OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CLINTON, Judge.
In an unpublished opinion the Waco Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment of conviction based on a jury verdict finding appellant guilty of murder and assessing his punishment at confinement for a term of forty five years. To do so the Court overruled five grounds of error presented by appellant, the adverse rulings on two of which are so stoutly challenged in his petition for discretionary review that we granted it in order to address them: first, his substantial constitutional claim that his invalid arrest rendered his resultant confession inadmissible was erroneously rejected by the court .through its own misreading and faulty application of the opinion of this Court in Cannady v. State, 582 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) and, second, in any event, the court wrongfully overruled his contention that from his confession there should have been excised his account of “an extraneous offense” since it bore “no relation to this particular offense.” We will place the challenged arrest in its factual setting, drawing on testimony taken at a midtrial hearing.1
A rather remarkable bit of investigative work on the next day after the homicide by McLennan County Deputy Sheriff Edward Torres led him to a construction job site in Waco and a personal conversation with an uncle of appellant. Later that relative called Deputy Torres from Lampasas and informed him that appellant and his cousin were in Lampasas and asked if Torres still wanted to talk to them; when Torres affirmed that he did, the uncle said he would drive them to Waco promptly.2
All agree that when appellant and his cousin, Ted Ryan, were brought to his office by Ryan’s father, Torres made clear that they had not been charged with any offense, that they did not have to talk if they did not want to, but since he was investigating the death of a friend of theirs, he needed to talk to them. According to Torres both were also given an “investigation warning” by a local magistrate, and a copy thereof in the record reflects such a warning being given at 6:35 p.m. January 30, 1980. Content of the conversation that followed was not developed by the State, but after it was concluded on a seemingly [32]*32unproductive note, Ryan was allowed to go, whereas appellant was arrested, detained and jailed on “a warrant sent to us from Lampasas”3 said to be for the offense of misdemeanor theft. The confession appellant sees as tainted by that arrest was obtained about twenty nine hours later, at approximately midnight January 31, 1980, and post we have more to say about intervening events.
The problem presented at this point is that neither party ever produced the Lam-pasas County warrant with a supporting affidavit, if any. When it became apparent that it constituted the only basis for arresting him, appellant objected to any further testimony by Deputy Torres or admission of any statement
“on the grounds that the affidavit and warrant on which [appellant] was held has not been produced in Court... We challenge the very existence of any warrant, unless produced ... in this Court. And we’re relying on Cannady v. State, 582 S.W.2d 467. Therefore, the arrest was illegal, and any subsequent statement given by appellant is the fruit of a poisonous tree.”
The prosecutor took the position that once it is shown to be a voluntary statement it is admissible “regardless of the legality of the arrest, so long as the statement is not a result of the arrest.” Whereupon the trial court overruled appellant’s objection.
Though ultimately the State’s position is incorrect, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Green v. State, 615 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), the threshold question is which party was charged with producing the warrant and getting it in the record for purposes of appellate determination of validity of arrest of appellant pursuant to the warrant. Both rely on selective portions of the Cannady opinion, as did the Court of Appeals. However, strictly viewed, Cannady is not controlling for either party since it involves a search warrant. Still, the rules reiterated there may well be applicable to seizure of the person purportedly made under an arrest warrant that leads to a confession, in that principles of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of Article I, § 9, Bill of Rights in the Texas Constitution are thereby implicated. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982); see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).
It is axiomatic that like a search of the person without a warrant, subject to well delineated exceptions not applicable here,4 a warrantless arrest is constitutionally and statutorily prohibited. Fourth Amendment; Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); Taylor v. Alabama, supra; Article I, § 9; Article 1.06, Y.A.C.C.P.; Heath v. Boyd, 141 Tex. 569, 175 S.W.2d 214 (1943).
When an arrest is thus challenged that the burden falls on the State to justify the arrest and its consequences is the lesson taught by too many leading decisions that have dealt with the issue, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, supra, 401 U.S. at 570, 91 S.Ct. at 1038; Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. at 604-605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262; Dowdy v. State, 534 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). When that justification is authority by warrant, implicit in the opinions of such cases as Haynes v. State, 468 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) is that the purported warrant must be produced for inspection of the trial court for a determination of its sufficiency, as was done there, id., at 378:
“The records reflect that the four felony arrest warrants were introduced into evidence. They are valid on their faces.”
See also Dusek v. State, 467 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), in which a stipulation [33]*33was substituted for three of four original warrants and the fourth was an exhibit, thus satisfying a contention that “before the officers testified as to the arrest and search” the State was required to present the warrants for inspection by the court, id., at 271. The Court noted that the authorities relied on by the appellant to support his contention dealt with a search rather than an arrest warrant, but did not suggest they are inapposite.
Accordingly, we find there is no principled reason to distinguish between a search and an arrest in applying the rules restated in Cannady v. State, supra.
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OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CLINTON, Judge.
In an unpublished opinion the Waco Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment of conviction based on a jury verdict finding appellant guilty of murder and assessing his punishment at confinement for a term of forty five years. To do so the Court overruled five grounds of error presented by appellant, the adverse rulings on two of which are so stoutly challenged in his petition for discretionary review that we granted it in order to address them: first, his substantial constitutional claim that his invalid arrest rendered his resultant confession inadmissible was erroneously rejected by the court .through its own misreading and faulty application of the opinion of this Court in Cannady v. State, 582 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) and, second, in any event, the court wrongfully overruled his contention that from his confession there should have been excised his account of “an extraneous offense” since it bore “no relation to this particular offense.” We will place the challenged arrest in its factual setting, drawing on testimony taken at a midtrial hearing.1
A rather remarkable bit of investigative work on the next day after the homicide by McLennan County Deputy Sheriff Edward Torres led him to a construction job site in Waco and a personal conversation with an uncle of appellant. Later that relative called Deputy Torres from Lampasas and informed him that appellant and his cousin were in Lampasas and asked if Torres still wanted to talk to them; when Torres affirmed that he did, the uncle said he would drive them to Waco promptly.2
All agree that when appellant and his cousin, Ted Ryan, were brought to his office by Ryan’s father, Torres made clear that they had not been charged with any offense, that they did not have to talk if they did not want to, but since he was investigating the death of a friend of theirs, he needed to talk to them. According to Torres both were also given an “investigation warning” by a local magistrate, and a copy thereof in the record reflects such a warning being given at 6:35 p.m. January 30, 1980. Content of the conversation that followed was not developed by the State, but after it was concluded on a seemingly [32]*32unproductive note, Ryan was allowed to go, whereas appellant was arrested, detained and jailed on “a warrant sent to us from Lampasas”3 said to be for the offense of misdemeanor theft. The confession appellant sees as tainted by that arrest was obtained about twenty nine hours later, at approximately midnight January 31, 1980, and post we have more to say about intervening events.
The problem presented at this point is that neither party ever produced the Lam-pasas County warrant with a supporting affidavit, if any. When it became apparent that it constituted the only basis for arresting him, appellant objected to any further testimony by Deputy Torres or admission of any statement
“on the grounds that the affidavit and warrant on which [appellant] was held has not been produced in Court... We challenge the very existence of any warrant, unless produced ... in this Court. And we’re relying on Cannady v. State, 582 S.W.2d 467. Therefore, the arrest was illegal, and any subsequent statement given by appellant is the fruit of a poisonous tree.”
The prosecutor took the position that once it is shown to be a voluntary statement it is admissible “regardless of the legality of the arrest, so long as the statement is not a result of the arrest.” Whereupon the trial court overruled appellant’s objection.
Though ultimately the State’s position is incorrect, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Green v. State, 615 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), the threshold question is which party was charged with producing the warrant and getting it in the record for purposes of appellate determination of validity of arrest of appellant pursuant to the warrant. Both rely on selective portions of the Cannady opinion, as did the Court of Appeals. However, strictly viewed, Cannady is not controlling for either party since it involves a search warrant. Still, the rules reiterated there may well be applicable to seizure of the person purportedly made under an arrest warrant that leads to a confession, in that principles of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of Article I, § 9, Bill of Rights in the Texas Constitution are thereby implicated. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982); see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).
It is axiomatic that like a search of the person without a warrant, subject to well delineated exceptions not applicable here,4 a warrantless arrest is constitutionally and statutorily prohibited. Fourth Amendment; Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); Taylor v. Alabama, supra; Article I, § 9; Article 1.06, Y.A.C.C.P.; Heath v. Boyd, 141 Tex. 569, 175 S.W.2d 214 (1943).
When an arrest is thus challenged that the burden falls on the State to justify the arrest and its consequences is the lesson taught by too many leading decisions that have dealt with the issue, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, supra, 401 U.S. at 570, 91 S.Ct. at 1038; Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. at 604-605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262; Dowdy v. State, 534 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). When that justification is authority by warrant, implicit in the opinions of such cases as Haynes v. State, 468 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) is that the purported warrant must be produced for inspection of the trial court for a determination of its sufficiency, as was done there, id., at 378:
“The records reflect that the four felony arrest warrants were introduced into evidence. They are valid on their faces.”
See also Dusek v. State, 467 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), in which a stipulation [33]*33was substituted for three of four original warrants and the fourth was an exhibit, thus satisfying a contention that “before the officers testified as to the arrest and search” the State was required to present the warrants for inspection by the court, id., at 271. The Court noted that the authorities relied on by the appellant to support his contention dealt with a search rather than an arrest warrant, but did not suggest they are inapposite.
Accordingly, we find there is no principled reason to distinguish between a search and an arrest in applying the rules restated in Cannady v. State, supra. Therefore, we hold that when an accused objects to admission of evidence on the ground that it is tainted by a warrantless arrest and the State relies on an arrest warrant, in the absence of waiver, reviewable error will result unless the record reflects that the arrest warrant was exhibited to the trial judge for a ruling. Cannady, supra, at 469. Unlike the record in Cannady, there is no showing in the record before the Court that the purported Lampasas County arrest warrant was ever exhibited to the trial judge. Thus, the corollary rule — that if appellant desires an appellate review of the warrant and supporting affidavit, if any, he must offer a copy thereof for the record — never came into play in the case at bar. Appellant’s objection to validity of his arrest should have been sustained. See Vines v. State, 397 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.Cr.App.1966) and Skiles v. State, 109 Tex.Cr.R. 6, 2 S.W.2d 436 (1928), two of several authorities cited by the Court in Cannady.
Having found that the trial court erred in that respect means only that we must now examine the circumstances surrounding acquisition of a written confession from appellant in the light of his being held in jail on an arrest not shown to be lawful Green v. State, supra; Dowdy v. State, supra, at 339. The key factors to be examined in light of the evidence are those set forth in Brown v. Illinois, supra.
After Torres allowed eousin Ted Ryan to leave, the nineteen year old appellant was booked into the McLennan County Jail on the Lampasas County warrant. But Torres merely “believed” that appellant was warned by a magistrate concerning that charge — we have no written warning in the record.5 Nor does it appear that proceedings mandated and contemplated by Articles 15.18 and 15.19, Y.A.C.C.P. were held.6
At some point during their discussion on Wednesday evening, January 30, Torres had asked appellant if he would object to “going on a polygraph;” since the latter did not, the next day, Thursday, Torres removed appellant from the McLennan County Jail and took him to a DPS polygraph operator in Waco. At completion of the examination the operator told appellant and Torres that appellant “knew more than he was saying” about the murder under investigation. Returning to the McLennan County Jail, Torres told appellant, “I probably would [want to talk to him some more],” and, according to Torres, appellant said that “he had something to tell me anyway.” However, Torres replied that since it was late in the evening for appellant to “go upstairs to his cell and get some rest and get something to eat,” and Torres would talk to him later.
The record, primarily testimony of Torres, is far from clear about how he and other officers came to converse with appellant again. It appears that about 11:00 p.m. Thursday night Torres “went up and talked to him again” after warning him, and at that point appellant “told me what he had done.” Torres “brought [appellant] downstairs” and before the confession in [34]*34question was reduced to writing somehow, somewhere “caused [appellant] to be warned” by the same magistrate that had given the “investigation warning” on Wednesday. (Though both parties referred to a State’s Exhibit No. 12 being dated January 31, with “murder” being handwritten “at the bottom of it,” and a time of “11:50 p.m.,” that exhibit is not in the record before us, and the confession itself recites only that appellant had been warned by the magistrate “at 6:35 p.m. ... on the 30 day of January, 1980” — in other words when the “investigation warning” had been given.)
Thereafter, as we understand it, appellant started talking about events leading up to the killing and a police record secretary attempted to write it down in longhand, but when appellant became dissatisfied with that procedure he volunteered to and did proceed to write the rest of his statement in his own words — consuming three and a half legal size pages. His own statement was then typed on the standard confession form alluded to above. The latter concludes: “Furthermore if one word is damaged, [sic] added to or taken from this statement; I will completely retract every word.” We observe that the typed version is faithful to what appellant wrote in his own hand, revealing meticulous details of events and occurrences before, leading up to, during and after the deceased was literally assassinated by appellant — exonerating entirely his cousin, Ted Ryan.
We find the taint of the presumptively illegal arrest of appellant at the McLennan County Jail, though not purged alone by Miranda warnings, Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. at 601-602, 95 S.Ct. at 2260-2261, was removed by the time and circumstances under which the confession was ultimately given. Thus, there could be no doubt of the purpose of his being driven by his uncle, along with his cousin, from Lampasas to McLennan County Sheriff’s Office. Though he may well have been surprised at being held on the Lampasas County warrant while Ryan was released to return to Lampasas, he willingly agreed to submit to a polygraph examination concerning his implication in the murder of a friend. As a practical matter, then, that Torres failed to take appellant before a magistrate for fixing of bail with respect to the outstanding misdemeanor theft charge pending in Lampasas is not particularly flagrant misconduct. Overnight and, so far as appears, well into the Thursday, though still confined, appellant was not interrogated, and he did not remark about any particular event occurring in the interim. The agreed visit to the polygraph operator and his test seem routine, and while no doubt troubled by the conclusion that he “knew more than he was saying,” appellant was not subjected to followup questioning about that. Torres even declined an opportunity to inquire what it was that appellant had to tell him, suggesting that appellant first eat and refresh himself. Later, after Torres returned and again' warned him, appellant simply told Torres what he had done.7 Shortly thereafter, appellant was writing out in his own hand an expansive account of the entire episode.8
[35]*35We conclude that his confession was not obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest and that the trial court did not err in admitting it into evidence. Dowdy v. State, 534 S.W.2d 336, 339-340 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); cf. Green v. State, supra. Accordingly, for these reasons the fourth ground for review (Ground of Error Five in the Court of Appeals) is without merit.
As to the refusal of the trial court to excise from the confession appellant’s recounting that on Monday, January 28, “I decided to go buy a pistol because I had been ripped off of some rare coins back in Lampasas by a couple of dudes and I was going to shoot them to get even with them,” we first observe that appellant recanted part of the statement.9 In any event we reject the rationale of the Court of Appeals: “The mere purchase of a gun with intent to shoot someone does not constitute an offense. There was not sufficient preparation. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, 15.01.”
The rule appellant invokes is not limited to a completed accomplishment of all elements of a penal offense defined in the code. Collins v. State, 577 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). It also embraces proof of similar occurrences, other extraneous transactions and prior specific acts of misconduct. The reason is such matters are generally irrelevant to the contested material issues in the case on trial and, therefore, inadmissible. Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). An accused’s “propensity to commit crimes” is not a material issue on the question of guilt with respect to the specific crime charged by the indictment, and using evidence showing only a propensity amounts to trying an accused as a “criminal generally,” thereby offending our system of criminal justice. Ibid., and cases cited therein. Like any other matter, admitting “evidence that is prejudicial and harmful and which has little or no relevance to any issue in the case generally requires reversal of the judgment,” Stanley v. State, 606 S.W.2d 918, 919 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
Once that kind of extraneous material is admitted not only may jurors immediately react adversely to the accused, but also there is potential for another vice: the offensive evidence becomes available to the prosecution for appropriation and exploitation almost at will.10 In our best judgment [36]*36the trial court should have caused to be excised from his confession appellant’s gratuitous explanation of his decision to buy a pistol, and thereby rendered inadmissible all the extracurricular testimony and jury argument about the matter. See Clemons v. State, 605 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
However, even though its admission be error and the evidence provided a good springboard for prosecutorial argument that was otherwise improper, we must still determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that admitting the single sentence into evidence “might have contributed to the conviction and the punishment imposed upon appellant by the jury.” Stanley v. State, supra, at 920; Clemons v. State, supra, at 571.
Killing the deceased has already been characterized as an assassination. Now we let appellant’s own words relate what he was willing to admit did happen, beginning just after he had decided to buy a pistol and get even with “a couple of dudes” in Lam-pasas.
“... This I did discuss with Roger11 and Ted. This discision [sic] was my own. The three of us went into the pawn shop I first asked to look at a .25 Caliber automatic then I tried to buy it; but I had a New Mexico drivers [sic] license and he wouldn’t sell it to me, because I needed a Texas drivers [sic] license. So Roger ... bought it for me using his driver’s license. He also bought a box of shells for the gun (.25 auto). Roger said that he wanted to get his gun also, so we went to Copperas Cove, to the Action Pawn Shop on Highway 190 and there we picked up his .22 caliber magnum revolver. There we also bought another .25 caliber automatic exactly like the other one. That was bought for Ted.
We drove back to Waco and went back to Praco’s Pawn Shop and bought a box of .22 caliber magnum shells for Roger. Roger went in to get them for himself. * * * Next morning January 29, 1980 I received a letter from my mother, Roger wanted to know who it was from and I didn’t tell him, so we argued about it and he got mad and left, and went walking down the road. Ted & I stayed in the room about another hour. At which time we left and went to the Contintental [sic] Cowboy, a bar, where we drank one beer each and left. Then we went to the WEstview [sic] Lounge, we stayed there untill [sic] about 4:00 P.M. Then we went back to the motel. Roger was there when we got back, and he was still mad because he wouldn’t say anything. We started watching T.V. and fell asleep. When I woke up Roger was gone but he came back a few minutes later. He was still mad and wanted to know who the letter was from. I told him it was none of his business. He then said we had to get out of the hotel, and I told him that I was paying for it and he could get out. He was determined that Ted & I should leave. So I told him we would go to Lampasas. He said he wanted to go, and I told him he couldn’t go with me, so he pulled his .22 magnum off of the end table and said that he was going. He was pointing the gun at me acting kinda strange. I was afraid he would shoot me so I said I would take him with us to Lampasas. At this time he calmed down and put the gun up, in the black leather holster and put it in the front of his pants, behind his belt. I then picked up my gun and put it behind my back in my belt and called Ted from the bathroom and told him to get everything ready so we could go. Roger was just standing by watching us get everything ready. I went out to get the truck warmed up and 1 or 2 minutes later Ted came out carrying our things and Roger walked out behind him. * * * I filled the truck with gas and bought a pack of beer. We left [37]*37Waco at this time heading west on Highway 84. As we were leaving Waco no one was saying anything. Shortly after we left town Roger started another argument about the letter, [sic] I had received. He said, ‘You ain’t worth a shit for not tellin me who wrote that letter’ and he kept on, to the point that I felt threatened. I was afraid he would try to shoot me, because he had pulled the gun on me, and he knew I had a gun. I didn’t say anything for a while and he kept on and cussing me. At this time we were all drinking a beer. I then reached back with my left hand and got my pistol and held it down on the outside of my left leg. I was driving, Ted was in the middle and Roger was by the passenger door. I held the gun by the side of my leg for about another minute and he was still mouthing off at me. He said, T don’t have to stand for this shit from you, and I know how to stop it.’ I then motioned with me [sic] head for Ted to sit back. Ted had not said anything up to this point. When he leaned back I put the gun in my right hand and took the steering wheel in my left [sic] I then reached over, pointed my pistol at the left side of Roger’s head and fired. He leaned forward and grabbed his head, by putting his two hands on his forehead, and I reached over and fired another shot to about the same place. Ted asked repeatedly, ‘What are you doing?’ Not saying a word to Ted I pulled over and stopped the truck. I then told Ted to hold the brake which he did. I jumped out of the truck and ran around the front and pulled Roger out onto the ground. He was leaning towards Ted moaning. When he hit the ground I reached down and fired some more shots into the back of his head. My gun jammed so I tried to jack the shell out, so I layed it on the seat and told Ted to give me his gun. He asked, ‘Why, what are you going to do?’ I picked up my gun again and pointin it at him I said ‘Just give me the God Damn gun. [sic] So he did. I fired it twice, I think at the back of Roger’s head while he still lay there, then got into the truck, gave back the gun and said, T think we better go.’ We then went to Lampasas and spent the night. The next morning we took the guns to a sueluded [sic] spot and hid them. In closing, I would like to add that Ted Ryan had any part he may have played in it, forced upon him, by me. Futher [sic] more if one word is damaged, added to or taken from this statement; [sic] I will completely retract every word. This is true and correct statement [sic] and did happen in McLennan County, Texas.”
Testifying before the jury, appellant elaborated on several aspects of matters in his confession and stressed his sudden fear of Roger, but he never denied anything of significance.12
A forensic pathologist, who performed an autopsy on the body of the deceased, testified he found eight bullet wounds to the head, which he described before the jury.
“[T]here were two bullets, in-shoot wounds of the left ear, one actually through the ear, and the other through the flap of the ear, coming from the left to the right, going into the head. There was stippling by gunpowder around these wounds ... which indicates that these two wounds were inflicted from a very close distance ... probably only an inch or two away from the ear ...
* ⅜ ‡ ⅝ ⅝ ⅝:
There was also a total of six wounds roughly of the back of the head and the [38]*38upper part of the neck. Three of these entered the cranial cavity, and three of them caused fractures of the skull, but the bullets were defected. * * * However, the initial direction of all six of these gunshot wounds to the back of the head is essentially the same, from back to front.
sfc * ⅜ * * *
There was, also, around some of these wounds to the back of the head, this same tattooing or stippling with gunpowder, indicating close range firing ... I would say a few inches.”
We are completely satisfied that allowing the jury to know of the inadmissible single sentence in a three and a half page handwritten confession full of descriptive details of the admitted killing of Roger, the resultant testimony about his decision to buy a pistol and the otherwise improper argument of the prosecutor did not contribute to the conviction of appellant, nor had these matters been excluded would the case for the State on punishment have been significantly less persuasive.
For these reasons we agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, and affirm its judgment.