Gaither v. Farmers & Mechanics Bank of Georgetown Ex Rel. Corcorran

26 U.S. 37, 7 L. Ed. 43, 1 Pet. 37, 1828 U.S. LEXIS 389
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 29, 1828
StatusPublished
Cited by40 cases

This text of 26 U.S. 37 (Gaither v. Farmers & Mechanics Bank of Georgetown Ex Rel. Corcorran) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gaither v. Farmers & Mechanics Bank of Georgetown Ex Rel. Corcorran, 26 U.S. 37, 7 L. Ed. 43, 1 Pet. 37, 1828 U.S. LEXIS 389 (1828).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Johnson

delivered the opinion of .the Court. — .

The plaintiff here was defendant in the Court below, to an action instituted by the Farmers and Mechanics Bank of Georgetown, on a note made by .him to -W. W. Corcorran &■ Co. and by them endorsed in blank to the Bank.

The record makes out a case for this Court, of which the following is a summary: That W. W. Corcorran & Co. discounted their own notes with this Bank, at thirty days • the Bank, expressly stipulating, that in lieu of money they should receive what they call a' post note of their own, payable at a future day, without interest. -The evidence would make out that the' post notes given for.this discounted note,w,ere at thirty-five days after date; that it is, two days after the discounted note fell due: so that in fact there was no advance of money, although an interest of six per cent, per annum, was taken’ from the’ Coreor-rans, and the post notes of the Bank wer.e proved to be at a discount of one per cent, making one 'and a half per. cent, for thirty days, or eighteen per cent, per annum. The note on which this suit was instituted, was passed to the Bank as a collateral security for the discounted note, and was altogether unaffected wifh *42 Usury in its origin. The ground on which the right of the iBank is • resisted, is, not that Gaither is discharged from his' contract with W. W. Corcorran & Co., but that the endorsement to the plaintiff below, having been made to secure a note given on an usurious contract, could vest no interest or cause of action, in the endorsee. In order to avoid the pressure of .this defence, in the Court below, the plaintiffs there gave in evidence a,writing, addressed by W. W. Corcorran & Co. to the Bank, bearing date 17th February. 1823,' prior to the institution of that suit, in these words: ‘‘ Please deliver to Thomas Corcórrán what notes of ours may remain in your possession, after the debt due the Bank, for which they are left as collateral security, shall have been paid, or hold the Same subject to his order.” And it' was further shown, that'a few days before the issue was tried below, an adjustment had taken place bétw'een the Bank and Thomas Corcorran, (who was then endorser and assignee of W; W. Corcorran'8c Go.) upon which Gaither’s note had been delivered to Thomas Corcdrran; he then endorsed his name t>n Gaither’s noté, below' that of W. W. Corcorran 8c Co. and thereupon the Bank, before the jury were charged, had the name of Thomas fcorcorran enter-, ed on the do.cket, as the cestuy que use, for whom they were-prosecuting their suit, and the jury, it appears, were charged with the causé,■■ according to the exhibition of parties, thus made-upon the docket; that is, to try ah issue between thp-Bank, to the use of Thomas fcorcorran, plaintiff, and Gaither, defendant. .

..This practice is familiar with the. Maryland'Courts, and when the áction originates in that form, the cestuy'que use is regarded is the real party to thé suit.

It is how,contended; that, although substituted at'the eleventh hour, Thomas Corcorran' is tobe regarded in that relation; and ■ under that idea this causo' has' been argued, ds though the question of. usury had been- raised betweén Gaither aád an innocént endorser.

But it is obviously, impossible, in the present action, to pay ■ any regard to Thomas Gorcorran’s interest or claims. The arrangement which -introdufced hisname into the cause, was' too obviously concocted- for the purpose of. rescuing the interests. of the plaintiffs in the record, from- the effects of the defence of usury. • It therefore' can pretend to no-' merit in the administration of justice.-, But if the effects of that - transaction be examined,'without reference to the motive, it is'equally clear, it can’have no bearing upon' the present action. The. interest in, or power over Gaither’s note,-was;only inchoate,-and con tingeh t, - un tilal 1 the debts due-the Bank should hie. paid,-or they otherwise be induced'to relinquish it to him-; and .this did *43 not take place until long posterior to the institution of the suit, and even after issue joined. '

The Bank sue on their, own interest, declared on their own Tight, and. acknowledge n<? participation with Thomas Cprcor---ran in the interest or„,the action, until the moment when-the cause is going ,'to trial. Tt was, surely then too late to permit them to assume a hew character, or interpose a new party; however liberally this Court might be disposed to' sacrifice the forms and rules of law, to the Maryland practice.

We will, therefore, -put Thomas Qorcorran’s interest out ot view, and will consider the parties, at the commencement of the action, as the ^parties at its close.

This puts the question on the right of an innocent endorser, out of the cause — since-the endorsee of Gaither’s note received the usurious interest,, and the endorser paid it. The only questions on the .point of usury, then, are,

1st, Whether, Gaither, in the relations in which he stood to these parties, could set up- the usury in his defence.

■ 2d,. Áríd-wHether that defence could be set up, after pay-, meiit'.of the note/om which the usury had been,received.

The. objection in the first point, is, that as there was no usury, in the concoction, of Gaither’s contract, he ought not to'be permitted to. avail himself of the usurious contract between the .endorser, and endorsee,' to avoid a debt -lynioh he' justly owes..

And this .is unquestionably true: for the rule cannot be doubted, that if the note be free from usury, in its origin, no subsequent usurious transactions respecting it, can affect it -with- tjie taint of usury, Nor does Gaither propose by this defence, to1 relieve himself from paying the note ; it goes only to his liability to pay it to this individual; and reason,. analogy, and ¿djudged cases,-.will sustain the defence. ' Suppose a note1 given to a woman, who marries, and then endorses it without her husband’s authority; such endorsement-would be void; (1 East, 432,)- and .the endorsee could not recover, yet the husband . and wife may recover.

In a comment on the case of Jones, and Davison,' in Holt’s Reports, (1 Holt, 256,) an usurious noté is likened to a bill of exchange on a bad. stamp: - If a stamp were necessary to give validity to an iendorsefnent, it- cannot be- doubted that none who claim’ through such1 an endorsement could maintain an action against the drawer. • The endorsement, though actual, was.ineffectual for the purpose of transferring, an interest in the npte. It -was a' void act.

, This case.is' governed by the laws of Maryland : and the Act of Maryland against usixry is in the words of thé Statute of .Ann, It declares, “ All bonds,, contracts, and assurances what *44 ever, taken on an usurious contract,” to be utterly void. Now the endorsement of a negotiable note creates several contracts; and if, in this case, it could give a right of action against Gaither, the,drawer,^ it ought also to sustain'an action .against W.- W. Corcorran & Co. the endorsers; but against them, it is perfectly clear that an action could not be maintained, for they were parties to the usurious loan..

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Bluebook (online)
26 U.S. 37, 7 L. Ed. 43, 1 Pet. 37, 1828 U.S. LEXIS 389, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gaither-v-farmers-mechanics-bank-of-georgetown-ex-rel-corcorran-scotus-1828.