Galette v. Morales

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedNovember 19, 2022
Docket0:22-cv-62061
StatusUnknown

This text of Galette v. Morales (Galette v. Morales) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Galette v. Morales, (S.D. Fla. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 22-CV-62061-RAR

JUNIOR GALETTE,

Plaintiff,

v.

MANUEL A. MORALES, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________/

ORDER TO AMEND THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon sua sponte review of a pro se Complaint filed on November 4, 2022. See Complaint [ECF No. 1] (“Compl.”). A “district court has unquestionable authority to control its own docket and broad discretion in deciding how best to manage the cases before it . . . .” Guice v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, 754 F. App’x 789, 791 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Smith v. Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014)). Further, “[a] federal district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte under Rule 41(b).” Hanna v. Florida, 599 F. App’x 362, 363 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 48–49 (1991)). Here, after careful consideration, the Court finds that an amended complaint is required because the Complaint does not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Before addressing the pleading deficiencies at issue, Plaintiff is first instructed on generally applicable rules of pleading. LEGAL STANDARD To begin, although appearing pro se, Plaintiff is required to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding that a pro se litigant is subject to a court’s rules and to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); McLeod v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 679 F. App’x 840, 843 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal after pro se litigant’s noncompliance with court orders); see also Local Rule 1.1 (explaining the Local Rules apply in all proceedings unless

otherwise indicated and that the word “counsel” shall apply to a party that is proceeding pro se). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide, in pertinent part, that a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). In addition, the complaint must specify the grounds for relief available to the moving party, state the facts supporting each ground for relief, and must be signed by Plaintiff or by a person authorized to sign on behalf of Plaintiff. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8; FED. R. CIV. P. 11. When plaintiffs fail to set forth a legally sufficient claim for relief, either because the complaint lacks sufficient factual support or because the complaint fails to comport with local rules, its usefulness is substantially diminished. Still, pro se litigants should ordinarily be afforded

an opportunity to amend. See Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that where it appears a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the movant is entitled an opportunity to amend). If an amended complaint is filed, the Court will only consider claims raised in the amended complaint. Furthermore, the Court does not act as researcher or investigator on a plaintiff’s behalf. See Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1284 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining courts may not act as a litigant’s lawyer and construct the party’s theory of liability from facts never alleged, alluded to, or mentioned during the litigation). Put simply, this Court does not serve as a litigant’s attorney, and any amendment subsumes previous allegations. See GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Failure to adhere to procedural rules or court orders, of course, provides grounds for dismissal. See Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that dismissal of the action may be severe but

warranted when the grounds for dismissal were previously notified). Indeed, pro se litigants are not exempt from procedural rules. See McLeod, 679 F. App’x at 843. The Court must hold the allegations in a pro se civil rights complaint to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1386 (11th Cir. 1998). However, despite the liberal construction afforded to pro se filings, they must conform with procedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). Likewise, liberal construction does not authorize pro se litigants to file impermissible “shotgun” pleadings. The Eleventh Circuit has identified four rough types or categories of shotgun pleadings. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). “The most common” shotgun pleading

is one “containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” Id. at 1321. “The next most common type . . . is a complaint that [is] . . . replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” Id. at 1321–22. “The third type of shotgun pleading is one that . . . [does] not separat[e] into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Id. at 1322–1323. Lastly, “there is the relatively rare [shotgun pleading] asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Id. at 1323. “The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly condemned the use of shotgun pleadings for “imped[ing] the administration of the district courts’

civil dockets.” PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Constr., N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 806 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010). Stated bluntly, shotgun pleadings are “a massive waste of judicial and private resources.” Id. (cleaned up).

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Related

GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia
132 F.3d 1359 (Eleventh Circuit, 1998)
Adem A. Albra v. Advan, Inc.
490 F.3d 826 (Eleventh Circuit, 2007)
Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.
501 U.S. 32 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Fils v. City of Aventura
647 F.3d 1272 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
David Richard Moon v. Lanson Newsome, Warden
863 F.2d 835 (Eleventh Circuit, 1989)
Leslie Smith v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc.
750 F.3d 1253 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)
Raymond Anthony Hanna v. State of Florida
599 F. App'x 362 (Eleventh Circuit, 2015)
Adam Keith Waldman v. Alabama Prison Commissioner
871 F.3d 1283 (Eleventh Circuit, 2017)

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Galette v. Morales, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/galette-v-morales-flsd-2022.