Gariety v. Thornton

261 F. App'x 456
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 8, 2008
Docket06-2248
StatusUnpublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 261 F. App'x 456 (Gariety v. Thornton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gariety v. Thornton, 261 F. App'x 456 (4th Cir. 2008).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

This appeal marks at least the fifth occasion we have addressed the repercussions of the 1999 collapse of First National Bank of Keystone, in Keystone, West Virginia (“Keystone”). See F.D.I.C. v. Bakkebo, 506 F.3d 286 (4th Cir.2007) (civil action brought by FDIC); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356 (4th Cir.2004) (“Gariety I ”)(class action by persons who purchased stock prior to Keystone’s failure); United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658 (4th Cir.2003) (criminal appeal); United States v. Church, 11 Fed.Appx. 264 (4th Cir.2001) (unpublished) (same). The current action, styled “Gariety II,” is a lawsuit filed by individuals (the “Plaintiffs”) who purchased Keystone stock between September 28, 1998 and September 1, 1999, when Keystone was declared insolvent and closed by federal regulators.

The Plaintiffs filed a three-count complaint on April 15, 2002 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 2006), and named more than twenty defendants, including the following persons: Nancy Vorono, identified as the long-time secretary of Keystone’s President, J. Knox McConnell; Vida Headrick, a close personal friend of Billy Cherry (one of the principal criminal conspirators); Evelyn Herron, a bank manager of Keystone’s Bradshaw, West Virginia branch; and Jeanie Wimmer, a teller at the Bradshaw branch. On appeal, our inquiry centers only on Count One of the Plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleged a claim for unjust enrichment. Specifically, Count One alleged that the defendants “obtained the proceeds of the sales of their [Keystone] stocks by fraud,” or, “that [if] any of the Defendants obtained the proceeds of the sale of them Keystone stock without fraud, it is against equity for any such Defendant to be permitted to continue to hold such proceeds.” (J.A. at 418.)

The district court, following discovery, granted summary judgment in favor of Vorono, Headrick, Herron, and Wimmer, concluding that the Plaintiffs had put forth insufficient evidence that the four women obtained any property by way of wrongdoing. 1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the district court then entered an order of final judgment as to the unjust enrichment claim against the four women. The Plaintiffs have appealed, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 2006).

I.

Until the early 1990s, Keystone was a community bank in the small town of Keystone, West Virginia (population less than 1,000) with assets of around $17 million. The town of Keystone itself “looks like a movie set left over from Coal Miner’s Daughter.” Timothy Roche, Poor Town, *459 Rich Bank, Time Magazine, November 1, 1999. At that time McConnell, a Pittsburgh area banker who had taken control of the bank in 1977, embarked upon a growth strategy based upon acquiring sub-prime mortgage loans and Federal Housing Authority home improvement loans. On paper, this growth strategy was highly successful. In Gariety I we explained:

To pursue its loan securitization business, Keystone entered into financing relationships with other banks, paying higher than normal interest rates. In 1997, Keystone began to securitize its own high loan-to-value loans made to highly leveraged borrowers with little or no collateral. During these years, Keystone made its highly risky securitization business its principal business. From 1992, when Keystone had assets of $107 million, to 1999, Keystone’s business grew almost tenfold. In 1995, Keystone was reported to be one of the most profitable community banks in the nation, and by 1999, it reported assets of $1.1 billion. Keystone was listed No. 1 in American Banker’s June 1999 list of “the 75 most profitable large community banks,” with a “whopping” 7.24% return on average assets in 1998.

368 F.3d at 359.

During this time frame, however, Keystone was under near-constant investigation from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) for possible reporting violations and falsification of bank records.

In October 1997, McConnell passed away unexpectedly. Under his then-existing will, a large portion of his estate was bequeathed to Waynesburg College, a private college in Pennsylvania. Fearful that the College would scrutinize Keystone’s finances if it took control of McConnell’s stock, two high ranking employees, Terry Church and Billy Cherry, forged a codicil to McConnell’s will that devised McConnell’s stock to Cherry and Church instead of to Waynesburg College. In addition, the codicil created small gifts of $20,000 for certain Keystone employees, including Vorono. Cherry also added her name to all of McConnell’s bank accounts, creating joint ownership with survivorship in those accounts, and then transferring the funds from those accounts into her own separate accounts.

Despite the concealment efforts of Cherry and Church (which included burying boxes of bank records on Cherry’s farm), the OCC finally caught up with Keystone in 1999. In 1998, Keystone, pursuant to an agreement with the OCC, hired an outside accounting firm, Grant Thornton, LLP, to review Keystone’s books. Gariety I, 368 F.3d at 359. In May 1999, Grant Thornton issued a report declaring the bank to be on solid footing. Id. The OCC kept up its investigatory vigor, however, and in August 1999, the OCC verified that Keystone could not substantiate almost $515 million in loan assets, nearly one-half of its total assets. Id. at 360. On September 1, 1999, the OCC declared Keystone insolvent and closed the bank. Id. The Federal Deposit Insurance Company (“FDIC”) has since indicated that Keystone’s failure cost the FDIC between $750 million and $850 million. Id.

Summarizing Keystone’s actual performance during the 1990s, we noted:

A subsequent investigation by the Office of Inspector General determined that Keystone had been suffering heavy losses early in its growth period and that by late 1996 Keystone had become insolvent. Keystone concealed its financial condition by continuing to record loans as assets even after they had been sold to investors as part of a securitized loan pool. The Office of Inspector General concluded that “[ajlleged fraudulent ac *460 counting practices, uncooperative bank management and reported high profitability may have all served to mask the bank’s true financial condition from OCC examiners.”

ü

Gariety I, 368 F.3d at 360 (alteration in original).

The four defendants before us obtained Keystone stock as part of the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (“ESOP”). The ESOP was terminated in 1995.

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Related

John Doe v. Marymount Univ.
297 F. Supp. 3d 573 (E.D. Virginia, 2018)
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530 F.3d 280 (Fourth Circuit, 2008)

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261 F. App'x 456, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gariety-v-thornton-ca4-2008.