Garcia v. King

164 S.W.2d 509, 139 Tex. 578
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 15, 1942
DocketNo. 7905.
StatusPublished
Cited by133 cases

This text of 164 S.W.2d 509 (Garcia v. King) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 139 Tex. 578 (Tex. 1942).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Alexander

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit involves the construction of an oil and gas mining lease. The lease was to run for a period of ten years “and so long thereafter as oil, gas, or other minerals is produced from said land.” The material question to be determined is whether sufficient oil was produced from the land after the expiration of the primary period to keep the lease in force.

The lease in question covered 7,500 acres of land. From 1925 to 1929 the land was under a lease that required the payment of an annual rental of $13,284.00, regardless of the amount of oil produced. Lessees were unable to pay this annual rental. Litigation ensued and a settlement was reached by the terms of which lessees paid lessors $3,500.00 in cash and agreed to pay them $2,500.00 out of the 1/8 of production, and the 10-year paid-up lease with a 1/8 royalty now in question was executed. It provided in part as follows:

*580 “Subject to the other provisions herein contained this lease shall be for a term of 10 years from this day (called primary term) and as long thereafter as oil, gas, and other minerals is produced from said land hereunder.”

At the time the lease was executed there were 112 producing wells on the land. The wells yielded large quantities of oil, from which the lessors were paid royalties running into thousands of dollars annually. All production was from a shallow reservoir, less than 200 feet deep. In the spring of 1936 forty-seven wells were still producing. At that time production ceased temporarily because a gas well that was furnishing fuel for pumping played out. Thereupon the lessees abandoned the shallow wells and decided to explore for oil in deeper sands. The money for this exploration was raised by sale of the casings and other equipment in the shallow wells. The deep tests were unsuccessful, and the lessees began drilling shallow wells again. At the expiration of the primary term on February 6, 1939, six shallow wells were being operated. Before that time, on November 15, 1938, the lessees had entered into a contract with one Juarez whereby Juarez was to operate the lease and receive as his compensation the entire seven-eighths working interest belonging to the lessees. This contract continued until July 16, 1939. During this period a total of 195 barrels of oil was produced, averaging about 24 barrels per month. After deducting the lessors’ royalty of $19.11, a total of $135.70 was received by Juarez for his seven-eighths of the oil, or $16.96 per month, wihich was barely adequate to pay for his labor in operating ihe wells. Out of this compensation, Juarez had to pay about a dollar each month for fuel. During this period of eight months the lessees received nothing at all from the lease, and yet they were paying the annual taxes thereon. In addition they had to make numerous trips at their own expense to the leased premises. The lessors received only about eight cents per day as royalty from the lease. From these undisputed facts it is clear that production was not in paying quantities when the primary term expired. However, there is evidence tending to show that production was increased after the termination of the Juarez contract, and that before the time of the trial production was obtained in paying quantities.

The lessors filed this suit against the lessees to cancel the lease and remove it as a cloud from their title to the land. Trial was to a jury, but upon the jury’s failure to agree upon several of the special issues, the trial judge discharged the *581 jury and rendered judgment for plaintiffs on the ground that their motion for peremptory instruction should have been granted. The court found that the undisputed evidence showed that the lease expired by its own terms at the end of the primary term because neither oil nor gas was then being “produced,” within the meaning of the lease. Upon appeal the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment for the defendants, holding that the term “produced” did not mean “produced in paying quantities.” 152 S. W. (2d)' 918.

It will be noted that the lease provides, in effect, that it shall run for a period of ten years, and as long thereafter as oil is “produced” from the land. It does not provide, as is ordinarily the case, that the production must be “in paying quantities” in order to continue the lease in force after the expiration of the primary term. At the end of the primary period the lease was producing only about 24 barrels of oil per month. This quantity was susceptible of division, but was insufficient to yield a profit over and above operating and marketing expenses. It becomes necessary for us to determine what is meant by the term “produced,” as used in the lease. It is the plaintiffs’ contention that the term “produced” means the same thing as “produced in paying quantities,” while the defendants contend that the terms of the contract are met if enough oil is produced to be susceptible of division. So far as we have been able to determine, the question has not heretofore been passed on in this State.

The question was before the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 260 Ill. 169, 102 N. E. 1043. In that case less than a hundred barrels of oil had been recovered over an eighteen-months period. The Supreme Court of Illinois said:

“The lease was for a five-year term, and so long thereafter as oil or gas was produced. Oil was produced continuously after the drilling of the well. It is true that the quantity produced was so small as to make the venture unprofitable, but the strict letter of the lease was complied with, and it had not expired by its own terms.”

No authorities were cited in support of this ruling. It will be noted that the above case was decided in 1913, before the oil industry had been fully developed.

*582 In the case of Enfield v. Woods, 198 Ky. 328, 248 S. W. 842, the Supreme Court of Kentucky used language which on its face appears to be decisive of the question. It was there said :

“It will be observed that the lessee is not required to produce oil in paying quantities, but he is required to produce oil or gas one or the other, from the premises. This, of course, means a production of oil or gas in such quantities as to be susceptible of division, so as to pay the landowner a royalty, even though small. A mere showing of oil manifestly is not sufficient, even though produced. The production must be tangible and substantial, but it need not be great.”

An examination of the case, however, discloses that the well there under consideration produced only a mere scum of oil, and the court held that this was insufficient to keep the contract in force. In view of the facts there involved the statement concerning production in paying quantities was not necessary to the decision of the case.

The above authorities are the only ones that we have found in which the question has been decided favorably to the defendants. After careful consideration we are of the opinion that the weight of authority supports plaintiffs’ contentions.

In Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 121 Okla. 135, 248 p. 329, 48 A. L. R. 876, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma passed directly on the question now before us.

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164 S.W.2d 509, 139 Tex. 578, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garcia-v-king-tex-1942.