Gale v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

141 F.R.D. 94, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1749, 1992 WL 32290
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedFebruary 12, 1992
DocketNo. 91 C 2314
StatusPublished

This text of 141 F.R.D. 94 (Gale v. Federal Bureau of Investigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gale v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 141 F.R.D. 94, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1749, 1992 WL 32290 (N.D. Ill. 1992).

Opinion

ORDER

NORGLE, District Judge.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”, collectively “defendants”) move for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion.

FACTS

Plaintiff, Andrew Gale, filed this suit pro se under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq., to compel defendants to produce all documents in their possession concerning him. Plaintiff first requested information from the FBI on November 20, 1989. On January 17, 1990, the FBI tendered six pages of Chicago Defender newspaper articles that referred to plaintiff’s involvement in racial problems at the Illinois Institute of Technology during the summer of 1968 and some 20 other pages consisting of correspondence between plaintiff and the FBI. However, and of significant import to plaintiff, one page of the FBI’s file was excised and several references were redacted from [96]*96the provided documents. The FBI has referenced exemptions (b)(2), (b)(7)(D), and (b)(7)(C) to 5 U.S.C. § 552 as the basis for refusing to disclose the retained and redacted material. Plaintiff also requested information from the CIA, but that agency responded that they had no file on him.

Plaintiff then filed suit against the government seeking production of the entire FBI file and claimed that the CIA and FBI were not truthful in their statements to him. That action was dismissed by this court as a result of plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Gale v. United States Government, No. 90 C 932, slip op. at 4, 1990 WL 357075 (N.D.Ill. July 9, 1990). On August 10, 1990, plaintiff sought administrative review of the FBI’s actions; the actions of the FBI were upheld by the Office of Information and Privacy on October 30.

This suit was then filed April 24, 1991, asserting violations of FOIA. Defendants have now moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) asserting that because they have tendered all documents in their files, if any file exists and subject to proper exemptions, they have complied with the FOIA law. At the sanie time, defendants filed their Statement of Undisputed Facts as required by Northern District .of Illinois Rule 12(m) and very detailed affidavits describing the material withheld, in generalized terms, and the reasons for the withholding. Plaintiff has responded to defendants’ motion but has not countered defendants’ 12(m) statement.

DISCUSSION

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.P. 56(c). See also Kreutzer v. A.O. Smith Corp., 951 F.2d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 1991) . A plaintiff cannot rest on mere allegations of a claim. Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 1988). Even though all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion, Carroll v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 955 F.2d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 1992) , a scintilla of evidence will not suffice to oppose a motion'for summary judgment. Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1289 (7th Cir.1991). Nor will some metaphysical doubt suffice. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, a dispute about a material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Indeed, “[o]ne of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims and defenses____” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Accordingly, the non-moving party is required to go beyond the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file to designate specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236 (7th Cir.1991).

There is no factual dispute here barring the court from deciding the matter on a summary basis. Plaintiff’s response has failed to designate any genuine issue of material fact for trial. He has provided no evidence outside of his complaint and response. Rather, he contests the veracity of the defendants in their response. His own self-serving statements are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact barring summary judgment.1 See Beard, 840 F.2d at 410.

[97]*97Defendants concede that plaintiff has a right to see the contents of his file. What is of controversy here is whether the exemptions the FBI alleges as a basis for non-disclosure and redaction apply. Those exemptions state:

(b) This section does not apply to matters that are—

(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [Exemption (b)(2) ]; ... (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records ... (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [Exemption 7(C)], (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source [Exemption 7(D)]____

5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(2), (7)(C), (7)(D) (1991).

The fundamental motivation of FOIA was to give the public access to government documents. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.,

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Related

Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson
456 U.S. 615 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Central Intelligence Agency v. Sims
471 U.S. 159 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.
493 U.S. 146 (Supreme Court, 1989)
United States Department of State v. Ray
502 U.S. 164 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Byron Ashley Parker v. Department of Justice
934 F.2d 375 (D.C. Circuit, 1991)
Gale v. United States Government
786 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Illinois, 1990)
Miller v. Bell
661 F.2d 623 (Seventh Circuit, 1981)
Beard v. Whitley County REMC
840 F.2d 405 (Seventh Circuit, 1988)
Brownell v. Figel
950 F.2d 1285 (Seventh Circuit, 1991)
Kreutzer v. A.O. Smith Corp.
951 F.2d 739 (Seventh Circuit, 1991)
Carroll v. Acme-Cleveland Corp.
955 F.2d 1107 (Seventh Circuit, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
141 F.R.D. 94, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1749, 1992 WL 32290, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gale-v-federal-bureau-of-investigation-ilnd-1992.