Cavanagh, C.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue presented in these cases calls upon the Court to construe MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2).1 Specifically, we must decide whether the statute requires an objective or subjective analysis when examining the significance of "actual events of employment” in determining the compensability of mental disabilities.
We hold that to establish a compensable mental disability claim, pursuant to MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2), a claimant must prove: (1) a mental disability; (2) arising out of the actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof; [28]*28and that (3) those events contributed to, aggravated, or accelerated the mental disability in a significant manner.
All that is statutorily required are "actual events of employment,” even if objectively unimportant, that contribute to, aggravate, or accelerate a mental disability in a significant manner.
Although the statutory test embodied in MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2), does contain objective elements, it is not a purely objective test. If one concentrates on the individual worker, as opposed to an average worker, the statutory test has substantial subjective elements as well.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
All three of these worker’s compensation cases involve mental disability claims based on MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2). All the plaintiffs allege that events and or stress from their respective jobs contributed to, aggravated, or accelerated their mental disability. All three claim a date of injury after January 1, 1982, the effective date of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2).
There being no showing of fraud, we take the factual findings of the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board as conclusive. Const 1963, art 6, §28.
A. BACH v FLINT BOARD OF EDUCATION
Plaintiff worked for two years as a secretary for one of defendant’s elementary schools where Sandra Epps was the principal. She testified that her relationship with Epps initially was cordial. In fact, her first performance review conducted by Epps indicated that she was a satisfactory employee. However, plaintiff soon began to feel alien[29]*29ated. She testified that her emotional and physical problems began in late September or early October of 1981.
Plaintiff felt that Epps was unresponsive to her questions, and she claimed that, at times, Epps snapped at her or answered her questions harshly. Plaintiff also alleged that a number of specific work events added to her feelings of alienation.
One such event occurred when Epps had all members of the staff switch jobs for half a day. Plaintiff performed the duties of a math teacher. She claimed that this made her feel uncomfortable because teaching math was not her job. Another event occurred when Epps had plaintiff tell a substitute teacher that the teacher was fired. Plaintiff initially refused, but Epps told her to think of some excuse and eventually made her dismiss the substitute. Plaintiff claimed that this event upset her. Similarly, she also claimed that Epps had her tell callers that Epps was not in when she was, and that this made her feel uneasy.
Another event involved a school bulletin board. Plaintiff maintained a bulletin board and changed the posted information monthly. Once, when school district administrators were visiting, Epps took responsibility for the bulletin board herself. Plaintiff felt that Epps had done a poor job on the bulletin board and that Epps had shown it off as a "fantastic job.” Epps failed to acknowledge plaintiff’s contribution in the day-to-day maintenance of the bulletin board. This upset her.
One of the most significant events involved plaintiff’s second performance review. She was disturbed by the fact that the second review showed no improvement. She felt that she had made significant improvement in her performance between reviews. Epps’ failure to acknowledge plaintiff’s perceived improvement upset her. Al[30]*30though she did not say anything at first, she eventually did write a letter to Epps indicating her disappointment. When Epps failed to acknowledge receiving the letter, she approached Epps about the issues she had raised. Plaintiff and Epps discussed the letter, but she left with the impression that the discussion had been fruitless. Their relationship continued to deteriorate after that meeting.
Plaintiff developed headaches and stomach pains, had irregular sleeping patterns, and became depressed. She lost weight, stayed in bed, and stopped doing household chores. After December 1981, she only went to work one or two times a week. Her mental condition steadily worsened. Her last day of work was February 3, 1982.
Epps testified that she was never aware of plaintiff’s discomfort. Epps explained her telephone policy, that plaintiff had seemed to enjoy switching jobs for a half day, that numerous people shared responsibility for the bulletin board, and that she deleted some of the comments she made in plaintiff’s second performance review after meeting with plaintiff.
Expert testimony went both ways regarding whether plaintiff was mentally disabled. Two doctors diagnosed two different forms of depression; another believed plaintiff was not suffering from any active psychiatric disorder.
The wcab denied plaintiff’s claim because, under MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2), it was not convinced that plaintiff’s disability was related to actual events of employment that plaintiff accurately perceived. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the wcab.
Actual "events” did occur in the course of plaintiff’s employment. But the meaning plaintiff [31]*31ascribed to these events, which was the basis for the concerns that led to her claimed disability, was not necessarily accurate. There was no convincing showing that Epps was dissatisfied with plaintiff’s work or that Epps would not willingly answer plaintiff’s questions. There was no convincing evidence showing that plaintiff’s working relationship with Epps deteriorated as plaintiff thought it did. [197 Mich App 247, 251; 494 NW2d 815 (1992).]
That Court concluded that the evidence, when viewed from an objective standard, did not support plaintiff’s claim for compensation.
B. BOYLE v DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION
For nearly thirty years, plaintiff worked for defendant as a teacher. During the bulk of his last fifteen years, he was an art teacher at Cooley High School.
Plaintiff testified that his mental distress began in the seventies. Student conduct markedly declined, and his art class became a "dumping ground” for problem students who were failing other subjects. He flunked eighty to ninety percent of his students in some classes because of high absenteeism or inattention. He testified that tardiness was also a serious problem; students in his first-hour classes would straggle in thirty or forty minutes late. Plaintiff found the tardiness problem to be very stressful.
Plaintiff was also upset by incidents that occurred in his classroom when he was not using it. He shared the room with another teacher, Robert Williams. Plaintiff felt that Williams did not maintain proper control of his students. He alleged that Williams let his students carve their initials on the tables and let paint drip on the chairs and [32]*32floor. He reported his concerns to the director of the art program, but apparently nothing came of it.
Cutbacks in the art department’s budget meant the cancellation of plaintiff’s advanced classes. This left him with students who only took his basic art class because they needed an elective course, art being one of the few electives available. Plaintiff called his advanced classes the bright spot of his day. After the cancellation of those classes, he became increasingly depressed by the caliber of students he was left to teach.
Plaintiff was also troubled by actions of the faculty and administration. He believed that some teachers had sex with students. He regarded such relationships as unprofessional.
Plaintiff started to use sick days so that he would not have to go to work. He began drinking heavily during the last four to five years of his employment. On October 28, 1983, he was helping a student draw a face when his hand began to shake uncontrollably. He went home after work and proceeded to go on a rampage. He destroyed his apartment and apparently attempted suicide.
On November 10, 1983, plaintiff was admitted to Woodside Medical, a facility described by the wcab as being for the "emotionally disturbed and alcoholics.” He was treated for alcohol dependency, given psychiatric counseling, and released on November 30, 1983.
Plaintiff briefly returned to work. January 4, 1984, turned out to be his last day of work. On that day, one of his. students opened the classroom door before the bell rang. When plaintiff told him to close it, the student responded by calling him a "crazy, old loony.” The remainder of the class began chanting the phrase. Plaintiff left work and never returned.
[33]*33Plaintiff filed a claim for mental disability benefits, claiming his emotional breakdown was due to mistreatment he received from students, coworkers, and administrators.
The experts agreed plaintiff was disabled, but disagreed on the cause. One doctor stated plaintiff’s inability to work was directly related to the stress of his employment; another attributed it to alcoholism.
The wcab denied plaintiff benefits because, under MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2), the events alleged by him did not establish that a work-related personal injury had arisen out of actual events of employment.
Assuming that plaintiff is disabled, we are not convinced that his disability occurred in or out of the course of his employment. We find that plaintiff has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he has incurred a disabling injury arising out of or in the course of his employment. [Unpublished opinion of the wcab, decided May 23, 1990 (Decision No. 645).]
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Workers’ compensation benefits are not available just because a plaintiff establishes the existence of some incident or "event” that is upsetting to the plaintiff. There must be an injury. The Legislature has required the injury to be based upon the "actual events” of employment. Sections 301(2) and 401(2)(b). This requirement would become meaningless if the ordinary daily conditions and minutiae of employment were sufficient to support a mental disability claim. Thus, ordinary stresses of employment (existing in probably all jobs) are not sufficient to establish the required injury. [197 Mich App 255, 260; 494 NW2d 818 (1992).]
[34]*34C. GARDNER v VAN BUREN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Between 1978 and 1984, plaintiff worked as a janitor for defendant in various schools. Plaintiff had difficulties with some of his supervisors and co-workers. He cited several events during which his supervisors and co-workers allegedly had mistreated him. He complained that he was given extra work, his supervisors sometimes gave him conflicting instructions, and his co-workers were jealous of his expensive home. The thought of losing his job devastated him.
Plaintiff believed that a supervisor conspired with other employees to have him fired. He discovered that the supervisor had offered some employees time off if they would assist in discovering whether he had a second job, which was against school policy.
Plaintiff’s co-workers and supervisors testified that plaintiff was a poor employee. Some of the witnesses even testified that he threatened them or their families with physical harm. Plaintiff also regularly used profanity at work.
The co-workers’ testimony confirmed that plaintiff had been given extra work (along with others to compensate for layoffs), and that plaintiff’s work was reduced following a grievance hearing. The testimony also showed that certain employees had been offered time off in exchange for "checking up” on the plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s last day of work was June 4, 1984. He filed for mental disability benefits, alleging that constant on-the-job harassment led to his mental disability.
The experts agreed plaintiff was disabled, but again differed on the causes. One doctor stated that plaintiff’s disorder was directly caused by [35]*35stress at work; the other felt it resulted from his genetic makeup.
The wcab awarded benefits, finding plaintiff to be suffering from a compensable mental disability. It concluded that plaintiff suffered a personal injury due to the grievance proceeding and the supervisor’s actions in checking up on the plaintiff. Further, it held that these two events actually occurred and that they contributed to plaintiff’s mental disability in a significant manner.
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding error in the wcab’s reasoning.
An objective analysis is used to determine whether a personal injury (usually in the form of a precipitating work-related event in mental disability cases) significantly affected an employee’s mental condition. Boyle v Detroit Bd of Ed, 197 Mich App 255; [494] NW2d [818] (1992); Sobh v Frederick & Herrud, Inc, 189 Mich App 24, 28; 472 NW2d 8 (1991). As in Sobh, in this case the wcab did not indicate why an objective person would find significant the two incidents that the wcab found satisfied the requirement of a personal injury. [197 Mich App 265, 270; 494 NW2d 845 (1992).]
III. COMPENSABILITY OF MENTAL DISABILITY IN MICHIGAN
Mental disability, in one form or another,2 has been recognized as a compensable injury in this [36]*36state for over seventy years. Before the legislative amendments of the worker’s compensation act in 1982, embodied in 1980 PA 357, the compensability of a mental disability arising from the ordinary events of employment was governed by a line of cases beginning with Carter v General Motors Corp, 361 Mich 577; 106 NW2d 105 (1960).
Carter involved a machine worker with a predisposition for paranoid schizophrenia. The worker filed for benefits, claiming that emotional pressures from his daily work triggered his psychosis.3
The central issue in Carter was whether a mental disability is compensable when it results from a series of ordinary employment events. The disability in Carter was unique because the claimant became disabled as a result of stress that gradually accumulated from ordinary events.
[The claimant’s] disability was caused by emotional pressures produced by production line employment not shown by him to be unusual in any respect, — that is, not shown by him to be any different from the emotional pressures encountered by his fellow workers in similar employment. [Id. at 585.]
Nonetheless, the Court found that mental disability, triggered by ordinary employment events and pressure, could be compensable.
Carter was expanded by this Court in the controversial Deziel v Difco Laboratories, Inc (After [37]*37Remand), 403 Mich 1; 268 NW2d 1 (1978). In Deziel,4 this Court articulated a three-step inquiry to determine the compensability of mental disabilities. Under Deziel, a claimant had to prove: (1) a mental disability; (2) arising out of a personal injury (defined as a precipitating work-related event); and (3) an honest, even if mistaken, perception that the employment-related injury was responsible for the disability. Id. at 35-37.
This Court determined that the proper causal standard to be applied in mental disability cases was a subjective one:
We hold, as a matter of law, that in cases involving mental (including psychoneurotic or psychotic) injuries, once a plaintiff is found disabled and a personal injury is established, it is sufficient that a strictly subjective causal nexus be utilized by referees and the wcab to determine compensability. Under a "strictly subjective causal nexus” standard, a claimant is entitled to compensation if it is factually established that claimant honestly perceives some personal injury incurred during the ordinary work of his employment "caused” his disability. This standard applies where the plaintiff alleges a disability resulting from either a physical or mental stimulus and honestly, even though mistakenly, believes that he is disabled due to that work-related injury and therefore cannot resume his normal employment. See anno: Workmen’s compensation: Neurasthenia as compensable, 44 ALR 500.
The focal point of this standard is the plaintiff’s own perception of reality. [Id. at 26. Emphasis in original.]
[38]*38Deziel expressly rejected application of an objective causal standard.
Any attempt to take the inquiry to an objective level, i.e., "did claimant’s employment really combine with some internal weakness or disease to produce the disability?,” is bound to lead to frustration and eventually ad hoc manipulation. This is true because in most cases the question is unanswerable. [Id. at 31. Emphasis in original.]
Dissatisfied with the majority’s subjective causal analysis, Justice Coleman dissented. She suggested an alternative standard:
The relevant inquiry is whether claimant’s employment did, in fact, "aggravate, accelerate or combine with some internal weakness or disease to produce the disability.”14 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 12.20.
We would add the caveat that the fact finder will have to find more than a "de minimis” relationship between the mental disorder and the occupation before awarding compensation. In other words, in light of the acknowledged relationship between symptoms and non-occupational events, the causal connection must be established in some substantial degree.
[Id. at 61.]
It appears therefore, that although Justice Coleman was dissatisfied with the "honest perception” causal standard, she too was reluctant to abandon a basic tenet of worker’s compensation law: employers take employees as they find them. For her, [39]*39the question was not whether the employment would have caused mental disability in an "average” employee. Rather, it was whether the employment did, in fact, play a significant role in aggravating or accelerating a particular employee’s mental disability.
Deziel was revisited briefly in Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531; 377 NW2d 300 (1985), and Peters v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 423 Mich 594; 377 NW2d 774 (1985). In Hurd, the Court held that MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2), applies to all personal injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1982. In Peters, the Court held that it would not reevaluate the Deziel standard because the legislative amendment5 of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2), made such a reevaluation unnecessary. Additionally, this Court wanted to avoid creating a third judicial standard for mental disability cases.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE REACTION TO DEZIEL
Justice Coleman was not the only person dissatisfied with Deziel. In 1980, the Legislature amended the definition of "personal injury” under chapters 36 and 47 of the worker’s compensation [40]*40act8 by enacting 1980 PA 357. Public Act 357 amended both chapters to explicitly provide compensation for work-related mental disabilities.
In terms of understanding the purpose of 1980 PA 357, the legislative history provides some insight. Apparently, some members of the Legislature believed that the unamended statute did "not prescribe definite standards as to what constitutes compensable heart or mental disabilities.” Workers’ Compensation Reform Task Force, Report of the Special Committee to Study Workers’ Compensation, December 1980, Issue No 2c. Moreover, proponents of the bill maintained that "the lack of such standards has led to reckless judicial interpretation of the disability standard as it applies to heart and mental cases resulting in compensation being paid to workers whose disability was not work related.” Id.; see also Dean v Chrysler Corp, 434 Mich 655, 666-667; 455 NW2d 699 (1990).
So it was the lack of legislative standards combined with "reckless” judicial interpretations that led the Legislature to consider comprehensive reform of the worker’s compensation act. A part of that reform was SB 1044, which became 1980 PA 357. The legislative analysis of SB 1044 notes that the act was intended to
limit compensation for heart conditions and mental disability to cases where employment is shown to have contributed significantly to the condition.
After December 31, 1981, mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process including heart [41]*41and cardiovascular conditions will be compensable only if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the condition of employment in a significant manner. Mental disability will be compensable if it arises out of actual events of employment; an employee’s unfounded perceptions of the employment and its relationship to a mental disability will not be sufficient to substantiate a claim for compensation. [Senate Analysis Service, SB 1044, Second Analysis, January 7, 1981.]
Insight into legislative intent is also provided by examining the economic conditions of the early eighties which fueled much of the political debate concerning comprehensive worker’s compensation reform.
Beginning in late 1979, Michigan’s economy had begun to slow. As the nation moved into a recession, the resulting downturn in auto production started to have a severe effect on the general public in terms of high inflation and high [unemployment. ... By early 1980 Michigan’s economic problems were clearly going from bad to worse, and some individuals and groups not usually concerned about the state’s "business climate” began to express some concern that the legislature should do something about the real or perceived problem of workers’ compensation in an effort to forestall any further plant closings or relocations. [VanderLaan & Studley, Workers’ compensation reform: A case study on the legislative process in Michigan, 14 U Mich J L Ref 451, 454 (1981).]
Several senators made comments on the senate floor regarding the motivation behind the reform movement. Senator Welborn noted:
Since 1979, and prior to that, 1978 during the elections, everybody said that worker’s compensation is the highest priority in the State of Michi[42]*42gan. We cannot afford to lose industry and jobs in this state. [1980 Journal of the Senate 820.]
Echoing these sentiments, Senator Guastello commented:
I think we, in Michigan, are leading the nation and perhaps the tip [sic] into one of the most serious economic dilemmas, if not depressions, that this country has ever seen. ... I think it is incumbent upon all of us who serve here today to do everything that we can do, personally, practically and expediently to solve the problems facing the business community in the State of Michigan .... [1980 Journal of the Senate 822.]
Although most agree that 1980 PA 357 was meant to be a substantive change in the law, tightening the requirements for compensable mental disabilities, there is little agreement about exactly what that change means.
v. DISCUSSION
A
We begin by acknowledging the obvious: the Legislature has seen fit to make mental disabilities compensable under this state’s worker’s compensation act. Worker’s compensation law is an area of the law committed to the discretion of the Legislature. The ultimate social and economic goals of the worker’s compensation act are for the Legislature, not the courts, to decide. Our duty is merely to determine whether a particular disability is compensable, given the statutory scheme.
Thus the only task facing this Court is to determine what standards are mandated by MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2). In so doing, this Court need not hone the analytical knife sharper [43]*43than the statutory language requires. Deziel, supra at 60, n 13 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
The statutory provision at issue in these cases provides:
Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant manner. Mental disabilities shall be compensable when arising out of actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof. [MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)2). Emphasis added.]
B
Initially, we are faced with the problem of distinguishing between "actual events of employment” and "unfounded perceptions thereof.” A basic maxim of statutory construction is that statutes are to be construed to avoid absurd results. Franges v General Motors Corp, 404 Mich 590, 612; 274 NW2d 392 (1979). Although we make no attempt in this opinion to define what a "mental” disability is, we are cognizant of the fact that to some degree many, if not all, mental disabilities are based on "unfounded perceptions” of "reality” or "actual events.” An unfounded perception of reality is the very characteristic that distinguishes a mentally disabled person from a "normal” person.
In finding solutions to their unconscious problems, psychoneurotics and psychotics develop personality problems which make it difficult for them to adapt to reality as it is encountered by so-called "average” or "normal” individuals. This failure of the psychoneurotic or psychotic’s reactions and [44]*44adjustment mechanisms can either distort his perception of reality or, in the worst psychotic cases, cause the individual to lose contact with reality .... [Deziel, supra at 29. See also Peters, supra at 626 ("by definition, the [mental disability] claimant may misperceive reality”) (Riley, J., dissenting).]
Thus if one reads MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2) as prohibiting compensation for claims based on unfounded perceptions of actual events, as opposed to prohibiting compensation for claims based on imagined or hallucinatory events, then one is left with a statute that makes little sense. Where the first part of the provision states that certain work-related mental disabilities shall be compensable, the last part excludes the vast majority of all mental disabilities, those based on unfounded perceptions of actual events. What the legislative right hand gives, the left takes. This is an absurd result. This Court has consistently attempted to construe statutes so as to avoid absurd results, and our construction of this statute will be no different.
c
It is also axiomatic that courts are to give effect to legislative intent. In re Certified Question, 433 Mich 710, 722; 449 NW2d 660 (1989). We acknowledge, as shown by the legislative history, that 1980 PA 357 was enacted to invalidate Deziel, thus effecting a substantive change in the law. We are equally aware of the fact that the legislative history indicates that one goal of that act was to restrict expansive interpretations of the worker’s compensation act, such as Deziel. However, one must not lose sight of what Deziel established and thus what 1980 PA 357 invalidated.
[45]*45Deziel established a subjective causal analysis based on the honest perceptions of the claimant. The honest perception test has two major problems, which we presume the Legislature intended to change: (1) it allows a compensable disability to be based on imagined events, and (2) it does away with any need to prove a factual causal connection between the disability and the employment events. In enacting 1980 PA 357, the Legislature intended to eliminate Deziel's honest perception test and its subjective causal analysis by requiring "actual events” and a "significant” causal connection.
The Legislature effected its change of the first Deziel problem by requiring that mental disabilities be based on actual events of employment. Courts and commentators alike realized that Deziel's honest perception test permits a mental disability claim to be based on imagined, hallucinatory, or delusional events. In other words, the honest perception test permits compensation to be based on "unfounded perceptions” that actual events of employment did occur.
This problem is exemplified by this Court’s handling of MacKenzie v Fisher Body, a companion case decided in Deziel. In MacKenzie, the wcab held:
"[W]e attempted then, and now, to exclude situations where the claimed compensable disability arose from an imagined/perceived/hallucinated stimulus that has not been proven [to have] existed or [to have taken] place, even in the most normal form — except in the mind of the recipient.
"Applied to the facts of this case ... we are forced by the medical description of plaintiff’s personality to find that it is at least as likely an [46]*46inference that these [events] were imagined.” [Deziel, supra at 20. Emphasis in original.]
This Court reversed and held that had the wcab applied a strictly subjective standard for establishing the causal nexus in MacKenzie, it would have awarded compensation. Thus the precedent was established in this state that even imagined, hallucinatory, or delusional events could form the basis of a compensable mental disability notwithstanding the fact that there was no causal connection between the employment and the disability.
Dissatisfied with this result, the Legislature enacted the "actual events” language, thereby partially invalidating Deziel’s honest perception test. No longer can imaginary events form the basis of a compensable mental disability claim. A claimant must prove that actual employment events occurred as a matter of objective fact.
The Legislature completed its invalidation of Deziel by addressing the second Deziel problem. It realized that merely requiring a claimed disability to arise out of actual employment events was not sufficient to ensure that a given claim is truly work related. Therefore, the Legislature not only requires "actual events of employment,” but also requires that those events contribute to, aggravate or accelerate the claimant’s disability "in a significant manner.”
The significant manner requirement does away with Deziel’s failure to require any factual causal connection whatsoever between the injury and the employment. Under Deziel, a claimant was considered disabled simply because of an honest belief of disability. The significant manner requirement now forces a claimant to actually prove a signifi[47]*47cant factual causal connection between the actual events of employment and the mental disability.
The significant manner requirement also imposes on claimants a higher standard of proof. Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 216; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). Although Farrington deals specifically with heart disease, the significant manner requirement at issue in that case is the same requirement as we are construing here. It is, in fact, contained in the very same provisions. Not surprisingly, the analysis developed in Farrington for determining the significance of work-related events applies in mental disability cases as well.
Under the statutory standard, causation is determined by the factfinder. It is not determined by the honest, even if unfounded, perceptions of the claimant. In determining whether specific events of employment contribute to, aggravate, or accelerate a mental disability in a significant manner, the factfinder must consider the totality of the occupational circumstances along with the totality of a claimant’s mental health in general.
The analysis must focus on whether actual events of employment affected the mental health of the claimant in a significant manner. This analysis will, by necessity, require a comparison of nonemployment and employment factors. Once actual employment events have been shown to have occurred, the significance of those events to the particular claimant must be judged against all the circumstances to determine whether the resulting mental disability is compensable.9
D
In construing this statute, we are also mindful [48]*48of the presumption that the Legislature is aware of judicial interpretations of existing law when passing legislation. Dean, supra at 667, n 18. Perhaps nowhere is this more relevant than in the field of worker’s compensation law which has a long and well-established legal history in this state. There are certain longstanding principles of worker’s compensation law that are implicated in almost all compensation cases — principles that have not been altered by 1980 PA 357.
For example, it is well established that employers take employees as they find them, with all preexisting mental and physical frailties. A claimant’s preexisting condition does not bar recovery:
Nothing is better settled in compensation law than that the act takes the workmen as they arrive at the plant gate. Some are weak and some are strong. Some, particularly as age advances, have a pre-existing "disease or condition” and some have not. No matter. All must work. They share equally the hazards of the press and their families the stringencies of want, and they all, in our opinion, share equally in the protection of the act in event of accident, regardless of their prior condition of health. [Sheppard v Michigan Nat’l Bank, 348 Mich 577, 584; 83 NW2d 614 (1957) (Smith, J., concurring).]
Worker’s compensation law in this state has also recognized that even the most trivial physical event can lead to a compensable physical injury. Zaremba v Chrysler Corp, 377 Mich 226, 231; 139 NW2d 745 (1966). The issue is not whether a person of "reasonable” or "average” health would have been injured. It is whether a specific individual, regardless of preexisting conditions, sustained an injury that arose out of, and in the course of employment. Absent an explicit legislative man[49]*49date, mental disabilities should not be treated differently.10
Further supporting our reading of this statute is the fact that the worker’s compensation act is remedial legislation, and, as such, it is to be liberally construed. Bower v Whitehall Leather Co, 412 Mich 172, 191; 312 NW2d 640 (1981). The primary intent underlying the worker’s compensation act is to provide compensation to eligible persons for covered disabilities. Accordingly, any statutory ambiguity should generally be construed in favor of awarding compensation. Id.Id. Deziel, supra at 34-35.
E
This Court recognizes that actual events of employment, even if "ordinary,” can be injurious to the mental health of a predisposed individual. The statute, by excluding "unfounded perceptions” of the actual events of employment, excludes situations in which the claimed events never occurred (i.e., where they are imagined, hallucinatory or delusional).
Although the statutory test embodied in MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2), does contain objective elements, it is not a purely objective test. The events must be objectively proven to have occurred; they cannot be based on the subjective, imaginary beliefs of the claimant. Furthermore, the causal connection must be objectively established given a particular claimant’s preexisting mental frailties. However, by focusing on the individual worker, as opposed to an average worker, both the significant manner requirement and the [50]*50actual events requirement also have substantial subjective elements.
It is, therefore, irrelevant how a "reasonable” person would react to the objectively established actual events. The relevant inquiry, and the only inquiry presently required by worker’s compensation law in this state, is: Did the actual events of employment occur, and do these bear a significant relationship to the mental disabilities? Reduced to its simplest form, the analysis is this: Given actual events and a particular claimant, with all the claimant’s preexisting mental frailties, can the actual events objectively be said to have contributed to, aggravated, or accelerated the claimant’s mental disability in a significant manner?
This type of inquiry places the focus where it should be: on the authenticity of the underlying event and the significance of its relationship to the resulting disability.
VI. APPLICATION
Turning to the cases at bar, it is clear that the Court of Appeals in all three cases applied a purely objective standard. We reject this standard. Had the Legislature desired to make mental disabilities compensable only when they arise out of unusual events or events likely to cause mental disability in a "reasonable” person, it could have easily and explicitly done so. It did not. Consequently, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in all three cases.
We hold that the wcab in Bach and Boyle applied a purely objective standard as well. De[51]*51spite the narrow scope of appellate review in these cases, we find that the wcab erred in determining the proper legal standard to be applied. Const 1963, art 6, § 28; MCL 418.861a(14); MSA 17.237(861a)(14). Accordingly, we reverse the rulings of the wcab in Bach and Boyle, and we remand these cases to the wcac for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We hold that the wcab applied the correct legal analysis in Gardner and thus we affirm its holding. The wcab held:
No psychiatric testimony has been presented that plaintiff is not disabled. We see no other finding except that he [Gardner] is unable to function psychiatrically in the workplace.
. . . [T]he fact that plaintiff was required to be subjected to a grievance hearing in regard to excess work and the fact that plaintiff was checked up on by his superiors are not unfounded perceptions, but are fact. . . .
Third, we must determine whether the employment significantly aggravated plaintiff’s condition. We find, based on the medical testimony of Dr. Feldstein, that the employment did indeed significantly contribute to plaintiff’s condition. [Unpublished opinion of the wcab, decided September 24, 1990 (Decision No. 1176).]
Although the wcab in Gardner purported to base its analysis on Deziel, it found a mental disability arising out of actual events of employment. It further found that the events of employment significantly aggravated the mental disability. This analysis, in fact, comports with our interpretation of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2).
[52]*52VII. CONCLUSION
We hold that to establish a compensable mental disability claim arising on or after January 1, 1982, a claimant must prove: (1) a mental disability; (2) arising out of the actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof; and that (3) those events contributed to, aggravated, or accelerated the mental disability in a significant manner.
We believe that our interpretation of 1980 PA 357 serves the legislative intent of restricting Deziel’s expansive causal analysis based on a claimant’s honest perceptions, while still providing compensation for mental disabilities. Our interpretation is also in accord with established worker’s compensation law in this state. Employers take employees as they find them. Allowing actual, if seemingly unimportant, events to form the basis of a compensable mental disability treats mental injuries the same as physical injuries.
We reject application of a purely objective standard when examining causation in mental disability cases. We will not infer such a radical change in this state’s worker’s compensation law merely because there is some ambiguity in a given statutory provision.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in all three cases. We reinstate the award of compensation made by the wcab in Gardner, and we remand to the wcac in Bach and Boyle for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Levin, Boyle, and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.