Garcia v. Seven Seas Associates, LLC

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 3, 2022
• Docket: 3:21-cv-00294
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 21-CV-294 JLS (MDD) ORLANDO GARCIA, an individual,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 13 BEST WESTERN INTERNATIONAL, v. INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS 14

SEVEN SEAS ASSOCIATES, LLC, a 15 (ECF No. 12) California Limited Liability Company;

16 BEST WESTERN INTERNATIONAL, INC., an Arizona Corporation; and 17 DOES 1-10, 18 Defendants. 19

21 Presently before the Court is Defendant Best Western International, Inc.’s 22 (“Defendant” or “BWI”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“Mot.,” 23 ECF No. 12). Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant’s Motion (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 14), 24 and Defendant filed a reply in support of its Motion (“Reply,” ECF No. 16). The Court 25 took this matter under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 26 7.1(d)(1). See ECF No. 15. Having carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s First Amended 27 Complaint (“FAC,” ECF No. 1-2, Ex. A), the Parties’ arguments, and the law, the Court 28 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion. 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff Orlando Garcia sues Seven Seas Associates, LLC (“Seven Seas”) and BWI 3 for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Unruh Civil Rights 4 Act (“Unruh Act”). See FAC at 1. Plaintiff’s claims are based on 20 C.F.R. § 36.302(e) 5 (“Reservations Rule”). 6 Plaintiff suffers from cerebral palsy and is limited in his ability to walk. FAC ¶ 1. 7 As such, he uses a wheelchair, walker, or cane for mobility. Id. Plaintiff is also a frequent 8 traveler and is “always on the lookout for businesses that violate the law or discriminate 9 against him,” with the intent to “have [discriminatory businesses] comply with the law and 10 pay statutory penalties.” Id. ¶ 20. Due to Plaintiff’s physical limitations, when he travels 11 he requires an accessible hotel room that includes clearance around the beds and throughout 12 the guestroom, as well as accessible sinks, tubs or showers, and toilets in the restrooms. 13 Id. ¶ 15. “In short, he benefits from and needs compliant accessible guestroom features.” 14 Id. 15 In preparation for a trip to San Diego, California in October 2020, Plaintiff visited 16 the website of the Best Western Seven Seas Hotel (“the Hotel”) on September 23, 2020. 17 Id. ¶¶ 13, 16. Seven Seas owns and operates the Hotel, and BWI owns and operates the 18 bestwestern.com website. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. Plaintiff noted that the bestwestern.com website 19 advertises the Hotel as having “‘Accessible bathrooms and features, including shower/tub’, 20 ‘Accessible clear floor space’, ‘Accessible parking spaces and signage (car and van)’, and 21 ‘An accessible reception desk or accessible folding shelf or reception area.’” Id. ¶ 17. The 22 “Mobility Accessible 1 Queen Bed” room tab advertised both a “Roll In Shower, Mobility 23 Accessible” and a “Bathtub, Mobility Accessible.” Id. The “Mobility Accessible 2 Double 24 Beds Room” also advertised a “Bathtub, Mobility Accessible.” Id. 25 /// 26 27 1 The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint are accepted as true for purposes of Defendant’s 28 Motion. See Vasquez v. Los Angles Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, in ruling on 1 Plaintiff chose the Hotel due to its desirable price and location but was 2 uncomfortable with the “lack of information” regarding accessibility on the Hotel website, 3 including the “vague and conclusory statements” pertaining to the accessible hotel rooms 4 that “do not contain enough information to assess if the room and hotel are accessible.” Id. 5 ¶¶ 14, 18. Ultimately, Plaintiff alleges he was deterred from patronizing the Hotel because 6 he was unable to “assess independently whether the particular guestroom met his 7 accessibility needs” through the website. Id. ¶ 18. 8 Plaintiff filed the initial complaint in San Diego County Superior Court on October 9 7, 2020 and the operative FAC on December 15, 2020. See ECF No. 1. On February 18, 10 2021, BWI removed the case to this Court. ECF No. 1. BWI filed the present Motion on 11 March 25, 2021. See ECF No. 12. 12 LEGAL STANDARD 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 14 defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” 15 generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint 16 states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil 17 Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 18 pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual 19 allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- 20 harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 21 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation to 22 provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 23 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 24 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A 25 complaint will not suffice “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 26 enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 27 To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 28 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 1 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 2 when the facts pled “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 3 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 4 556). That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but there must be “more than a 5 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent 6 with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting 7 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). This review requires context-specific analysis involving the 8 Court’s “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 675 (citation omitted). “[W]here 9 the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 10 misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is 11 entitled to relief.’” Id. 12 “In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true 13 all facts alleged in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 14 plaintiff.” Wi-LAN Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 382 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2019) 15 (citing Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 16 945 (9th Cir. 2014)). Where a complaint does not survive 12(b)(6) analysis, the Court will 17 grant leave to amend unless it determines that no modified contention “consistent with the 18 challenged pleading . . . [will] cure the deficiency.” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 19 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture 20 Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). 21 ANALYSIS 22 As relevant to the present Motion, Plaintiff’s FAC asserts two claims against BWI: 23 (1) a violation of the ADA; and (2) a violation of the Unruh Act. FAC ¶¶ 25–28. BWI 24 contends that the Court must dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims against it because Plaintiff 25 fails to state any claim on which relief may be granted. See Mot. at 6. Defendant argues 26 that it cannot be liable under the Reservations Rule because it is not an entity that owns, 27 leases, or operates a place of lodging. Id. at 7–8. Whether Defendant owns, leases, or 28 /// 1 operates a place of lodging is a threshold issue here and as it is ultimately dispositive, this 2 is the only argument raised in BWI’s Motion that the Court will address. 3 Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of a disability in the full 4 and equal enjoyment of . . . any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 5 leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 6 To prevail on a Title III claim, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she is disabled within the 7 meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a 8 place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations 9 by the defendant because of her disability.” Love v. Wildcats Owner LLC, No. 20-CV- 10 08913-DMR, 2021 WL 1253739, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2021) (quoting Molski v. M.J. 11 Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007)). 12 Pursuant to the Reservations Rule promulgated under the ADA: 13 A public accommodation that owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of lodging shall . . . Modify its policies, 14 practices, or procedures to ensure that individuals with 15 disabilities can make reservations for accessible guest rooms during the same hours and in the same manner as individuals who 16 do not need accessible rooms [and] identify and describe 17 accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms offered through its reservations service in enough detail to reasonably permit 18 individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether a 19 given hotel or guest room meets his or her accessibility needs[.]

21 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1). The Ninth Circuit has held that a “place of public 22 accommodation,” as the term is used in Title III of the ADA, refers to “actual, physical 23 places where goods or services are open to the public, and places where the public gets 24 those goods or services.” Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 25 1114 (9th Cir. 2000). However, entities covered by the ADA must “ensure that no 26 individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated 27 differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services.” 28 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). Title III’s “auxiliary aids and services” requirement can 1 apply to a place of public accommodation’s website. Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 2 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The statute applies to the services of a place of public 3 accommodation, not services in a place of public accommodation. To limit the ADA to 4 discrimination in the provision of services occurring on the premises of a public 5 accommodation would contradict the plain language of the statute.” (quoting Nat’l Fed’n 6 of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (emphasis in 7 original)). 8 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the Reservations Rule because it: 9 failed to modify its reservation policies and procedures to ensure that it identified and described accessible features in the hotels 10 and guest rooms in enough detail to reasonably permit 11 individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether a given hotel or guest room meets his or her accessibility needs and 12 failed to ensure that individuals with disabilities can make 13 reservations for accessible guest rooms during the same hours and in the same manner as individuals who do not need 14 accessible rooms. 15 16 FAC ¶ 24. Defendant argues that the Reservations Rule does not apply to BWI because 17 BWI is not a place of public accommodation and does not own, operate, or lease a place of 18 lodging. Mot. at 1. Rather, Defendant argues that the only proper defendant in this action 19 is Seven Seas, as it independently owns and operates the Hotel, and the Reservations Rule 20 only applies to owners and operators of independent lodging. Mot. at 8. In response, 21 Plaintiff contends that this argument fails for two reasons. See Opp’n at 22–24. Plaintiff 22 argues that (1) Defendant is liable as an “operator” of a place of lodging, and (2) Defendant 23 is a necessary party under Rule 19 to fashion injunctive relief. Id. at 22–23. 24 Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant BWI owns, operates, or leases a public place 25 of accommodation as required under the Reservations Rule. See generally FAC. Instead, 26 Plaintiff alleges that Seven Seas “owns and operates [the Hotel] currently and at all times 27 relevant to this complaint,” while BWI only “owns and operates the bestwestern.com 28 website currently and at all times relevant to this complaint.” FAC ¶¶ 2–3. Therefore, as 1 presently alleged, BWI is a third-party owner and operator of the reservation website and 2 does not own, lease, or operate the physical Hotel at issue. The U.S. Department of Justice 3 guidance is instructive on this point: 4 Hotels and other places of lodging that use third-party reservations services must make reasonable efforts to make 5 accessible rooms available through at least some of these 6 services and must provide these third-party services with information concerning the accessible features of the hotel and 7 the accessible rooms. 8 9 Department of Justice, Americans with Disabilities Act Title III Regulations: Part 36 10 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in 11 Commercial Facilities (Jan. 17, 2017) [hereinafter DOJ Guidance].2 Unlike in Robles, in 12 which the Ninth Circuit extended ADA liability to the defendant’s website where the 13 defendant owned both the physical restaurant and the website at issue, Plaintiff does not 14 allege that BWI owns, leases, or operates the Hotel. Cf. Robles, 913 F.3d at 905 (9th Cir. 15 2019). Seven Seas, as the owner and operator of the Hotel, is the proper defendant for an 16 alleged violation of the ADA on the Hotel’s website. Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant 17 is liable as an “operator” misses the mark. See Opp’n at 22–23. The Ninth Circuit has 18 interpreted “operation” within the regulations to mean “the relationship between a private 19 entity and a physical place that renders the entity responsible under Title III.” Disabled 20 Rts. Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 875 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 21 C.F.R. § 36.104). Arguing that Defendant is an “operator” still requires Defendant to be 22 the entity responsible for the physical Hotel, which Plaintiff has not alleged here. 23 Next, Plaintiff argues that Defendant “operates and controls the reservation website 24 for a place of public accommodation and in its absence, the Court would not be able to 25 ‘accord complete relief among existing parties.’” Opp’n at 25 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 19(a)(1)(A)). Rule 19(a) sets forth two circumstances under which an absent party is 27

28 1 necessary to the suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Plaintiff relies on the first circumstance, which 2 states that an absent party must be joined “if in that person’s absence, the court cannot 3 accord complete relief among existing parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A). “This factor 4 is concerned with consummate rather than partial or hollow relief as to those already 5 parties, and with precluding multiple lawsuits on the same cause of action.” Northrop 6 Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983). 7 Plaintiff has not sufficiently argued that Defendant is a necessary party under Rule 8 19. It is apparent to the Court that Plaintiff’s requested remedy for injunctive relief is 9 available absent BWI. The U.S. Department of Justice has made clear that the owner and 10 operator of the Hotel is the entity that “must provide these third-party services with 11 information concerning the accessible features of the hotel and the accessible rooms.” See 12 DOJ Guidance. Liability under the Reservations Rule does not extend to an entity that 13 operates a reservation website unless that entity is also responsible for the physical place 14 of lodging. 15 Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to BWI in the FAC are insufficient to state 16 a claim under the ADA. Because there is an insufficient basis for an ADA claim, there is 17 also an insufficient basis for an Unruh Act claim. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f); Arroyo v. 18 Newage Desert Springs, LLC, 2021 WL 4260663, 7 (2021) (“Because Plaintiff fails to state 19 a claim under the ADA, his Unruh Act claim – predicated on Defendant’s alleged violation 20 of the ADA – also fails.”). 21 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant BWI’s Motion and DISMISSES 22 WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s FAC under the ADA and the Unruh Act as to 23 Defendant BWI. 24 CONCLUSION 25 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 26 12) and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant 27 BWI. Plaintiff MAY FILE an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of 28 the electronic docketing of this Order. Failure to file a second amended complaint within 1 || thirty (30) days of the electronic docketing of this Order will result in dismissal with 2 prejudice of all claims asserted against BWI without further order of the Court. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: January 3, 2022 . tt f te 5 on. Janis L. Sammartino 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28