Galan v. Bellinsky

CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedNovember 21, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-01799
StatusUnknown

This text of Galan v. Bellinsky (Galan v. Bellinsky) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Galan v. Bellinsky, (D. Colo. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer

Civil Action No. 23-cv-01799-PAB

RACHEL ZINNA GALAN,

Plaintiff, v.

JACOB BELLINSKY,

Defendant. _____________________________________________________________________

ORDER ACCEPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RECOMMENDATION _____________________________________________________________________

This matter is before the Court on the Order and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [Docket No. 15]. I. BACKGROUND On July 17, 2023, Jacob Bellinsky filed a pro se notice of removal from the Gilpin County District Court. Docket No. 1. On July 25, 2023, Judge Scott T. Varholak ordered Mr. Bellinsky to show cause why the case should not be remanded due to the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Docket No. 8 at 3. Judge Varholak stated that Mr. Bellinsky “appears to seek the removal of a domestic relations case from Colorado state court to this Court” because Mr. Bellinsky “seeks review of a recently filed ‘Motion to Relocate Children’ filed in the state-court domestic-relations proceeding.” Id. at 2. Judge Varholak noted that “[f]ederal courts lack jurisdiction over domestic- relations cases.” Id. (quoting Alfaro v. Cnty. of Arapahoe, 766 F. App’x 657, 659 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992))). On September 5, 2023, Mr. Bellinsky filed a response to the magistrate judge’s order to show cause. Docket No. 14. On September 18, 2023, Judge Varholak issued a recommendation to remand this case to the Gilpin County District Court due to the Court’s lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. Docket No. 15 at 1, 6. Judge Varholak stated that the notice of removal contends that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at 2. However, Judge Varholak recommends that the Court remand the case because Mr. Bellinsky removed a pending child custody dispute seeking relocation of children. Id. at 4. Judge Varholak discussed how the “domestic relations exception divests federal courts of the power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.” Id. at 3 (quoting Leathers v. Leathers, 856 F.3d 729, 756 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703)). Judge Varholak noted that Mr. Bellinsky cited no authority permitting a federal court to decide a child custody dispute. Id. at 4. Furthermore, Judge Varholak stated that “Colorado law expressly contemplates state courts handling ‘cases in which

a party with whom the child resides a majority of the time is seeking to relocate with the child to a residence that substantially changes the geographical ties between the child and the other party.’” Id. (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-129(1)(a)(II)). To the extent that Mr. Bellinsky sought to remove only the relocation motion from state court and not the entire case, the magistrate judge discussed how a “party may not remove a single motion from an on-going state court case to federal court.” Id. at 5 (quoting Black v. Black, No. 22-cv-03098-DDD-NRN, 2023 WL 1989793, at *11 (D. Colo. Feb. 14, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3976422 (D. Colo.

2 Apr. 5, 2023)). Finally, Judge Varholak rejected Mr. Bellinsky’s argument that the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate Mr. Bellinsky’s “federal grievances.” Id. (quoting Docket No. 14 at 5). The magistrate judge stated that “[i]t appears that Defendant believes that he has grounds to raise constitutional or other federal claims or defenses relating to or

arising out of the state court proceedings.” Id. The magistrate judge explained that “[A] case may not be removed to federal court solely because of a defense or counterclaim arising under federal law.” Topeka Hous. Auth. v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (“federal jurisdiction generally exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint” (quotation and emphasis removed)). Defendant, through filing a notice of removal as opposed to a complaint, is not bringing any new claims, but [is] seeking the removal of an on-going state court matter over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”). While a federal court may, perhaps, possess jurisdiction over a separately brought suit alleging violations of Defendant’s federal rights arising out of the series of events alluded to by Defendant, this Court certainly lacks jurisdiction over the state court proceedings themselves.

Id. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommends that the case be remanded to the Gilpin County District Court due to the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 6. II. LEGAL STANDARD The Court must “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). An objection is “proper” if it is both timely and specific. United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996). A specific objection “enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues – factual and legal – that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” Id. 3 In the absence of an objection, the district court may review a magistrate judge’s recommendation under any standard it deems appropriate. See Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s

factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings.”). The Court therefore reviews the non-objected to portions of a recommendation to confirm there is “no clear error on the face of the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes. This standard of review is something less than a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard of review, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which in turn is less than a de novo review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Because Mr. Bellinsky is proceeding pro se, the Court will construe his objections and pleadings liberally without serving as his advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

III. ANALYSIS On October 20, 2023, Mr. Bellinsky filed a timely objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Docket No. 21.1 The Court construes Mr.

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Galan v. Bellinsky, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/galan-v-bellinsky-cod-2023.