided medical attention, Ms. Garot would not 6 presently by completely incapacitated . . . .” (Doc. No. 7. at ¶ 37.) In reviewing a Rule 7 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint 8 and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the claimant. See Retail Prop. Trust v. United 9 Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, 10 based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court concludes that the SAC pleads facts 11 sufficient to establish Plaintiff’s inadequate medical care claim. 12 B. Liability for Unconstitutional Custom, Practice, or Policy 13 Defendant County moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action which alleges 14 liability for an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy. (Doc. No. 8 at 4.) The Civil 15 Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) provides a cause of action for the 16 “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” 17 of the United States. To state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, “a plaintiff must 18 allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, 19 and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color 20 of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (internal citations omitted). 21 Municipalities are “persons” under § 1983 and thus may be liable for causing a 22 constitutional deprivation. Monell v. Dep’t Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 23 Section 1983 does not provide for respondeat superior liability. Id. at 691. Rather, it 24 is only when execution of a municipality’s policy or custom inflicts the injury that the 25 municipality as an entity is responsible. Id. at 694. A policy is “a deliberate choice to follow 26 a course of action . . . made from among various alternatives by the official or officials 27 responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” 28 Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting Oviatt v. Pearce, 1 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir.1992)). A policy can be one of action or inaction. See City 2 of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 3 Here, Plaintiff alleges only a failure to act claim. (See SAC.) “To impose liability 4 against a county for its failure to act, a plaintiff must show: (1) that a county employee 5 violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) that the county has customs or policies that 6 amount to deliberate indifference; and (3) that these customs or policies were the moving 7 force behind the employee's violation of constitutional rights.” Long v. Cnty. of L.A., 442 8 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). Defendant advances four 9 arguments as to why Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead a failure to act claim. 10 First, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s SAC cannot support a § 1983 claim because it 11 “does not allege facts to support the claim that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were 12 violated.” (Doc. No. 8-1, at 8.) Defendant argues that “medical malpractice in the 13 correctional setting is not the same as a constitutional violation” and that Plaintiff must 14 show evidence of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Id. This argument fails 15 as Plaintiff has adequately alleged a violation of her constitutional rights in the first cause 16 of action for a § 1983 claim. 17 Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s SAC fails to identify how municipal 18 policies or practices were unconstitutional or inadequate. (Doc. No. 8 at 10.) Plaintiff 19 argues that the SAC “alleges a policy of inaction, not a formal policy . . .” and that this 20 can be the basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 9 at 8.) Defendant responds 21 by arguing that “the ‘inaction’ and ‘inadequacies’ are not apparent from the SAC.” (Doc 22 No. 10 at 5.) 23 Plaintiff complaint alleges that Defendant maintained a policy of “inadequately 24 staffing its facilities with personal” and “maintaining grossly inadequate procedures and 25 protocols in the event inmates fac[ed] a serious medical condition” (Doc. No. 7 at ¶ 45.) 26 Plaintiff’s complaint also cites to a San Diego County Grand jury report that found in 2016, 27 before this incident, that “policies and procedures for screening, placement and monitoring 28 of detainees were obviously inadequate and need to be improved.” (Doc. No. 7 at ¶ 42.) 1 Plaintiff contends that if Defendants had not acted with “deliberate indifference to Ms. 2 Garot’s obvious, serious health needs and provided medical attention, Ms. Garot would not 3 presently by completely incapacitated . . .” (Doc. No. 7. at ¶ 37.) Plaintiff has alleged 4 sufficient facts to support its theory that the County has a policy of inaction in the screening 5 of pretrial detainees for serious medical problems which amounts to deliberate indifference 6 towards detainees’ medical needs. In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this 7 Court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable 8 inferences in favor of the claimant. See Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & 9 Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014). Based on the present allegations, the 10 complaint survives a motion to dismiss but Defendant may bring a motion for summary 11 judgment when the Court may consider evidence outside of the pleadings and the record is 12 more fully developed. 13 Third, Defendant contends that the SAC does not allege a pattern of similar 14 constitutional violations necessary to make out a case of deliberate indifference. (Doc. No. 15 8 at 12.) Plaintiff, citing to the San Diego County Grand jury finding before this incident 16 and a separate San Diego jury verdict holding the County liable for unsafe practices in the 17 treatment of detainees, argues that they have adequately pled a pattern of similar 18 constitutional violations. (Doc. No 7. at ¶ 42-43.) Defendant appropriately argues that the 19 San Diego jury verdict is from 2019 and is “insufficient to show notice to policymakers 20 before Plaintiff’s injury, which occurred a year prior, in 2018.” (Doc. No. 8 at 13.) 21 However, the events which gave rise to that verdict occurred in 2016 and could have put 22 policymakers on notice of a pattern of unsafe practices in the treatment of detainees before 23 2018. (Doc. No. 7. at 8-9.) The two instances Plaintiff cites are sufficient to satisfy the 24 pleading standard articulated in Twomby. 25 Fourth, Defendant argues that the SAC lacks factual allegations sufficient to 26 establish a causal link between Plaintiff’s alleged harm and the County policy. (Doc. No. 27 8 at 13.) Plaintiff responds by pointing out that the SAC alleges that if Ms. Garot had 28 received “proper medical care and been timely referred to a doctor” she would not 1 “presently be completely incapacitated . . . .” (Doc No. 9 at 10.) The Court views the facts 2 contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and must draw all 3 reasonable inferences in their favor. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. National League of 4 Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007). Give this pleading standard, the 5 Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss. 6 Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of 7 action. 8 C. State Law Immunity for Negligence and Professional Negligence 9 Since Plaintiff has adequately pled her 1983 claim the Court will also address the 10 state law causes of action.2 Plaintiff brings claims for negligence and professional 11 negligence against the Defendant Does and the County. “California public entities are not 12 subject to common law tort liability; all liability must be pursuant to statute.” AE ex rel. 13 Hernandez v. Cnty of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 638 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Cal. Gov't 14 Code § 815). The County seeks the dismissal of Plaintiff's negligence causes of action on 15 two different grounds: (1) the County is immune from liability 16 under California Government Code section 844.6(a)(2) and (2) that the County is immune 17 from liability under California Government Code section 855.6. (Doc. No. 8 at 20 and 21.)3 18 Defendant argues that he is immune from liability under California Government 19 Code section 844.6(a)(2). California Government Code Section 844.6, states “a public 20 entity is not liable for: (2) injury to any prisoner.” Plaintiff counters by citing to California 21 Government Code § 845.6, which states that an employee and public entity “is liable if the 22 employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical 23 care and fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” Plaintiff has alleged 24

25 2 If the Court subsequently dismisses or otherwise disposes of Plaintiff’s federal claim, the Court 26 reserves the right to decline jurisdiction over any remaining state claims. 3 The County also argues that it cannot be liable for negligence or professional negligence based 27 on Ms. Garot’s arrest which was pursuant to a warrant. (Doc. No. 8 at 15-18.) Plaintiff clarifies in her 28 Opposition that the basis for Ms. Garot’s claim for negligence is not based on her lawful arrest. (Doc. No. 1 that Defendant had reason to know that medical attention was required based on Ms. 2 Garot’s erratic behavior and visible wounds and that this bring the County within the ambit 3 of § 845.6. (Doc. No. 7 at ¶ 11,23.) At a motion to dismiss, the Court views the facts 4 contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and must draw all 5 reasonable inferences in their favor. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. National League of 6 Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a 7 delayed response to her injury which caused her harm and could establish liability under 8 California Code § 845.6. Defendant’s arguments are better suited to a motion for summary 9 judgment when the Court may consider evidence outside of the pleadings and the record is 10 more fully developed. 11 The County also argues that they are immune from liability under California 12 Government Code § 855.6. Section 855.6 shields a public employee from liability “for 13 injury caused by the failure to make a[n] examination, or to make an adequate [ ] 14 examination, . . . for the purpose of determining whether [a] person has a . . . mental 15 condition that would constitute a hazard to the health and safety of himself or others.” 16 Plaintiff argues that the immunity granted under Section 855.6 does not apply in 17 “situation[s] where the defendant fails to provide medical care for a prisoner in obvious 18 need of such care,” as set forth in Lum v. City of San Joaquin, 756 F.Supp.2d 1243 (E.D. 19 Cal. 2010). Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Defendant “had, or had reason to have, 20 actual knowledge that Ms. Garot was in need of medical care for her serious medical 21 condition, a skull fracture and traumatic brain injury, and evidenced by Ms. Garot’s black 22 eye, head abrasions, and incoherence.” (Doc. No. 7 at ¶ 60.) Plaintiff argues that the County 23 knew of these symptoms and yet wrongfully failed to order further evaluations. In 24 reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true all facts 25 alleged in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the claimant. See 26 Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th 27 Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' Motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Third 28 and Fifth Causes of Action. Defendant’s arguments are better suited to a motion for 1 summary judgment when the Court may consider evidence outside of the pleadings and 2 the record is more fully developed. 3 D. Failure to Summon Medical Care 4 Lastly, Plaintiff brings a claim for Failure to Summon Medical Care under California 5 Government Code Section 845.6 against the Defendant Does and the County. A claim for 6 failure to furnish medical care is based on a violation of California Government Code § 7 845.6, which states in pertinent part: 8 “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused 9 by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his 10 custody; but ... a public employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting 11 within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason 12 to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take 13 reasonable action to summon such medical care.” 14 Defendant argues that any misdiagnosis of Ms. Garot’s condition could not give rise 15 to liability as a “failure to summon under Section 845.6.” (Doc. No. 8 at 23.) Plaintiff 16 contends that this is a mischaracterization of the SAC’s allegations which claim instead 17 that “the County, through its agents, knew or ha[d] reason to know that Ms. Garot was in 18 need of immediate medical care and failed to take reasonable action to summon such 19 medical care.” (Doc. No. 9 at 18.) At a motion to dismiss, the Court views the facts 20 contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and must draw all 21 reasonable inferences in their favor. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. National League of 22 Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007). The second amended complaint is 23 enough to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 24 which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Based on the allegations of the complaint, 25 Plaintiff sets forth facts–disputed by Defendant–to support her claim of Failure to Summon 26 Medical Care. Defendant’s arguments are better suited to a motion for summary judgment

27 when the Court may consider evidence outside of the pleadings and the record is more fully 28 1 developed. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the failure to summon 2 medical care cause of action. 3 E. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 4 The County moves to dismiss all the causes of action asserted against it for failure 5 to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint 6 contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 7 relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose is to “give the defendant fair notice of what 8 the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration 9 and citation omitted). Plaintiff has adequately pled a cause of action for each of her claims. 10 Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to comply with 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. 12 Conclusion 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss. The Court 14 orders Defendant to answer Plaintiff’s complaint by December 13, 2019. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 DATED: November 13, 2019

17 MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge 18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28