Garcia v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.

Opinion

----oo0oo---- JAIME GARCIA, individually, and No. 2:24-cv-01881 WBS JDP on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND v. AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO., L.P.; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. ----oo0oo---- Plaintiff Jaime Garcia (“Garcia” or “plaintiff”) originally filed this putative class action against defendant Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. (“defendant” or “Penske”) in Yolo County Superior Court, seeking monetary and equitable relief pursuant to the California Labor Code and the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). Plaintiff alleges that defendant denied him minimum wages, overtime compensation, meal periods, rest breaks, expense reimbursements, timely pay, and income statements. The court now considers plaintiff’s motion to remand (Docket No. 10) and defendant’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 4). I. Factual Background Plaintiff is a California resident who worked for defendant in Yolo County “as a technician from approximately September 2022 to July 2023.” (Notice of Removal (Docket No. 1 Ex. A) (“Compl.”) ¶ 7.) Defendant is a transportation services company which is headquartered in Pennsylvania and incorporated in Delaware. (Notice of Removal (Docket No. 1) at 3-4.) Garcia states that Penske violated various provisions of the California Labor Code while it employed him. For example, Penske “typically scheduled [plaintiff] to work at least 5 days in a workweek, and typically in excess of 8 hours in a single day.” (Compl. ¶ 13.) In addition, Garcia asserts that “defendant[] failed to pay [him] for all hours worked (including minimum wages and overtime wages).” (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff also alleges that Penske did not give him “uninterrupted meal periods” or “uninterrupted rest periods” while working. (Id.) Finally, Garcia contends that defendant did not provide him with a timely final paycheck, reimbursements for business expenses it made him undertake (such as buying tools and equipment), or itemized wage statements. (Id. ¶¶ 14-20.) II. Motion to Remand A. Standard Pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), defendant removed the instant action from Yolo County Superior Court. (Notice of Removal at 2.) CAFA gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over class action lawsuits where the class numbers at least 100, at least one plaintiff is diverse in citizenship from any named defendant, and the aggregate amount- in-controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1441(a), 1446. When a party moves for remand to state court and challenges the non-movant’s projected amount-in-controversy, both parties must proffer evidence on “whether the amount-in- controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2015). The burden of proof falls on the removing party to make reasonable assumptions and show that the amount-in-controversy exceeds $5 million by a preponderance of the evidence. Jaurengui v. Roadrunner Transp. Servs., Inc., 228 F.4th 989, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2022). The Ninth Circuit has characterized the amount-in- controversy requirement as an upper bound on “possible liability.” Greene v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 965 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2020). B. Discussion Plaintiff contests that the amount-in-controversy is over $5 million, as required for removal under CAFA. The court disagrees and finds that defendant has shouldered its burden for removal. On behalf of himself and over 3,400 other people employed by defendant, plaintiff seeks multiple declarations, unpaid wages, statutory penalties, actual damages, a receivership to preside over the disgorgement of defendant, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief. With respect to each of the overtime and wage statement claims, defendant estimates that plaintiff’s desired remedies places the amount-in-controversy north of $5 million. (See Notice of Removal at 7-11.) At any rate, defendant argues that the remedies taken together across all claims easily surpass the $5 million mark. Plaintiff, in contrast, offers no competing facts bearing on the amount-in-controversy. Instead, plaintiff only asserts that defendant’s analysis is flawed without providing contrary evidence. The court concludes that it is more likely than not that the CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement is met. For the foregoing reason, the court will retain jurisdiction over the matter under CAFA and deny Garcia’s motion to remand. III. Motion to Dismiss A. Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows the court to dismiss a claim in a complaint when it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In deciding such a motion, the court accepts all material allegations of the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs from them. Id. Dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to allege “sufficient facts . . . to support a cognizable legal theory.” Id. As such, the plaintiff must state “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Although “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. B. Discussion The Ninth Circuit has held that a plaintiff seeking redress for violation of minimum or overtime wage laws must specify at least one workweek by date where the employer underpaid him or her. See Landers v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 644-45 (9th Cir. 2014), amended, (Jan. 26, 2015). The same applies to a claim seeking minimum wages. Id. at 645 & n.2.1 In his first and second claims, Garcia alleges that Penske failed to pay him minimum wages and overtime compensation. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 32, 43-44.) California law requires that an employer pay an employee at least minimum wage for the first eight hours of his or her workday and then 150% of that hourly 1 In Landers, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a complaint alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1), 207(a)(1), 211(c). Following the decision, district courts have applied its holding to claims arising under parallel provisions in the California Labor Code. See, e.g., Ritenour v. Carrington Mortg. Servs. LLC, 228 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1033-34 (C.D. Cal. 2017); Haralson v. United Airlines, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 928, 942-43 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Shann v. Durham Sch. Servs., L.P., 182 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1048-49 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“The pleading standards set forth in Landers apply equally to plaintiffs’ state overtime, minimum wage, meal period, and rest break allegations.” (capitalization altered)); Tan v. GrubHub, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1005-07 & n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2016). rate for anytime worked afterwards. See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194, 1197. Plaintiff argues that the defendant “required [him] to work off the clock[] and uncompensated” by undertaking tasks such as cleaning and preparing trucks during his free time. (Compl. ¶ 15.) However, Garcia does not meet the threshold of showing the court that his first and second claims are plausible. Plaintiff does not specify any specific period of time where Penske neglected to pay him his due. See Ritenour, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 1033-34. Such defects are fatal to plaintiff’s first and second claims, which do not state sufficient facts to survive dismissal. With respect to his third and fourth claims, Garcia avers that Penske neglected to provide him with sufficient meal periods and rest breaks. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-17, 51, 55.) California law prohibits an employer from asking its employee to work “during a meal or rest or recovery period mandated pursuant to an applicable statute.” Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7(b). Plaintiff states that defendant made him work when he was supposed to be taking a meal or rest break. (Compl. ¶¶ 16- 17, 51, 55.) On either claim, Garcia does not go farther than asserting that Penske denied him meal or rest breaks. Plaintiff does not even specify a single workweek where that occurred. He may not proceed to discovery on the third and fourth claims without details in that vein. See Shann, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1044 at 1048-49. Accordingly, Garcia does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted regarding meal periods or rest breaks. Regarding his fifth claim, plaintiff claims that defendant omitted to reimburse him for necessary business expenses he incurred in the course of work. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 58.) California law obligates “[a]n employer [to] indemnify his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2802(a). In particular, Penske “required [Garcia] to purchase masks, tools, and equipment (such as basic tools, pliers, clamps, cocking guns, drills, and other tools).” (Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff adds that Penske “required [him] to use [his] personal cellular telephones for work purposes, without reimbursement.” (Id.) Defendant contends that plaintiff must provide even more facts, such as whether Penske would in fact reimburse the expenses Garcia lists, to cross the threshold of plausibility. See Ritenour, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 1033-34 (dismissing claim for failure to reimburse business expenses due to plaintiff not specifying when plaintiff incurred such costs). The issue with Penske’s suggestion is that it would require bloating the Complaint with minutia. In contrast to the first four claims, Garcia provides sufficient detail here as opposed to just reciting the statutory language. See Shann, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 1005-06. Accordingly, Garcia states a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted on this claim. In his sixth claim, Garcia alleges that Penske “willfully failed and refused to timely pay [him]” following the end of his employment with the company. (Compl. ¶ 19.) California law requires that employers give an employee his or her last paycheck within 72 hours after the end of the working relationship or face fines. See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-03. In that vein, Plaintiff explains that he stopped working for defendant in July 2023, after which he did not receive his final paycheck in a timely manner. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 14, 19.) With that detail and the other allegations in the complaint, Garcia pleads sufficient facts to survive Penske’s motion to dismiss on his sixth claim. Plaintiff’s seventh claim is that defendant failed to provide him with accurate itemized wage statements. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 20, 70.) California law mandates that an employer “furnish to their employee . . . an accurate itemized statement” of wages earned. Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a). Only “a knowing and intentional failure by an employer to [do so]” violates the statute. Id.(e)(1). Here, Garcia alleges that Penske neglected to give him itemized wage statements with the requisite intent. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”). In particular, he states that “defendant[] ha[s] intentionally and willfully failed to provide [its] employees with complete and accurate wage statements.” (Compl. ¶ 70 (capitalization altered).) Plaintiff also provides exact dates where defendant did not provide him with sufficient information regarding his pay. See Varsam v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 120 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1180-81 (S.D. Cal. 2015). Plaintiff’s seventh claim states a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted. Garcia’s eighth claim seeks relief under the UCL, which prohibits any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice. (Compl. ¶¶ 76-94 (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-01).) In other words, a claim arising under the UCL may allege that a business act or practice is unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent. Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1553-54 (4th Dist. 2007). To show that a business act or practice is unlawful, Garcia must show “a violation of another law [a]s a predicate” for the claim. Id. at 1554. Because plaintiff pleads sufficient facts in the Complaint to survive Penske’s motion to dismiss on the fifth, sixth, and seventh claims, his eighth claim under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL may utilize the violations alleged in those three claims as predicates. See id. at 1553-54. To the extent it does so, Garcia’s eighth claim states a claim upon which relief may be granted. Penske concludes by moving to dismiss Garcia’s class claims. (Def.’s Mot. (Docket No. 4) at 21-24 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23).) In its current posture, the court declines to address arguments regarding class certification. See Varsam, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 1184 (“It is more appropriate for such arguments to be presented at the class certification stage of the litigation.”). For all the foregoing reasons, the court will dismiss only the first, second, third, and fourth claims against defendant. C. Leave to Amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) directs the —ee—ee mE ON OS OE IER REE RIOD IEE OREN IIE I OS OEE OS NE EIR IO eee

court to “freely give leave [to amend a complaint] when justice so reguires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (2). “[T]his policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 8 F.4th 1148, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, the court will give plaintiff leave to amend his complaint against Penske. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to state court (Docket No. 10) be, and the same herby is, DENIED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first, second, third, and fourth claims against it (Docket No. 4), be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims against it be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. Plaintiff is granted twenty days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint if he can do so consistent with this Order. . - Dated: October 3, 2024 ah thew ah WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10