1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Gabriel Ramirez-Landeros and Alma Rosa Case No. 2:25-cv-01311-CDS-MDC Ramirez, 5 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Their Complaint and Denying 6 Plaintiffs Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand.
7 v.
8 Ecolab Inc., et al., [ECF Nos. 6, 8] 9 Defendants
10 11 This negligence action arises from an auto accident in Clark County, Nevada. Plaintiffs 12 Gabriel Ramirez-Landeros and Alma Rosa Ramirez brought negligence claims in Nevada state 13 court against Ecolab Inc., Ecolab Corporate Fleets, and Ricardo Cisnero Belmudez. Compl., Ex. 14 A, ECF No. 1 at 5–15. Ecolab petitioned for removal based on diversity jurisdiction. See Pet., ECF 15 No. 1. The plaintiffs now move to amend their complaint to change the domicile of Belmudez 16 from California to Nevada. Mot. am. compl., ECF No. 6. They also move to remand the case back 17 to state court because there is not complete diversity between the parties. Mot. remand, ECF 18 No. 8. For the reasons stated herein, I deny the plaintiffs’ motion to amend and their motion to 19 remand. 20 I. Background 21 The auto accident at issue here occurred in July 2023. ECF No. 1 at 7.1 The plaintiffs 22 initiated this action in Nevada state court in June 2025. See ECF No. 1 at 14. Based on the original 23 complaint, the plaintiffs’ domiciles are Nevada; the respective domiciles of defendants Belmudez, 24 Ecolab Inc., and Ecolab Corporate Fleet are California, Delaware, and Nevada. Id. at ¶¶ 3–4. And 25 it alleged damages exceeding $75,000. See id. at 9, ¶ 25. 26 1 Unless otherwise noted, the court only cites to the plaintiffs’ original complaint (ECF No. 1) to provide context to this action, not to indicate a finding of fact. 1 Thereafter, Ecolab removed to the case to federal district court based on diversity 2 jurisdiction. ECF No. 1. The petition stated that Belmudez is a California resident who has not 3 been served, Ecolab Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in 4 Minnesota, and Ecolab Corporate Fleets is an internal Ecolab group and not a separate entity. In 5 support of removal, Ecolab submitted declarations from private investigator Richard J. Haayen 6 and from Ecolab district sales manager Andrew Powell. Decls. ECF Nos. 11-1, 11-2. The 7 declaration from Haayen reveals that he investigated Belmudez’s domicile in August 2025 and 8 found that Belmudez has a valid and current California driver’s license, California pest control 9 license, and California residence. ECF No. 11-1 at 1–2. He found that Belmudez applied for the 10 California license in December 2024—i.e., over a year after the accident had taken place, and 11 roughly six months before the plaintiffs filed suit. 12 Now, the plaintiffs move to amend their complaint to change defendant Belmudez’s 13 domicile to Nevada. ECF No. 6 at 2. They argue that the body worn camera from Belmudez’s 14 arrest shows that he actually is a resident of Nevada rather than California. See id.; BWC video, 15 Ex. A, ECF No. 7-1. They also move to remand the case because the parties are not completely 16 diverse. ECF No. 8. 17 II. Legal standard 18 A. Standard for granting leave to amend the complaint. 19 Under Rule 15(a), courts should “freely” grant leave to amend a complaint “when justice 20 so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “Several factors govern the propriety of a motion to amend: 21 (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith, (3) prejudice to the opponent, and (4) futility of amendment.” 22 Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 785 F.2d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). “Leave to 23 amend may be denied if the proposed amendment is futile or would be subject to dismissal.” 24 Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2018). A “proposed amendment is futile 25 only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would 26 1 constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., 119 F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th 2 Cir. 1997) (quoting Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988)). 3 B. Standard for remanding a case due to a lack of complete diversity. 4 There is a “strong presumption against removal.” Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka 5 ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). To overcome this presumption, a defendant 6 seeking removal must show that removal is proper by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 7 1106–07. Removal based on diversity jurisdiction is proper when there is (1) complete diversity 8 between the parties at the time of removal, and (2) an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. 9 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446. Parties are completely diverse when no plaintiff shares a 10 domicile with any defendant in the case. Grancare, LLC v. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 11 2018). But in “determining whether there is complete diversity, district courts may disregard the 12 citizenship of a non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently joined.” Id. (citing Chesapeake & 13 O. R. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914)). And even if there is complete diversity, removal is 14 barred if any defendant who has “been properly joined and served” declines to “join in or consent 15 to the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). 16 III. Discussion 17 A person is “domiciled” where “he or she has established a ‘fixed habitation or abode in a 18 particular place’” with the intent to “remain there permanently or indefinitely.” Lew v. Moss, 797 19 F.2d 747, 749–50 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation modified). As such, a “change in domicile requires the 20 confluence of (a) physical presence at the new location with (b) an intention to remain there 21 indefinitely.” Id. at 750. For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the parties’ domiciles must be 22 completely diverse “at the time [the] lawsuit was instituted.” Id. at 749. If the action is removed 23 based on diversity jurisdiction, then there must also be complete diversity at the time of 24 removal; otherwise, the federal district court must “remand the action to state court.” Miller v. 25 Grgurich, 763 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1985). 26 1 Here, Belmudez’s consent to removal is not necessary because he has not been properly 2 served. See ECF No. 12 at 3. But his domicile is still accounted for in determining whether 3 diversity jurisdiction exists because neither party has shown that Belmudez is a nominal 4 defendant. See Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 1986). The parties dispute 5 Belmudez’s domicile and, in turn, the presence of complete diversity. 6 Ecolab argues that there is complete diversity because Belmudez’s domicile was 7 California when the plaintiffs initiated the suit. See Def.’s decls. ECF Nos. 11-1, 11-2.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Gabriel Ramirez-Landeros and Alma Rosa Case No. 2:25-cv-01311-CDS-MDC Ramirez, 5 Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Their Complaint and Denying 6 Plaintiffs Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand.
7 v.
8 Ecolab Inc., et al., [ECF Nos. 6, 8] 9 Defendants
10 11 This negligence action arises from an auto accident in Clark County, Nevada. Plaintiffs 12 Gabriel Ramirez-Landeros and Alma Rosa Ramirez brought negligence claims in Nevada state 13 court against Ecolab Inc., Ecolab Corporate Fleets, and Ricardo Cisnero Belmudez. Compl., Ex. 14 A, ECF No. 1 at 5–15. Ecolab petitioned for removal based on diversity jurisdiction. See Pet., ECF 15 No. 1. The plaintiffs now move to amend their complaint to change the domicile of Belmudez 16 from California to Nevada. Mot. am. compl., ECF No. 6. They also move to remand the case back 17 to state court because there is not complete diversity between the parties. Mot. remand, ECF 18 No. 8. For the reasons stated herein, I deny the plaintiffs’ motion to amend and their motion to 19 remand. 20 I. Background 21 The auto accident at issue here occurred in July 2023. ECF No. 1 at 7.1 The plaintiffs 22 initiated this action in Nevada state court in June 2025. See ECF No. 1 at 14. Based on the original 23 complaint, the plaintiffs’ domiciles are Nevada; the respective domiciles of defendants Belmudez, 24 Ecolab Inc., and Ecolab Corporate Fleet are California, Delaware, and Nevada. Id. at ¶¶ 3–4. And 25 it alleged damages exceeding $75,000. See id. at 9, ¶ 25. 26 1 Unless otherwise noted, the court only cites to the plaintiffs’ original complaint (ECF No. 1) to provide context to this action, not to indicate a finding of fact. 1 Thereafter, Ecolab removed to the case to federal district court based on diversity 2 jurisdiction. ECF No. 1. The petition stated that Belmudez is a California resident who has not 3 been served, Ecolab Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in 4 Minnesota, and Ecolab Corporate Fleets is an internal Ecolab group and not a separate entity. In 5 support of removal, Ecolab submitted declarations from private investigator Richard J. Haayen 6 and from Ecolab district sales manager Andrew Powell. Decls. ECF Nos. 11-1, 11-2. The 7 declaration from Haayen reveals that he investigated Belmudez’s domicile in August 2025 and 8 found that Belmudez has a valid and current California driver’s license, California pest control 9 license, and California residence. ECF No. 11-1 at 1–2. He found that Belmudez applied for the 10 California license in December 2024—i.e., over a year after the accident had taken place, and 11 roughly six months before the plaintiffs filed suit. 12 Now, the plaintiffs move to amend their complaint to change defendant Belmudez’s 13 domicile to Nevada. ECF No. 6 at 2. They argue that the body worn camera from Belmudez’s 14 arrest shows that he actually is a resident of Nevada rather than California. See id.; BWC video, 15 Ex. A, ECF No. 7-1. They also move to remand the case because the parties are not completely 16 diverse. ECF No. 8. 17 II. Legal standard 18 A. Standard for granting leave to amend the complaint. 19 Under Rule 15(a), courts should “freely” grant leave to amend a complaint “when justice 20 so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “Several factors govern the propriety of a motion to amend: 21 (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith, (3) prejudice to the opponent, and (4) futility of amendment.” 22 Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 785 F.2d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). “Leave to 23 amend may be denied if the proposed amendment is futile or would be subject to dismissal.” 24 Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2018). A “proposed amendment is futile 25 only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would 26 1 constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., 119 F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th 2 Cir. 1997) (quoting Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988)). 3 B. Standard for remanding a case due to a lack of complete diversity. 4 There is a “strong presumption against removal.” Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka 5 ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). To overcome this presumption, a defendant 6 seeking removal must show that removal is proper by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 7 1106–07. Removal based on diversity jurisdiction is proper when there is (1) complete diversity 8 between the parties at the time of removal, and (2) an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. 9 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446. Parties are completely diverse when no plaintiff shares a 10 domicile with any defendant in the case. Grancare, LLC v. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 11 2018). But in “determining whether there is complete diversity, district courts may disregard the 12 citizenship of a non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently joined.” Id. (citing Chesapeake & 13 O. R. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914)). And even if there is complete diversity, removal is 14 barred if any defendant who has “been properly joined and served” declines to “join in or consent 15 to the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). 16 III. Discussion 17 A person is “domiciled” where “he or she has established a ‘fixed habitation or abode in a 18 particular place’” with the intent to “remain there permanently or indefinitely.” Lew v. Moss, 797 19 F.2d 747, 749–50 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation modified). As such, a “change in domicile requires the 20 confluence of (a) physical presence at the new location with (b) an intention to remain there 21 indefinitely.” Id. at 750. For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the parties’ domiciles must be 22 completely diverse “at the time [the] lawsuit was instituted.” Id. at 749. If the action is removed 23 based on diversity jurisdiction, then there must also be complete diversity at the time of 24 removal; otherwise, the federal district court must “remand the action to state court.” Miller v. 25 Grgurich, 763 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1985). 26 1 Here, Belmudez’s consent to removal is not necessary because he has not been properly 2 served. See ECF No. 12 at 3. But his domicile is still accounted for in determining whether 3 diversity jurisdiction exists because neither party has shown that Belmudez is a nominal 4 defendant. See Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 1986). The parties dispute 5 Belmudez’s domicile and, in turn, the presence of complete diversity. 6 Ecolab argues that there is complete diversity because Belmudez’s domicile was 7 California when the plaintiffs initiated the suit. See Def.’s decls. ECF Nos. 11-1, 11-2. To support 8 this argument, Ecolab points to Belmudez’s California driver’s license and a California Structural 9 Pest Control Board License, as well as declarations from private investigator Richard J. Haayen 10 and Andrew Powell. 11 The plaintiffs argue that removal is improper because there is not complete diversity 12 between the parties. To support their argument, they point to body worn camera footage of 13 Belmudez arguably showing that his domicile is Nevada. That body cam footage depicts the 14 following conversation after Belmudez showed the officer his California license: 15 Officer: “Do you live in Vegas? Or do you live in California?” 16 Belmudez: “I live in Vegas. I moved here, like, July last year.” 17 Officer: “July of last year? Why haven’t you updated your license?” 18 Belmudez: “I went over there, to the DMV. . . . I told the lady, ‘I don’t know if I’m going to be here for awhile or not.’ And she said, ‘Just keep your California 19 driver’s license until you figure out if you want to stay for a while or if you want 20 to stay or leave.’ So, I kept my driver’s license—my California driver’s license.” 21 ECF No. 7-1 at 12:16–12:41. Then, Belmudez indicated his intent to move back to California: 22 Belmudez: “I’m from San Diego. . . I moved here a year ago. And I’m moving back to San Diego a week ago from today. I’m moving back to the Navy.” 23 24 Id. at 31:30–31:38. This statement only suggests that Belmudez intended to change his domicile. 25 Though intent alone does not establish domicile, I find that the private investigator’s discoveries 26 as to Belmudez’s residence—particularly, Belmudez’s current California licenses and address— 1 makes up the rest. That is, applying the objective facts cited by Ecolab, they have shown beyond a preponderance of the evidence that Belmudez is domiciled in California. See Lew, 797 F.2d at 750 (A defendant may satisfy its burden to show diversity of citizenship using a declaration, but 4|| the claim for domicile should be “evaluated in terms of objective facts” and “statements of intent 5] are entitled to little weight when in conflict with facts. Belmudez’s domicile is more likely to be 6|| California than Nevada. See Adams v. W. Marine Prods., Inc., 958 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 2020) (“At 7|| minimum, a person’s residence constitutes some evidence of domicile.”). 8 Because the plaintiffs are residents of Nevada while the defendants are residents of 9}| Delaware, Minnesota, and California, there is complete diversity between them. Therefore, 10] complete diversity exists, and Ecolab properly removed this case based on diversity jurisdiction. LI IV. Conclusion 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to amend the petition for removal 13|| [ECF No. 6] is DENIED. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to remand [ECF No. 8] is 15|| DENIED. / ) 16 Dated: November 14, 2025 LZ 7 i 4. CrisfingD. Silva 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26