Gala v. Harris

77 So. 3d 1065, 2011 WL 5172354
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 2, 2011
DocketNo. 11-654
StatusPublished

This text of 77 So. 3d 1065 (Gala v. Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gala v. Harris, 77 So. 3d 1065, 2011 WL 5172354 (La. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

GREMILLION, Judge.

hThe plaintiff, Milan Gala, d/b/a Acadia-na A-l Fence Company, appeals the judgment in favor of the defendant, Mark Harris. For the following reasons, we reverse in part and render and affirm in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September 2008, Gala filed a petition for sums due on an open account against Harris. Gala alleged that Harris owed him $20,000.00 for a fence he partially built for Harris and his wife at their Youngs-ville, Louisiana home. A contract dated August 12, 2005 obligated Gala to construct a fence around the Harris home for $43,432.86. Harris paid Gala $27,650.00 as a down payment with the balance to be paid upon completion. Work on the fence began in August 2005 but was interrupted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Harrises claim that Gala never returned to finish the job, while Gala claims that he was prevented from finishing the job.

Following a one-day trial in November 2010, the trial court found a contract existed between the parties, but that the $15,782.86 balance was not due since Gala failed to complete the fence, and the contract was for the sale of a future thing that never came into existence. The trial court further found that there was never a meeting of the minds regarding certain modifications of the fence. Thus, the trial court found the contract was not modified. The [1067]*1067trial court further found that Gala only partially performed and failed to prove that the Harrises prevented him from completing performance.

Gala filed a Motion for New Trial and to Hold in Contempt and/or Annul Judgment. The trial court denied the motions for new trial, to hold the Harrises in contempt for perjury, and to annul the judgment. Gala now appeals.1

| ¡ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Gala assigns as error:

1. The trial court’s failure to award damages to him pursuant to substantial performance or quantum meruit.

2. The trial court’s denial of his Motion for New Trial and To Hold In Contempt and/or To Annul Judgment.

SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE/QUANTUM MERUIT

Gala does not dispute the trial court’s finding that the instant matter was not an open account, but instead arose in contract. The trial court based its ruling on La.Civ.Code art. 2450, which states:

A future thing may be the object of a contract of sale. In such a case the coming into existence of the thing is a condition that suspends the effects of the sale. A party who, through his fault, prevents the coming into existence of the thing is liable for damages.

The trial court stated:

The contract was for the sale of [sic] future thing. The future thing was the fabrication and installation of a fence. The plaintiff provided partial performance; but, the performance was not competed. Final payment for the future thing was due upon completion. Since the future thing was never completed the $15,782.86 has not come due. Plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendants prevented the plaintiffs performance during the period August through December 2005.

We find the trial court legally erred in finding that the contract was for the sale of a future thing. A future thing is a thing that has yet to come into existence, such as a sale of a future crop or an unborn animal. See Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So.2d 166 (La.1992). A nearly 90% completed fence is not a future thing. We perform a de novo review of the record and render a judgment on the merits when the trial court legally errs by applying the wrong legal standard. Lasha v. Olin, 625 So.2d 1002 (La.1993).

Substantial Performance

| aGala argues that of an approximately 1300 foot fence, the portion that he did not complete was roughly a 120 foot section that included a metal frame gate. Gala claims that he made repeated attempts to complete the project, but was prevented from doing so by the Harrises. Thus, he argues that he was entitled to recover the contract price because the job was substantially completed. Gala argues that even if the contract had not been substantially completed, the trial court was required to make an award based on quantum meruit. We agree.

In disputes involving construction contracts, whether the contractor has substantially performed determines whether he will recover the full contract price. Ortego v. Dupont, 611 So.2d 792 (La.App. 3 Cir.1992). Whether a contractor has [1068]*1068substantially performed under the contract is a question of fact. Id. Factors to consider in determining whether substantial performance exists are “the utility to the owner of the work performed, the extent of the defect or non-performance, the degree to which the purpose of the contract is defeated, and the ease of correction.” Walter Lafargue Real Estate, Inc., v. Raines, 420 So.2d 1309, 1311 (La.App. 3 Cir.1982). If the contractor has not substantially performed under the contract, i.e. there is unfinished work, the contractor is limited to recovery in quantum meruit, and his recovery will be reduced by the amounts the owner must expend to complete the project. Id. “The burden of proof of unfinished work or defects and the cost of completion or correction is upon the owner.” Boydstun v. Johnson, 401 So.2d 629, 631 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 404 So.2d 1262 (La.1981).

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court rendered oral reasons for judgment and stated:

Completion has not yet occurred, and the plaintiff has not proven one way or the — I’m not able to determine one way or the other whether the defendants prevented the plaintiff from performing during the period of August and December, or whether or not the defendant simply chose — I’m sorry, plaintiffs simply chose to not perform during that time period.
|4But ultimately, on the 13th of December, plaintiff notified defendant that he was dissolving the contract as a result of failing to perform, and four months of non performance is sufficient to allow the plaintiff to conclude that performance would not occur within a reasonable period of time.
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MR. EDWARDS: Your Honor, are you making any specific finding regarding substantial completion?
THE COURT: No, I did not.

The trial court did not make any factual findings regarding the central issues in this case upon which we could rely. In performing our de novo review of the record, the following testimonial evidence was considered. Gala testified that he had been in the fencing business for ten years. He described going out to the Harris property and offering a written proposal, which was submitted into evidence. The proposal lists 658 feet of cedar fence with cedar capping, 655 feet of black aluminum fencing, and several gates, for a total price of $43,432.86. It further shows payments to be made of a $27,650.00 deposit with $15,782.86 due upon completion. Gala testified the down payment was for materials. Gala stated that approximately two weeks after the proposal the materials had arrived and he and Jake Fruge began working on the fence, first setting up fence posts.

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77 So. 3d 1065, 2011 WL 5172354, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gala-v-harris-lactapp-2011.