Garcia v. Adams County

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: December 1, 2022
• Docket: 22-1063
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 22-1063 Document: 010110776183 Date Filed: 12/01/2022 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 1, 2022 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court ALEXANDER NOEL GARCIA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 22-1063 (D.C. No. 1:21-CV-01120-CMA-KLM) ADAMS COUNTY; ADAMS COUNTY (D. Colo.) SHERRIFF’S DEPT.; J. SPILLIS, Sergeant; WELLPATH; D. WEATHERWAX; MAY, Nurse; MATTHEW GILLESPIE; ADAMS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; ADAMS COUNTY DETENTION FACILITY; LAWS, Chief, Adams County Deputy,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before McHUGH, MORITZ, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Alexander Noel Garcia, a pretrial detainee in the Adams County Detention

Facility, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sued various entities and

individuals, alleging deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. His claim

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 22-1063 Document: 010110776183 Date Filed: 12/01/2022 Page: 2

rested on allegations that he suffers from sleep apnea and that staff at the detention

facility did not treat it with a continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) machine.

The district court dismissed his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Mr. Garcia appeals, and we affirm.

I. Background

Mr. Garcia’s operative complaint alleged the following facts. He suffers from

sleep apnea, a disorder that causes him to stop breathing 103 times per hour and to

wake up choking and coughing. He also experiences pain, daily migraine headaches,

and “mild [periodic] blackouts.” R. at 28.

He received a sleep-apnea diagnosis in 2017 and had been prescribed a CPAP

machine. He arrived at the Adams County Detention Facility in 2021, having used a

CPAP machine during a prior term of incarceration at the facility. Although staff

approved him to use a CPAP machine again if he could provide one, they refused to

provide a machine themselves. Mr. Garcia did not have his own CPAP machine,

however, because it had been “lost.” R. at 28. Medical staff prescribed oxygen and

gave him an oxygen concentrator for his sleep apnea, and prescribed Tylenol for his

headaches. Despite this treatment, his symptoms persisted.

Based on these allegations, Mr. Garcia filed a complaint alleging deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need, a claim available to pretrial detainees under

the Fourteenth Amendment. Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 989 (10th Cir. 2020).

A deliberate-indifference claim has both an objective component and a subjective

one. Id. To satisfy the objective component, a plaintiff must show “that the

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deprivation at issue was in fact sufficiently serious.” Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751

(10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). A “medical need is sufficiently

serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or

one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for

a doctor’s attention.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The subjective

component is satisfied if an “official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and she must

also draw the inference.” Strain, 977 F.3d at 990 (brackets and internal quotation

marks omitted).

The district court concluded Mr. Garcia failed to allege facts that could

establish either component of a deliberate-indifference claim. It further concluded

that allowing Mr. Garcia to amend his complaint would be futile, and it dismissed the

complaint with prejudice.

II. Discussion

A. Standards of Review

Because Mr. Garcia represents himself, we construe his filings liberally. See

Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). But

we cannot assume the role of his advocate by constructing arguments for him. See id.

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim. Strain, 977 F.3d at 989. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

a “complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief plausible on its

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face.” Id. We accept as true all well-pleaded facts in Mr. Garcia’s complaint, view

them in the light most favorable to him, and draw all reasonable inferences in his

favor. See Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 985 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10th Cir.),

cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 477 (2021).

Although we generally review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for an

abuse of discretion, when the “denial is based on a determination that amendment

would be futile, our review for abuse of discretion includes de novo review of the

legal basis for the finding of futility.” Barnes v. Harris, 783 F.3d 1185, 1197

(10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. The complaint failed to state a claim.

We will assume Mr. Garcia alleged facts that could establish the objective

component of his deliberate-indifference claim.1 But he failed to allege facts that

could satisfy the subjective component. After all, the “negligent failure to provide

adequate medical care, even one constituting medical malpractice, does not give rise

to a constitutional violation.” Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 811

(10th Cir. 1999). And “a prisoner who merely disagrees with a diagnosis or a

prescribed course of treatment does not state a constitutional violation.” Id.

That is the case here. Mr. Garcia merely disagrees with the treatment he

received for his sleep apnea. Although he underscores that he had been prescribed a

CPAP machine in the past, that fact does not support a claim that medical staff acted

1 We therefore need not consider Mr. Garcia’s arguments targeting the district court’s analysis of the objective component. 4 Appellate Case: 22-1063 Document: 010110776183 Date Filed: 12/01/2022 Page: 5

with deliberate indifference when they prescribed alternative treatment. See Strain,

977 F.3d at 995 (recognizing that a plaintiff’s challenge to the adequacy of prescribed

treatment “goes to the efficacy of treatment, not deliberate indifference”). Because

Mr. Garcia did not allege facts that could show he suffered a constitutional violation,

the district court correctly dismissed his claim against all defendants.2 See Crowson

v. Washington Cnty., 983 F.3d 1166, 1186 (10th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that “a claim

under § 1983 against either an individual actor or a municipality cannot survive a

determination that there has been no constitutional violation”), cert. denied,

142 S. Ct. 224 (2021).

Mr. Garcia seems to assert that because his complaint survived an initial

screening, res judicata and the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6). Yet he does not support this assertion with analysis or authority. In

short, he has not adequately briefed this argument, and we deem it waived. See

Garrett, 425 F.3d at 841. Even if Mr. Garcia had adequately briefed this argument,

however, it would fail. The initial screening is not a final judgment, and district

courts remain free to reconsider prior interlocutory orders before entry of final

judgment. See Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2011).

2 Mr. Garcia argues that the court should have considered the factors in Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992), before dismissing his complaint with prejudice. But Ehrenhaus does not address dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6).

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C. Amending the complaint would be futile.

The district court correctly concluded it would be futile to allow Mr. Garcia to

amend his complaint. Arguing otherwise, Mr. Garcia focuses on medical records that

he filed separately from his complaint showing a past sleep-apnea diagnosis and a

past prescription for a CPAP machine.3 But Mr. Garcia alleged the past diagnosis

and prescription in his complaint, so his medical records add nothing to the

complaint’s allegations.4

Mr. Garcia also says that, by amending his complaint, he could have named

previously unidentified medical staff and added allegations that his symptoms grew

worse after he contracted COVID-19. But he fails to explain how this new

information would remedy his complaint’s fundamental shortcoming—its failure to

allege facts showing more than his mere disagreement with the treatment he

received.5

3 Mr. Garcia’s medical records were filed (and shall remain) under seal. Even so, we have determined that the public’s right to access the information mentioned in this decision outweighs any privacy interest. See Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 663 F.3d 1124, 1135–36 (10th Cir. 2011). We have mentioned only those parts of the records relevant to our decision. And Mr. Garcia himself has discussed this same information in public filings. 4 Because Mr. Garcia’s medical records do not affect the merits of his claim, we need not consider his argument that the district court should have taken judicial notice of them. 5 Mr. Garcia asserts that the district court unfairly denied leave to amend his complaint as a matter of course. A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course, as relevant here, within 21 days after service of a Rule 12(b) motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). During that time frame, however, Mr. Garcia did not 6 Appellate Case: 22-1063 Document: 010110776183 Date Filed: 12/01/2022 Page: 7

We reject Mr. Garcia’s argument that he should now prevail because the

defendants have admitted liability by ultimately offering and providing him a CPAP

machine. Mr. Garcia claims to have received the machine after the district court

entered judgment, and we “generally limit our review on appeal to the record that

was before the district court when it made its decision.” Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen

Co., 526 F.3d 641, 648 (10th Cir. 2008). In any event, the defendants have not

admitted liability.

Because allowing Mr. Garcia to amend his complaint would be futile, the

district court did not err when it dismissed the complaint without granting leave to

amend. See Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2007).

D. Mr. Garcia’s allegations of judicial bias are unfounded.

Mr. Garcia appears to seek reversal based on an allegation the district court

was biased. But he supports this argument by citing adverse rulings, which “alone do

not demonstrate judicial bias.” Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 762 (10th Cir. 2010).

III. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s judgment. We grant Mr. Garcia’s motion to

proceed without prepaying costs and fees. We deny all other pending motions.

Entered for the Court

Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge

actually attempt to amend his complaint; he instead sought leave to amend his complaint at an unspecified “date in the future.” Second Suppl. R. at 22. 7