Galleher v. Artisanal, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedOctober 31, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-00055
StatusUnknown

This text of Galleher v. Artisanal, LLC (Galleher v. Artisanal, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Galleher v. Artisanal, LLC, (W.D.N.C. 2019).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ASHEVILLE DIVISION 1:19 CV 55

ASHLEY GALLEHER, on behalf of ) herself and all others similarly situated, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ORDER ) v. ) ) ARTISANAL, LLC, and BILL GREENE, ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________ )

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Conditionally Certify a Collective Action and Facilitate Notice Under 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (Doc. 14) (“Motion for Conditional Certification”), which has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). I. Relevant Procedural Background Plaintiff filed her Complaint on February 18, 2019 (Doc. 1). Defendants answered on June 14, 2019 (Doc. 10). A Certification of Initial Attorneys’ Conference was filed on July 9, 2019 (Doc. 12). Plaintiff filed her Motion for Conditional Certification, a supporting memorandum, and a declaration on July 31, 2019. (Docs. 14, 15). Defendants responded and Plaintiff replied. (Docs. 16, 17). II. Factual Background Plaintiff alleges as follows:

Defendant Artisanal, LLC (“Artisanal”) is a North Carolina company with its principal place of business in Banner Elk. Pl.’s Compl. (“Complaint”) (Doc. 1) at ¶ 6. Defendant Bill Greene is an owner, member and/or officer of Artisanal.

Complaint at ¶ 7. Artisanal owns and operates fine dining establishments in Banner Elk and Charlotte, North Carolina. Declaration of Ashley Galleher (“Declaration”) (Doc 15-1) at ¶ 3.

Artisanal’s restaurant in Banner Elk (“Restaurant”) operates seasonally, from May through October of each year. Declaration at ¶ 3. Plaintiff was employed at the Restaurant from July 2017 until June 2018. Complaint at ¶ 5. She was hired by Defendants as a server and worked

during her employment as both a bartender and a server until resigning to pursue other employment. Declaration at ¶ 4. While she was employed at the Restaurant, Plaintiff was paid bi-weekly at the hourly rate of $2.13 per hour. Her primary compensation, however, was

through gratuities. Other employees, including bussers, hosts/hostesses, and food runners/expediters, were paid in a similar manner (“Tipped Workers”). Declaration at ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff alleges that Tipped Workers were required to contribute all of their tips to a “tip pool” that was then distributed, partially in cash and

partially through regular paychecks. Declaration at ¶ 8. The Restaurant would not identify those who participated in the tip pool or how the tips were distributed. Declaration at ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have failed to pay her and all other

Tipped Workers minimum wages and overtime compensation and have misappropriated tips belonging to the Tipped Workers in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (“NCWHA”). Complaint at ¶¶ 2-3.

In the instant Motion, Plaintiff seeks to certify a collective action on behalf of herself and other Tipped Workers. Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 14) at 1. III. Discussion

A. Conditional Certification

A plaintiff alleging a violation of the FLSA may bring suit on her own behalf and as well as a collective action on behalf of other employees who are similarly situated. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Courts within the Fourth Circuit generally follow a two-step approach when considering a motion for conditional certification of a FLSA collective action. See, e.g., Hart v. Barbeque Integrated, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 3d 762, 768-69 (D.S.C. 2017) (collecting cases). First, the court must determine whether the named plaintiff and the potential additional plaintiffs are similarly situated. This process does not require the court to “resolve factual disputes, decide substantive issues on the merits, or make

credibility determinations.” Myers v. Loomis Armored US, LLC, No. 3:18-CV- 00532-FDW-DSC, 2019 WL 3338172, at *2 (W.D.N.C. July 25, 2019) (citing Solais v. Vesuvio’s II Pizza & Grill, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-227, 2016 WL 1057038, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 2016)). “The sole consequence of conditional

certification is the sending of court-approved written notice to employees, who in turn become parties to a collective action only by filing written consent with the court.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 75 (2013) (internal citations omitted).

At this first stage, a named plaintiff need only allege that she and the potential plaintiffs “were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.” Romero v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Only a “modest factual

showing” is needed, Essame v. SSC Laurel Operating Co., 847 F.Supp.2d 821, 825 (D. Md. 2012), and such a showing may be made through affidavits, declarations, deposition testimony, or other means. Myers, 2019 WL 3338172, at *2 (W.D.N.C. July 25, 2019) (citing Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 679,

685 (D. Md. 2008)). Once a class has been conditionally certified, the named plaintiff’s counsel may provide any potential plaintiffs with notice of the suit and of their right to opt-in. Romero, 796 F.Supp.2d at 705. The second step of the certification process is a motion by the defendant to decertify the class. See, e.g., Long v. CPI Sec. Sys., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 296, 299

(W.D.N.C. 2013) (citation omitted). Because such a motion is generally made after the parties have completed discovery, defendants are given the opportunity to oppose certification based upon a more fully developed record. Myers, 2019 WL 3338172, at *3 (W.D.N.C. July 25, 2019). At this second stage,

courts apply a “heightened fact-specific standard” to the similarly situated analysis. Id. (internal citations omitted). Consequently, in the instant case, the issue now before the Court is whether Plaintiff and the other Tipped Workers are “similarly situated”; the

merits of Plaintiff’s underlying claims are not considered. On the current record, the Court finds that Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence that she and other Tipped Workers “were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.” Romero, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 705.

Plaintiff alleges that she and other Tipped Workers were subject to the same policies and practices which may constitute wage, overtime, and tip-related violations of the FLSA. Specifically, she alleges that the Restaurant (1) paid all Tipped Workers an hourly rate less than the minimum required by the

FLSA; (2) required Tipped Workers to participate in a “tip pooling” arrangement in which tips were partially withheld and redistributed; (3) required Tipped Workers to pay uniform fees and for the replacement of broken glassware, dishes, and decanters out of their tips; and (4) failed to pay Plaintiff and other Tipped Workers for overtime hours at the rate required by the FLSA,

among other violations. See Declaration at ¶¶ 5-17; Complaint at ¶¶ 19-37. Therefore, the Motion for Conditional Certification will be allowed. As for the proposed class, Plaintiff’s description has varied. Her Complaint describes the proposed class as:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk
133 S. Ct. 1523 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Williams v. Long
585 F. Supp. 2d 679 (D. Maryland, 2008)
Romero v. Mountaire Farms, Inc.
796 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. North Carolina, 2011)
Hart v. Barbeque Integrated, Inc.
299 F. Supp. 3d 762 (D. South Carolina, 2017)
Essame v. SSC Laurel Operating Co.
847 F. Supp. 2d 821 (D. Maryland, 2012)
Long v. CPI Security Systems, Inc.
292 F.R.D. 296 (W.D. North Carolina, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Galleher v. Artisanal, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/galleher-v-artisanal-llc-ncwd-2019.