FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 21 2018 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GAIL VINCENT, No. 17-35487
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:16-cv-05023-RBL-TLF v.
BELINDA STEWART, Correctional MEMORANDUM* Program Administrator, DOC; WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; BERNARD WARNER, Secretary, DOC; JOE WILLIAMSON, Facility Food Manager, SCCC; BRENT CARNEY; PAT DOE 1, Religious Dietary Final Policy Makers; PAT DOE 2, Religious Dietary Final Policy Makers,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 4, 2018 Seattle, Washington
Before: W. FLETCHER, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Appellant Gail Vincent appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to various prison officials (collectively, “defendants”) of the Washington
State Department of Corrections (“Department”) on his claims that they violated
his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse in part and affirm in part.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Shakur v.
Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2008). “Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, we must determine whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the
relevant substantive law.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
1. We conclude that the district court incorrectly granted summary
judgment on Vincent’s RLUIPA claim. To state a claim under RLUIPA, Vincent
must show that the state placed a substantial burden on the exercise of his religious
beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). While the
1 In his Replacement Opening Brief, Vincent “conceded that the dismissal of the [Department] as a defendant was proper.” 2 court may not “inquir[e] into whether a particular belief or practice is ‘central’ to a
prisoner’s religion, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A), the Act does not preclude
inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s professed religiousity.” Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (citations omitted). Here, the district
court acknowledged that it could not inquire into “whether [Vincent’s] exercise of
religion is required by [his] faith.” Nevertheless, the court concluded that
Vincent’s professed personal belief was insincere on the basis of his past
commissary purchases. We disagree. Even if the evidence considered by the
district court “call[s] into question the sincerity of [Vincent’s] belief,” there
remains a factual dispute concerning Vincent’s consumption of the ramen
sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Moreover, we are unconvinced that a
single incidence of deviation occurring more than four years ago is legally
sufficient to prove a lack of sincerity.
In addition, the district court incorrectly concluded that the defendants did
not substantially burden the practice of Vincent’s religion. To constitute a
substantial burden, the government’s conduct “must have a tendency to coerce
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Jones v.
Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Here, there
3 remains a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the cheese products
offered in the commissary are sufficient to satisfy the demands of Vincent’s
religious beliefs. See Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d
916, 923 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding a substantial burden where the government
“block[s] [the adherent] from obtaining religious materials or leadership from other
sources”). Furthermore, the defendants’ refusal to provide Vincent with a
metabolic diet that meets his religious needs substantially burdened his religious
beliefs. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 888–89 (finding a substantial burden where an
inmate was forced to eat a diet that caused “adverse physical effects” in order to
comply with his religious dietary laws); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198
(9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that inmates “have the right to be provided
with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of
their religion”).
2. The district court also erred in granting summary judgment on Vincent’s
First Amendment claim. Under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, a
government regulation that substantially burdens an individual’s exercise of their
religion must be “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Shakur,
514 F.3d at 884. To make this determination, the court must conduct the four-part
inquiry set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Here, dietary restrictions
4 can rationally further a legitimate penological interest in running a simplified food
service. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 885–86. In addition, Vincent’s ability to read
holy scripture and communicate with religious leaders provided him with
alternative means of practicing his religion. See id. However, the defendants’
allegations that accommodating Vincent would require significant additional labor,
time, and staff are conclusory and do not indicate that the defendants actually
looked into providing Vincent and other similarly situated inmates with religiously
compliant metabolic meals. See id. at 887–88. Thus, the defendants’ allegations
were inadequate to satisfy the third and fourth Turner factors, and summary
judgment was inappropriate. See id.
3. We conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment
on Vincent’s equal protection claim. To survive summary judgment on an equal
protection claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Vincent was required to allege
facts plausibly showing that “the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to
discriminate against [him] based upon membership in a protected class.” Thornton
v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lee v. City of
L.A.,
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FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 21 2018 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GAIL VINCENT, No. 17-35487
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:16-cv-05023-RBL-TLF v.
BELINDA STEWART, Correctional MEMORANDUM* Program Administrator, DOC; WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; BERNARD WARNER, Secretary, DOC; JOE WILLIAMSON, Facility Food Manager, SCCC; BRENT CARNEY; PAT DOE 1, Religious Dietary Final Policy Makers; PAT DOE 2, Religious Dietary Final Policy Makers,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 4, 2018 Seattle, Washington
Before: W. FLETCHER, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Appellant Gail Vincent appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to various prison officials (collectively, “defendants”) of the Washington
State Department of Corrections (“Department”) on his claims that they violated
his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse in part and affirm in part.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Shakur v.
Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2008). “Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, we must determine whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the
relevant substantive law.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
1. We conclude that the district court incorrectly granted summary
judgment on Vincent’s RLUIPA claim. To state a claim under RLUIPA, Vincent
must show that the state placed a substantial burden on the exercise of his religious
beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). While the
1 In his Replacement Opening Brief, Vincent “conceded that the dismissal of the [Department] as a defendant was proper.” 2 court may not “inquir[e] into whether a particular belief or practice is ‘central’ to a
prisoner’s religion, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A), the Act does not preclude
inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s professed religiousity.” Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (citations omitted). Here, the district
court acknowledged that it could not inquire into “whether [Vincent’s] exercise of
religion is required by [his] faith.” Nevertheless, the court concluded that
Vincent’s professed personal belief was insincere on the basis of his past
commissary purchases. We disagree. Even if the evidence considered by the
district court “call[s] into question the sincerity of [Vincent’s] belief,” there
remains a factual dispute concerning Vincent’s consumption of the ramen
sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Moreover, we are unconvinced that a
single incidence of deviation occurring more than four years ago is legally
sufficient to prove a lack of sincerity.
In addition, the district court incorrectly concluded that the defendants did
not substantially burden the practice of Vincent’s religion. To constitute a
substantial burden, the government’s conduct “must have a tendency to coerce
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Jones v.
Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Here, there
3 remains a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the cheese products
offered in the commissary are sufficient to satisfy the demands of Vincent’s
religious beliefs. See Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d
916, 923 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding a substantial burden where the government
“block[s] [the adherent] from obtaining religious materials or leadership from other
sources”). Furthermore, the defendants’ refusal to provide Vincent with a
metabolic diet that meets his religious needs substantially burdened his religious
beliefs. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 888–89 (finding a substantial burden where an
inmate was forced to eat a diet that caused “adverse physical effects” in order to
comply with his religious dietary laws); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198
(9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that inmates “have the right to be provided
with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of
their religion”).
2. The district court also erred in granting summary judgment on Vincent’s
First Amendment claim. Under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, a
government regulation that substantially burdens an individual’s exercise of their
religion must be “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Shakur,
514 F.3d at 884. To make this determination, the court must conduct the four-part
inquiry set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Here, dietary restrictions
4 can rationally further a legitimate penological interest in running a simplified food
service. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 885–86. In addition, Vincent’s ability to read
holy scripture and communicate with religious leaders provided him with
alternative means of practicing his religion. See id. However, the defendants’
allegations that accommodating Vincent would require significant additional labor,
time, and staff are conclusory and do not indicate that the defendants actually
looked into providing Vincent and other similarly situated inmates with religiously
compliant metabolic meals. See id. at 887–88. Thus, the defendants’ allegations
were inadequate to satisfy the third and fourth Turner factors, and summary
judgment was inappropriate. See id.
3. We conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment
on Vincent’s equal protection claim. To survive summary judgment on an equal
protection claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Vincent was required to allege
facts plausibly showing that “the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to
discriminate against [him] based upon membership in a protected class.” Thornton
v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lee v. City of
L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001)). Discriminatory purpose “implies that the
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects.” Navarro v. Block,
5 72 F.3d 712, 716 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). Here, Vincent has not shown that he was singled out and
intentionally treated differently from any other inmate in the Department’s custody
on account of his religion. The district court thus properly granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants on Vincent’s equal protection claim.
4. We affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity in favor of
defendants as to Vincent’s claim for damages. To overcome the defense of
qualified immunity, Vincent must show (1) that the defendants violated his
constitutional rights and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the
violation. Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, while
we conclude that Vincent raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his
First Amendment rights were violated, the constitutional question was not “beyond
debate,” see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011), and qualified immunity
was thus proper.
Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Vincent’s
RLUIPA and First Amendment claims is REVERSED and the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on Vincent’s Equal Protection claim and the
defendants’ qualified immunity defense is AFFIRMED.