Gaines v. Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co.

173 F. 303, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5875
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Alabama
DecidedOctober 6, 1909
DocketNo. 182
StatusPublished

This text of 173 F. 303 (Gaines v. Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gaines v. Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co., 173 F. 303, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5875 (circtndal 1909).

Opinion

GRUBB, District Judge.

The equity of the bill of complaint is attacked by the general demurrer of the defendant upon the ground that the patent, which it is charged that defendant infringed, was invalid for want of invention and patentable novelty.

The invalidity must appear upon the face of the patent, and from facts of which the court takes judicial knowledge, and must so appear as to be clear and free from doubt. The rule, in hearings of this nature upon general demurrer, is well settled that:

“In considering the question of the validity of a patent on its face, the court may take judicial knowledge of facts of common and general knowledge, tending to show that the device or process patented is old, or lacking in invention, and that the court may refresh and strengthen its recollection and impression of what facts were of common and general knowledge at the time of the application for the patent by reference to any printed source of general information which is known to the court to be reliable, and to have been published prior to the application for the patent. Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 38, [304]*30423 L. Ed. 200. The presumption from the issuance of the patent is that it involves both novelty and invention. The effect of dismissing the bill upon demurrer is to deny to the complainant the right to adduce evidence to support that presumption. Therefore, the court must be able, from the statements on the face of the patent, and from the common and general knowledge already referred to, to say that the want of novelty and invention is so palpable that it is impossible that evidence of any kind could show the fact to be otherwise. Hence it must follow that, if the court has any doubt whatever with reference to the novelty or invention of that which is patented, it must overrule the demurrer, and give the complainant an opportunity, by proof, to support and justify the action of the patent office.” American Fiber-Chamois Co. v. Buckskin-Fibre Co., 72 Fed. 508, 18 C. C. A. 662.

In this case, the patent covered an apparatus, the purpose of which was to convey stock (coke, ore, and limestone) from the stockyard oi bins to the furnace, handling and unloading it automatically. The original method of filling the furnace with stock was by means of “buggies” loaded on the stockyard by hand, wheeled by laborers onto the cage of a vertical elevator, by which they were hoisted to the top of the furnace and rolled off the cage to the mouth of the furnace, and unloaded by hand into the furnace. The method covered by the patent adopted the vertical hoist or elevator and cage. Instead of loading and rolling buggies onto the cage, at the bottom of the furnace, and rolling them off the cage when it had reached the top of the furnace, and unloading them into the furnace, all by hand, complainant’s method adopted the use of a car operating on a track on the floor of the cage, which was loaded direct from bins containing the stock, and while standing on the cage and hoisted to the top loaded, where it was mechanically released from the cage running down a track connecting with the track on the cage to the mouth of the furnace, where it was dumped mechanically and returned mechanically to the cage, empty. The improvement consisted in the economical handling of the stock, due to the saving in labor.

It becomes important, in determining the question of invention or patentable novelty, to arrive at the stage of the art at the time of complainant’s application for the patent under consideration, which was in January, 1904. Prom the recitals of the patent itself, it appears that, at the time it was applied for, there had been generally introduced among furnacemen a device for handling stock from the yard into the. furnace known as the incline or skip hoist. Beginning with line 22, p. 1, the recital is: . ■

“Nearly all furnace plants' using vertical hoists were built prior to the general introduction of the' skip or incline hoist, and it entails a very large expense to reconstruct such furnaces for the incline hoist, often necessitating a new furnace, because the old shells are generally too thin to support the • weight of such incline or skip hoist. Our invention, which secures all the advantages of the modern skip hoist, can be applied to all such furnaces at a .cost so small as may well be considered nominal.”

It thus appears from the recitals of the patent itself that the skip .or incline hoist was in general use when complainant’s patent was applied for, and that the advantages claimed for complainant’s invention were those realized by the skip or incline hoist. The exhibits, offered,, by defendants to refresh the recollection of the court, consisting. of trade and scientific .journals, published .prior to the com[305]*305plainant’s application, show the same fact, and illustrate the nature of the apparatus, known as the skip or incline hoist, and its method of accomplishing the advantages which complainant contends are also the resultant of his invention.

The court has arrived at the conclusion that the fact that the skip hoist was in general use prior to the application of complainant for his patent, and the general character of skip hoists are matters of common knowledge in this district, of which the court will take judicial notice, and are shown as well by the recitals of complainant’s patent. The skip hoist was an inclined instead of vertical elevator, running from the foot to the top of the furnace, on which its weight rested, and on which cars, loaded at the foot, were lifted to the top and automatically dumped into the mouth of the furnace, being returned automatically for reloading. The skip car was loaded indifferently at different plants, either direct from bins, while standing at the bottom of the incline, or from larries, which were loaded from the bins, and which conveyed the stock to the foot of the incline, and, standing over the incline car, dumped its load into it, while it was stationary at the bottom of the incline ; and possibly there existed types where the incline car was moved by an electric motor away from the foot of the incline to the bins, to be loaded, and was then by it returned to the incline foot for hoisting to the furnace. In this stage of the art, the complainant applied for his patent, and the controlling inquiry is whether liis apparatus shows invention or patentable novelty, in view of the fact that the incline or skip hoist was in general use at and before the date of his application. It appears from the claims of the patent that there was no new element in the combination or aggregation described and claimed in it. The only suggestion of novelty in any one of the separate elements is that the car is loaded on the cage while stationary on it. Conceding that this method had never been used prior to complainant’s application, it is not the result of an original conception in the sense of an invention, but, at most, mere mechanical adaptation, and not patentable. But the method of loading the incline car while standing on the incline trade in the incline pit, both from larries and from bins direct, was in general use before the complainant’s application, and is the equivalent of loading the cage car while stationary on it. Numerous other instances of the same method at mines have long been in general use in all mining districts. Unless, therefore, the combination was patentable, as such, the patent cannot be sustained.

The rule as to when a combination of all old élements may be patented is expressed in the case of Richards v. Chase Elevator Co., 158 U. S. 302, 15 Sup. Ct. 833, 39 L. Ed. 991, as follows:

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Bluebook (online)
173 F. 303, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5875, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gaines-v-alabama-consol-coal-iron-co-circtndal-1909.