Garcia v. Bruder

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided May 20, 2022·No. 7:22-cv-02800·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DAMIEN GARCIA, Plaintiff, -against- 22-CV-2800 (CS) OFFICERS BRUDER, FIGUERAOA, ORDER OF SERVICE MURPHY, ORANGE COUNTY CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS; ORANGE COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT, Defendants. CATHY SEIBEL, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently detained at the Orange County Jail (“OCJ”), brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants used excessive force against him at the OCJ. Plaintiff names as Defendants Correction Officers Bruder and Figueroa, Sergeant Murphy, and “Orange County Law Enforcement.” By order dated May 18, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses Orange County Law Enforcement because it is a non-suable entity and adds Orange County as a defendant under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also directs service on Bruder, Figueroa, Murphy, and Orange County. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572

F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). DISCUSSION A. Orange County Law Enforcement Plaintiff’s claims against the Orange County Law Enforcement must be dismissed because city agencies or departments do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law. See Omnipoint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F. Supp. 2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In New York, agencies of a municipality are not suable entities.”); Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the

municipality and cannot sue or be sued.”); see also N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 2 (“The term ‘municipal corporation,’ as used in this chapter, includes only a county, town, city and village.”). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against Orange County, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against Orange County, and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to replace the Orange County Law Enforcement with Orange County. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses Orange County may wish to assert. B. Service on Bruder, Murphy, Figueroa, and Orange County Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to

serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP)). Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that summonses and the complaint be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served summonses and the complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that summonses be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date summonses are issued. If the complaint is not served within that time, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service); see also Murray v. Pataki, 378 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (“As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the information necessary to identify the

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Murray v. Pataki
378 F. App'x 50 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange
658 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Hall v. City of White Plains
185 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D. New York, 2002)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)