Gaines v. Relf

53 U.S. 472, 13 L. Ed. 1071, 12 How. 472, 1851 U.S. LEXIS 676
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 18, 1852
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 53 U.S. 472 (Gaines v. Relf) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. 472, 13 L. Ed. 1071, 12 How. 472, 1851 U.S. LEXIS 676 (1852).

Opinions

Mr. Justice CATRON

delivered the opinion of the court.

This cause comes here by appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court of the Eastern District of Louisiana, where the bill was dismissed.

The complainant sues as the only legitimate child of the late Daniel Clark, who died in the city of New Orleans the 13th of August, 1813. No account is prayed against Daniel Clark’s executors; but the complainant seeks to recover the property sold by them, consisting of lands and slaves, on the ground that her father could not deprive her, as his legitimate child, of more than one fifth part of his estate by a last will, according to the laws of Louisiana as they stood in 1813. And she maintains that.the sales made by Chew and Relf, were made without any orders of court to authorize them, and that therefore they are void; the laws of Louisiana requiring such orders before a valid sale could be made.

The respondents claim under a will made by Daniel Clark in 1811, by which he devised all his property* real and personal, to his mother, Mary Clark, and appointed Richard Relf and Beverly . Chew, his executors ; and to whom Mary Clark made a power to sell Daniel Clark’s estate for the purpose of raising money to pay his;debts. Chew and Relf, acting as executors of Daniel Clark and also as attorneys of Mary Clark, did sell the property in controversy for .the purpose of paying the debts of the tés[506]*506tatór. To meet this claim of title, the complainant insists, 1st, That the sales made-by Chew and Relf, as executors, were made without orders from the court of probate' to authorize them, and are voidi 2nd, That Mary Clark had not accepted in legal form, the bequest of her son when she conveyed by her attorneys; and that therefore, her conveyances cannot be relied on by her vendees to support the plea of innocent purchaser.

On the 10th day of June, 1844, the mother of the complainant, styling herself Madame Marie Zulime Carriére, and widow of the late Daniel Clark, by her notarial act, made in the eity of • New Orleans, accepted, without benefit of inventory, the community of acquests and gains of one moiety, which it is alleged existed between her and her late husband Daniel Clark, according to the laws in such cases provided. And on the 2d of July, 1844, the then complainants, Gaines and wife, among other amendments to their bill, filed the following: “Your oratrix alleges that she is entitled to the one moiety of the estate of which the said Daniel Clark died possessed, by reason of' a conveyance thereof, made to her by M. Z. Gardette, the widow of the said Clark, and the mother cf your oratrix, on the 7th day of May, 1836, and which is hereunto annexed, marked A. B. and prayed to be taken as part hereof; and the mother of your oratrix did thereafter, on the 20th June, 1844, further convey to her all her interest in said estate, as appears by her act, a copy of which is herewith exhibited, marked C.; the whole of said estate having been acquired during the coverture, of said Clark and wife.”

The exhibits in these particulars correspond, to the allegations. It follows, therefore, that the complainant claims one half of Daniel Clark’s estate by a conveyance from her mother,

The first and most important of the issues presented is that of the legitimacy of the complainant. It is raised, by the following pleadings:

She alleges that her'father; Daniel Clark, was married to Zulime Née Carriere, in the city of Philadelphia, in the year 1802 or 1803; and that she is the legitimate, and the only legitimate offspring of that marriage.

The defendants deny that Daniel Clark was married to said Zülimé at the time and place alleged, or at any other time or place. And they further aver, that at the time said marriage is alleged to have taken place, the said Zulime was the lawful wife of one Jerome Desgrange.

If the mother of. the complainant was the lawful wife of Jerome Desgrange at the time said Zulime is alleged to have intermarried with Daniel Clarkj then the marriage with Clark is merely void; and it is immaterial whether it did of did not take [507]*507place. And the first question we propose to examine is, as to the fact, whether said Zulime was Desgrange’s lawful wife in 1802 or 1803.

A formal record of the marriage between Desgrange and Marie Julia Carriére, obtained from the cathedral catholic church at New Orleans, is before us. That it is a true record •of said marriage is not controverted. Marie Julia is designated Zulime, by a soubriquet or nickname, which is proved to have been a common custom in Louisiana at that time. The .marriage was solemnized in due form on the 2d day of December, 1794. This is admitted on part of the complainant. The parties cohabited together as man and wife for seven or eight years. This is also conceded by both sides. To rebut and overcome the established fact of this marriage, it is alleged that previous to Desgrange’s marriage with Zulime he had lawfully married another woman, who was living when he' married Zulime, and was still his wife; and that therefore, the second marriage was void. And this issue we are called on to try.

The marriage with Desgrange having been proved, it was established as primd facie true, that Zulime was not the lawful •wife of Clark, and the onus of proving that Desgrange had a former wife living when he married Zulime was imposed on the complainant; she was bound to prove the affirmative fact that Desgrange committed bigamy. To establish such previous marriage and the consequent bigamy by marrying a second time, much evidence was introduced and relied on by the complainant. The first witness whose testimony will be referred to was Madame Despau, sister of Zulime.. Her testimony has been taken three times ; first in 1839, then in 1845, and again in 1849.

In 1839 she says, “ I was well acquainted with the late Daniel Clark, of New Orleans. He was married in Philadelphia in 1803, by a catholic priest. I was present at this marriage. One child was born of that marriage, to wit: Myra Clark, who married William Wallace Whitney. I was present at her birth and knew that Mr. Clark claimed -and acknowledged her to be his child. She was born in 1806. I neither knew nor had any reason to believe, that-any other child, besides Myra, was born of that marriage. The circumstances of her marriage with Daniel Clark were these: Several years after her marriage with Desgrange, she heard he had a living wife; our family charged him with the crime of bigamy in marrying said Zulime; he at first denied it, but afterwards admitted it, and fled from the country. These circumstances became public, and Mr. Clark made proposals of marriage to my sister, with the knowledge of all our family. It was considered essential first to obtain re[508]*508cord-proof of Desgrange having a living wife at the time he married my sister; to obtain which, from the records of the catholic church in New York, (where Mr. Desgrange’s prior marriage was celebrated,) we sailed for that city. On our arrival there, we found that the registry of marriages had been ' destroyed. Mr. Clark arrived after us. We heard that a Mr. Gardette, then living in Philadelphia, was one of the witnesses to Mr. Desgrange’s prior marriage. We proceeded to that city, and found Mr. Gardette. He answered, that he was present at said prior marriage of Desgrange, and that he afterwards knew Desgrange and his wife by this marriage; that his wife had sailed for France. Mr. Clark then said, 1

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Bluebook (online)
53 U.S. 472, 13 L. Ed. 1071, 12 How. 472, 1851 U.S. LEXIS 676, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gaines-v-relf-scotus-1852.