Garcia v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: October 3, 2024
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01881
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 JAIME GARCIA, individually, and No. 2:24-cv-01881 WBS JDP on behalf of all others 13 similarly situated, 14 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND 15 v. AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 16 PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO., L.P.; and DOES 1 through 10, 17 inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 20 ----oo0oo---- 21 Plaintiff Jaime Garcia (“Garcia” or “plaintiff”) 22 originally filed this putative class action against defendant 23 Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. (“defendant” or “Penske”) in Yolo 24 County Superior Court, seeking monetary and equitable relief 25 pursuant to the California Labor Code and the Unfair Competition 26 Law (“UCL”). Plaintiff alleges that defendant denied him minimum 27 wages, overtime compensation, meal periods, rest breaks, expense 28 reimbursements, timely pay, and income statements. 1 The court now considers plaintiff’s motion to remand 2 (Docket No. 10) and defendant’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 4). 3 I. Factual Background 4 Plaintiff is a California resident who worked for 5 defendant in Yolo County “as a technician from approximately 6 September 2022 to July 2023.” (Notice of Removal (Docket No. 1 7 Ex. A) (“Compl.”) ¶ 7.) Defendant is a transportation services 8 company which is headquartered in Pennsylvania and incorporated 9 in Delaware. (Notice of Removal (Docket No. 1) at 3-4.) 10 Garcia states that Penske violated various provisions 11 of the California Labor Code while it employed him. For example, 12 Penske “typically scheduled [plaintiff] to work at least 5 days 13 in a workweek, and typically in excess of 8 hours in a single 14 day.” (Compl. ¶ 13.) In addition, Garcia asserts that 15 “defendant[] failed to pay [him] for all hours worked (including 16 minimum wages and overtime wages).” (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff also 17 alleges that Penske did not give him “uninterrupted meal periods” 18 or “uninterrupted rest periods” while working. (Id.) Finally, 19 Garcia contends that defendant did not provide him with a timely 20 final paycheck, reimbursements for business expenses it made him 21 undertake (such as buying tools and equipment), or itemized wage 22 statements. (Id. ¶¶ 14-20.) 23 II. Motion to Remand 24 A. Standard 25 Pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 26 defendant removed the instant action from Yolo County Superior 27 Court. (Notice of Removal at 2.) CAFA gives federal district 28 courts original jurisdiction over class action lawsuits where the 1 class numbers at least 100, at least one plaintiff is diverse in 2 citizenship from any named defendant, and the aggregate amount- 3 in-controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest and 4 costs. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1441(a), 1446. 5 When a party moves for remand to state court and 6 challenges the non-movant’s projected amount-in-controversy, both 7 parties must proffer evidence on “whether the amount-in- 8 controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Ibarra v. Manheim 9 Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2015). The burden 10 of proof falls on the removing party to make reasonable 11 assumptions and show that the amount-in-controversy exceeds $5 12 million by a preponderance of the evidence. Jaurengui v. 13 Roadrunner Transp. Servs., Inc., 228 F.4th 989, 993-94 (9th Cir. 14 2022). The Ninth Circuit has characterized the amount-in- 15 controversy requirement as an upper bound on “possible 16 liability.” Greene v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 965 F.3d 767 (9th 17 Cir. 2020). 18 B. Discussion 19 Plaintiff contests that the amount-in-controversy is 20 over $5 million, as required for removal under CAFA. The court 21 disagrees and finds that defendant has shouldered its burden for 22 removal. On behalf of himself and over 3,400 other people 23 employed by defendant, plaintiff seeks multiple declarations, 24 unpaid wages, statutory penalties, actual damages, a receivership 25 to preside over the disgorgement of defendant, punitive damages, 26 attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief. With respect to each of 27 the overtime and wage statement claims, defendant estimates that 28 plaintiff’s desired remedies places the amount-in-controversy 1 north of $5 million. (See Notice of Removal at 7-11.) At any 2 rate, defendant argues that the remedies taken together across 3 all claims easily surpass the $5 million mark. 4 Plaintiff, in contrast, offers no competing facts 5 bearing on the amount-in-controversy. Instead, plaintiff only 6 asserts that defendant’s analysis is flawed without providing 7 contrary evidence. The court concludes that it is more likely 8 than not that the CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement is 9 met. 10 For the foregoing reason, the court will retain 11 jurisdiction over the matter under CAFA and deny Garcia’s motion 12 to remand. 13 III. Motion to Dismiss 14 A. Standard 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows the 16 court to dismiss a claim in a complaint when it fails to state a 17 claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 12(b)(6). “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of 19 a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 20 In deciding such a motion, the court accepts all material 21 allegations of the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences 22 in favor of the plaintiffs from them. Id. 23 Dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to allege 24 “sufficient facts . . . to support a cognizable legal theory.” 25 Id. As such, the plaintiff must state “a claim to relief that is 26 plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 27 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 28 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 1 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 2 misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 3 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 4 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 5 Id. Although “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a 6 complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. 7 B. Discussion 8 The Ninth Circuit has held that a plaintiff seeking 9 redress for violation of minimum or overtime wage laws must 10 specify at least one workweek by date where the employer 11 underpaid him or her. See Landers v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc., 771 12 F.3d 638, 644-45 (9th Cir. 2014), amended, (Jan. 26, 2015). The 13 same applies to a claim seeking minimum wages. Id. at 645 & 14 n.2.1 15 In his first and second claims, Garcia alleges that 16 Penske failed to pay him minimum wages and overtime compensation. 17 (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 32, 43-44.) California law requires that an 18 employer pay an employee at least minimum wage for the first 19 eight hours of his or her workday and then 150% of that hourly 20 1 In Landers, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of 21 a complaint alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 22 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1), 207(a)(1), 211(c). Following the decision, district courts have applied its holding to claims 23 arising under parallel provisions in the California Labor Code. See, e.g., Ritenour v. Carrington Mortg. Servs. LLC, 228 F. Supp. 24 3d 1025, 1033-34 (C.D. Cal. 2017); Haralson v. United Airlines, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 928, 942-43 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Shann v. 25 Durham Sch. Servs., L.P., 182 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1048-49 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“The pleading standards set forth in Landers apply 26 equally to plaintiffs’ state overtime, minimum wage, meal period, 27 and rest break allegations.” (capitalization altered)); Tan v. GrubHub, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1005-07 & n.3 (N.D. Cal. 28 2016). 1 rate for anytime worked afterwards. See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, 2 1194, 1197. 3 Plaintiff argues that the defendant “required [him] to 4 work off the clock[] and uncompensated” by undertaking tasks such 5 as cleaning and preparing trucks during his free time. (Compl. 6 ¶ 15.) However, Garcia does not meet the threshold of showing 7 the court that his first and second claims are plausible. 8 Plaintiff does not specify any specific period of time where 9 Penske neglected to pay him his due. See Ritenour, 228 F. Supp. 10 3d at 1033-34. Such defects are fatal to plaintiff’s first and 11 second claims, which do not state sufficient facts to survive 12 dismissal. 13 With respect to his third and fourth claims, Garcia 14 avers that Penske neglected to provide him with sufficient meal 15 periods and rest breaks. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-17, 51, 55.) California 16 law prohibits an employer from asking its employee to work 17 “during a meal or rest or recovery period mandated pursuant to an 18 applicable statute.” Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7(b). 19 Plaintiff states that defendant made him work when he 20 was supposed to be taking a meal or rest break. (Compl. ¶¶ 16- 21 17, 51, 55.) On either claim, Garcia does not go farther than 22 asserting that Penske denied him meal or rest breaks. Plaintiff 23 does not even specify a single workweek where that occurred. He 24 may not proceed to discovery on the third and fourth claims 25 without details in that vein. See Shann, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1044 at 26 1048-49. Accordingly, Garcia does not state a claim upon which 27 relief may be granted regarding meal periods or rest breaks. 28 Regarding his fifth claim, plaintiff claims that 1 defendant omitted to reimburse him for necessary business 2 expenses he incurred in the course of work. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 58.) 3 California law obligates “[a]n employer [to] indemnify his or her 4 employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the 5 employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her 6 duties.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2802(a). 7 In particular, Penske “required [Garcia] to purchase 8 masks, tools, and equipment (such as basic tools, pliers, clamps, 9 cocking guns, drills, and other tools).” (Compl. ¶ 18.) 10 Plaintiff adds that Penske “required [him] to use [his] personal 11 cellular telephones for work purposes, without reimbursement.” 12 (Id.) 13 Defendant contends that plaintiff must provide even 14 more facts, such as whether Penske would in fact reimburse the 15 expenses Garcia lists, to cross the threshold of plausibility. 16 See Ritenour, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 1033-34 (dismissing claim for 17 failure to reimburse business expenses due to plaintiff not 18 specifying when plaintiff incurred such costs). 19 The issue with Penske’s suggestion is that it would 20 require bloating the Complaint with minutia. In contrast to the 21 first four claims, Garcia provides sufficient detail here as 22 opposed to just reciting the statutory language. See Shann, 182 23 F. Supp. 3d at 1005-06. Accordingly, Garcia states a plausible 24 claim upon which relief may be granted on this claim. 25 In his sixth claim, Garcia alleges that Penske 26 “willfully failed and refused to timely pay [him]” following the 27 end of his employment with the company. (Compl. ¶ 19.) 28 California law requires that employers give an employee his or 1 her last paycheck within 72 hours after the end of the working 2 relationship or face fines. See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-03. 3 In that vein, Plaintiff explains that he stopped 4 working for defendant in July 2023, after which he did not 5 receive his final paycheck in a timely manner. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 14, 6 19.) With that detail and the other allegations in the 7 complaint, Garcia pleads sufficient facts to survive Penske’s 8 motion to dismiss on his sixth claim. 9 Plaintiff’s seventh claim is that defendant failed to 10 provide him with accurate itemized wage statements. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 11 20, 70.) California law mandates that an employer “furnish to 12 their employee . . . an accurate itemized statement” of wages 13 earned. Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a). Only “a knowing and 14 intentional failure by an employer to [do so]” violates the 15 statute. Id.(e)(1). 16 Here, Garcia alleges that Penske neglected to give him 17 itemized wage statements with the requisite intent. See Fed. R. 18 Civ. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of 19 a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”). In particular, he 20 states that “defendant[] ha[s] intentionally and willfully failed 21 to provide [its] employees with complete and accurate wage 22 statements.” (Compl. ¶ 70 (capitalization altered).) Plaintiff 23 also provides exact dates where defendant did not provide him 24 with sufficient information regarding his pay. See Varsam v. 25 Lab’y Corp. of Am., 120 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1180-81 (S.D. Cal. 26 2015). Plaintiff’s seventh claim states a plausible claim upon 27 which relief may be granted. 28 Garcia’s eighth claim seeks relief under the UCL, which 1 prohibits any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or 2 practice. (Compl. ¶¶ 76-94 (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 3 §§ 17200-01).) In other words, a claim arising under the UCL may 4 allege that a business act or practice is unlawful, unfair, 5 and/or fraudulent. Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 152 6 Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1553-54 (4th Dist. 2007). To show that a 7 business act or practice is unlawful, Garcia must show “a 8 violation of another law [a]s a predicate” for the claim. Id. at 9 1554. 10 Because plaintiff pleads sufficient facts in the 11 Complaint to survive Penske’s motion to dismiss on the fifth, 12 sixth, and seventh claims, his eighth claim under the “unlawful” 13 prong of the UCL may utilize the violations alleged in those 14 three claims as predicates. See id. at 1553-54. To the extent 15 it does so, Garcia’s eighth claim states a claim upon which 16 relief may be granted. 17 Penske concludes by moving to dismiss Garcia’s class 18 claims. (Def.’s Mot. (Docket No. 4) at 21-24 (citing Fed. R. 19 Civ. P. 23).) In its current posture, the court declines to 20 address arguments regarding class certification. See Varsam, 120 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1184 (“It is more appropriate for such arguments 22 to be presented at the class certification stage of the 23 litigation.”). 24 For all the foregoing reasons, the court will dismiss 25 only the first, second, third, and fourth claims against 26 defendant. 27 C. Leave to Amend 28 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) directs the —ee—ee mE ON OS OE IER REE RIOD IEE OREN IIE I OS OEE OS NE EIR IO eee

1 court to “freely give leave [to amend a complaint] when justice 2 so reguires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (2). “[T]his policy is to be 3 applied with extreme liberality.” Herring Networks, Inc. v. 4 Maddow, 8 F.4th 1148, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, the 5 court will give plaintiff leave to amend his complaint against 6 Penske. 7 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to 8 remand the case to state court (Docket No. 10) be, and the same 9 | herby is, DENIED; 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to 11 dismiss plaintiff’s first, second, third, and fourth claims 12 against it (Docket No. 4), be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; 13 AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to 14 dismiss plaintiff’s fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims 15 against it be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 16 Plaintiff is granted twenty days from the date of this 17 Order to file an amended complaint if he can do so consistent 18 | with this Order. . - 19 Dated: October 3, 2024 ah thew ah WILLIAM B. SHUBB 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10