UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
GABRIEL MASSEY-SMITH, Plaintiff, 18-CV-33 (JPO) -v- OPINION AND ORDER CAPTAIN O’HARA, et al., Defendants.
J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge: In this Section 1983 action, pro se Plaintiff Gabriel Massey-Smith brings claims against former Officer Blades, Officer Williams, Officer Camacho, and former Captain O’Hara, who are current or former officers with the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”). The only remaining claims in the fourth amended complaint are (i) a failure to protect claim against Officer Williams and former Officer Blades; (ii) a failure to protect claim against Officer Camacho; (iii) a federal excessive force claim against former Captain O’Hara; and (iv) a deliberate indifference claim against former Captain O’Hara. Defendants move to dismiss the fourth amended complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is granted. I. Background The following comes from the allegations in the fourth amended complaint, which “are assumed to be true.” Hamilton v. Westchester Cnty., 3 F.4th 86, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2021). A. Factual Background Plaintiff Gabriel Massey-Smith is a prisoner under the supervision of the New York City Department of Correction. (See Dkt. No. 64 (“Fourth Am. Compl.”).) Plaintiff alleges that on January 6, 2015, he was moved to the 9 Mod B side of his detention center. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) Soon after, on January 9, 2015, Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by 9 Bloods gang members. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 25.) At that time, Plaintiff alleges, the 9 Mod B side was under the watch of Officer Williams and former Officer Blades. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-38.) Plaintiff alleges that Officer Blades was “sitting in the area” and Officer Williams
was “in the officer’s station”; they “knew [that he] was being assaulted and did not do anything to . . . intervene[] to stop that situation from happening.” (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55-61.) Plaintiff alleges that following the incident, he was “investigated/interviewed” by officers including Officer Camacho. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-49.) According to Plaintiff, during that interview, he was “shown photographs of the people housed in 9 Mod,” and he pointed out the perpetrators. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50-53.) This resulted in Plaintiff’s relocation. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-64.) At a later unspecified time, Plaintiff further alleges that former Captain O’Hara used “unlawful force” when he “physically assaulted” other inmates and “sprayed the rest of” the people there, including Plaintiff. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 145-149.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted with a scalpel on September 3, 2015. (See
Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 158-160.) Afterwards, Plaintiff alleges, an officer named Captain Brown lied, stating that [he] cut [himself] with his I.D. and cover[ed] up the altercation then denied [him] medical treatment.” (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 165-168.) Plaintiff further alleges that Captain Brown and Captain O’Hara “wrote a report to [g]et [him] transferred to O.B.C.C. Emergency Security Housing . . . [and] Emergency Security Unit.” (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 169-172.) Because Plaintiff is “heat sensitive,” he “was moved to O.B.C.C.’s intake [p]ens where it was air conditioning.” (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 174-177.) B. Procedural History Plaintiff filed the initial complaint in this action on January 2, 2018. (See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”).) The fourth amended complaint, filed on April 5, 2019, alleged that Defendants the City of New York, Captains Brown and O’Hara, and Officers Blades, Brown, Camacho, Dockery, Lake, Ogletree, Perez, Sclafani, and Williams violated Plaintiff’s civil rights during his incarceration. (See Fourth Am. Compl.) Defendants the City of New York, Captain Brown, and Officers Brown, Dockery, Lake, Ogletree, Perez, and Sclafani moved to dismiss the claims
against them under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (See Dkt. No. 75.) The Court granted that motion and dismissed those defendants. (See Dkt. No. 93.) The remaining claims in the fourth amended complaint target Defendants former Officer Blades, Officer Williams, Officer Camacho, and former Captain O’Hara. The operative complaint can be read to assert (i) a failure to protect claim against Officer Williams and former Officer Blades (see Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-38); (ii) a failure to protect claim against Officer Camacho (see Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-49); (iii) a federal excessive force claim against former Captain O’Hara (see Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 145-149); and (iv) a deliberate indifference claim against former Captain O’Hara (see Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 174-177.) Defendants move to dismiss those claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
(See Dkt. No. 136.) II. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) directs a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complainant must state “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This means that a complaint is properly dismissed where “the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. A complaint is also properly dismissed “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. “It is well established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.” Meadows v. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020). “Nonetheless, a pro se complaint must state a plausible claim for relief.” Id. III. Discussion Defendants’ motion is granted. The fourth amended complaint fails to state a claim against former Officer Blades, Officer Williams, Officer Camacho, or former Captain O’Hara. The claims against Officer Williams and former Officer Blades are dismissed as time barred. The claim against Officer Camacho is dismissed for lack of personal involvement. The claims against former Captain O’Hara are dismissed as withdrawn. A. Officer Blades and Officer Williams The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is governed by the limitations period that “the law of the State in which the cause of action arose” applies to personal-injury torts. Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In New York, the relevant limitations period is three years, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), so Smith’s complaint “must have been filed within three years of the accrual of [his] claim,” Smith v. Campbell, 782 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2015).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
GABRIEL MASSEY-SMITH, Plaintiff, 18-CV-33 (JPO) -v- OPINION AND ORDER CAPTAIN O’HARA, et al., Defendants.
J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge: In this Section 1983 action, pro se Plaintiff Gabriel Massey-Smith brings claims against former Officer Blades, Officer Williams, Officer Camacho, and former Captain O’Hara, who are current or former officers with the New York City Department of Correction (“DOC”). The only remaining claims in the fourth amended complaint are (i) a failure to protect claim against Officer Williams and former Officer Blades; (ii) a failure to protect claim against Officer Camacho; (iii) a federal excessive force claim against former Captain O’Hara; and (iv) a deliberate indifference claim against former Captain O’Hara. Defendants move to dismiss the fourth amended complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is granted. I. Background The following comes from the allegations in the fourth amended complaint, which “are assumed to be true.” Hamilton v. Westchester Cnty., 3 F.4th 86, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2021). A. Factual Background Plaintiff Gabriel Massey-Smith is a prisoner under the supervision of the New York City Department of Correction. (See Dkt. No. 64 (“Fourth Am. Compl.”).) Plaintiff alleges that on January 6, 2015, he was moved to the 9 Mod B side of his detention center. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) Soon after, on January 9, 2015, Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by 9 Bloods gang members. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 25.) At that time, Plaintiff alleges, the 9 Mod B side was under the watch of Officer Williams and former Officer Blades. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-38.) Plaintiff alleges that Officer Blades was “sitting in the area” and Officer Williams
was “in the officer’s station”; they “knew [that he] was being assaulted and did not do anything to . . . intervene[] to stop that situation from happening.” (Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55-61.) Plaintiff alleges that following the incident, he was “investigated/interviewed” by officers including Officer Camacho. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-49.) According to Plaintiff, during that interview, he was “shown photographs of the people housed in 9 Mod,” and he pointed out the perpetrators. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50-53.) This resulted in Plaintiff’s relocation. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-64.) At a later unspecified time, Plaintiff further alleges that former Captain O’Hara used “unlawful force” when he “physically assaulted” other inmates and “sprayed the rest of” the people there, including Plaintiff. (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 145-149.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted with a scalpel on September 3, 2015. (See
Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 158-160.) Afterwards, Plaintiff alleges, an officer named Captain Brown lied, stating that [he] cut [himself] with his I.D. and cover[ed] up the altercation then denied [him] medical treatment.” (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 165-168.) Plaintiff further alleges that Captain Brown and Captain O’Hara “wrote a report to [g]et [him] transferred to O.B.C.C. Emergency Security Housing . . . [and] Emergency Security Unit.” (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 169-172.) Because Plaintiff is “heat sensitive,” he “was moved to O.B.C.C.’s intake [p]ens where it was air conditioning.” (See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 174-177.) B. Procedural History Plaintiff filed the initial complaint in this action on January 2, 2018. (See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”).) The fourth amended complaint, filed on April 5, 2019, alleged that Defendants the City of New York, Captains Brown and O’Hara, and Officers Blades, Brown, Camacho, Dockery, Lake, Ogletree, Perez, Sclafani, and Williams violated Plaintiff’s civil rights during his incarceration. (See Fourth Am. Compl.) Defendants the City of New York, Captain Brown, and Officers Brown, Dockery, Lake, Ogletree, Perez, and Sclafani moved to dismiss the claims
against them under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (See Dkt. No. 75.) The Court granted that motion and dismissed those defendants. (See Dkt. No. 93.) The remaining claims in the fourth amended complaint target Defendants former Officer Blades, Officer Williams, Officer Camacho, and former Captain O’Hara. The operative complaint can be read to assert (i) a failure to protect claim against Officer Williams and former Officer Blades (see Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-38); (ii) a failure to protect claim against Officer Camacho (see Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-49); (iii) a federal excessive force claim against former Captain O’Hara (see Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 145-149); and (iv) a deliberate indifference claim against former Captain O’Hara (see Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 174-177.) Defendants move to dismiss those claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
(See Dkt. No. 136.) II. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) directs a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complainant must state “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This means that a complaint is properly dismissed where “the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. A complaint is also properly dismissed “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. “It is well established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.” Meadows v. United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020). “Nonetheless, a pro se complaint must state a plausible claim for relief.” Id. III. Discussion Defendants’ motion is granted. The fourth amended complaint fails to state a claim against former Officer Blades, Officer Williams, Officer Camacho, or former Captain O’Hara. The claims against Officer Williams and former Officer Blades are dismissed as time barred. The claim against Officer Camacho is dismissed for lack of personal involvement. The claims against former Captain O’Hara are dismissed as withdrawn. A. Officer Blades and Officer Williams The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is governed by the limitations period that “the law of the State in which the cause of action arose” applies to personal-injury torts. Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In New York, the relevant limitations period is three years, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), so Smith’s complaint “must have been filed within three years of the accrual of [his] claim,” Smith v. Campbell, 782 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2015). Under federal law, which governs the question of when a § 1983 claim accrues, “it is the standard rule that accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Id. (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388). Because the Fourth Amended Complaint was filed on April 5, 2019, any § 1983 claims that accrued before April 5, 2016, are barred, unless they can be shown to relate back to an earlier filing. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Blades and Officer Williams failed to protect him from a gang assault on January 9, 2015. (See Dkt. No. 64 ¶¶ 24-38, 55-61.) Plaintiff does not attempt to show that this allegation relates back to an earlier filing, and in any event, as Defendants explain, no timely filing contains any similar allegation. (See Dkt. No. 137 at 12.) These claims are therefore dismissed as untimely.
B. Officer Camacho Plaintiff’s claim against Officer Camacho is dismissed because he does not allege Officer Camacho’s personal involvement in any constitutional deprivation. “[T]o establish a defendant’s individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show . . . the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). The only mention of Officer Camacho in the fourth amended complaint is that he “investigated/interviewed” Plaintiff after he was assaulted by gang members. (See Fourth Am. Comp. ¶¶ 46-49.) But Plaintiff does not allege any misconduct by Officer Camacho during this interview or afterwards. Because Plaintiff does not “attribute any of the actions giving rise to [his] allegations” of assault, excessive force, and failure to protect to Officer Camacho, it is appropriate to dismiss Officer Camacho from this case. Sforza v. City of
New York, No. 07-CV-6122, 2009 WL 857496, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009). C. Former Captain O’Hara Plaintiff has withdrawn his claims against Captain O’Hara. After Defendants requested and received a briefing schedule on their anticipated motion to dismiss (see Dkt. No. 120,) Plaintiff submitted a letter stating that he “will agree Captain O’Hara, yes, you could dismiss him.” (See Dkt. No. 125 ¶¶ 6-7.) Accordingly, the claims against Captain O’Hara are dismissed. See Shalom v. Hunter Coll. of City Univ. of New York, 645 F. App’x 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming summary judgment where pro se plaintiff withdrew her § 1983 claim by letter). Further, the fourth amended complaint does not state a claim against Captain O’ Hara. For the reasons explained in this Court’s April 26, 2020 opinion and order, Plaintiffs excessive force claim that “Captain O’ Hara used unlawful force and sprayed [Plaintiff] while Captain Brown was present” is time barred. (Dkt. No. 93 at 4-5.) As also explained in that opinion, Plaintiff's allegations that Captain O’Hara was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs also does not state a claim. Instead, Plaintiff's allegations reflect Captain O’Hara’s “acknowledgment of and adjustment to [Plaintiff's] ‘heat sensitive’ condition.” (Dkt. No. 93 at 6.) IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this opinion and order to the pro se party in this matter. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at Docket Number 136. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. SO ORDERED. Dated: August 8, 2022 New York, New York
| ] J. PAUL OETKEN United States District Judge