G. Ashley v. Michael Rey Moore

District Court, C.D. California·Decided June 21, 2023·No. 2:22-cv-04909·Unknown

Opinion

1 Thomas C. Hurrell, State Bar No. 119876 E-Mail: thurrell@hurrellcantrall.com 2 Nzhdeh Aghazaryan, State Bar No. 316492 E-Mail: naghazaryan@hurrellcantrall.com 3 Ryan C. Oca, State Bar No. 303113 E-Mail: roca@hurrellcantrall.com 4 HURRELL CANTRALL LLP 725 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 3800 5 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 426-2000 6 Facsimile: (213) 426-2020 7 Attorneys for Defendants, MICHEL MOORE, JUSTIN PETERS, EDGAR MURO, KRISTOPHER CLARK, NICHOLAS CHACON, BEN MCPHEETERS, JERITT 8 SEVERNS, VICENTE LOPEZ, IVAN GUILLERMO, RUBEN CHAVEZ, ARMANDO HOYOS, JAMES ZOUREK and DAVID CHRISTENSEN 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION 12 13 G. ASHLEY, Case No. 2:22-cv-04909-DMG (KSx) ____________ 14 Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS' [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER TO LIMIT 15 v. DISSEMINATION OF DOCUMENTS AND TO PROHIBIT 16 MICHEL RAY MOORE, ERIC THE DEPOSITION OF CHIEF MICHAEL GARCETTI, GILBERT MICHEL MOORE 17 CEDILLO, PAUL KREKORIAN, ROBERT BLUMENFIELD, NITHYA Judge: Hon. Dolly M. Gee 18 RAMAN, PAUL KORETZ, NURY MARTINEZ, MONICA RODIGUEZ, Trial Date: 04/09/24 19 MARQUEECE-HARRIS, MARK RIDLEY-THOMAS, MICHAEL 20 JOSEPH BONIN, JOHN LEE, MITCH O'FARRELL, KEVIN DE LEON, 21 JOSEPH BUSCAINO, WILLIAM J. BRIGGS II, EILEEN DECKER, DALE 22 BONNER, MARIA LOU CALANCHE, STEVE SOBOROFF, LAPD 23 OFFICERS J. PETERS 37708, E. MURO 36863, CLARK 39587, N. 24 CHACON, B. McPHEETERS 30483, RUBEN CHAVEZ, DAVID 25 CHRISTENSEN, BRIAN COLLINS, IVAN GUILLERMO, ARMANDO 26 HOYOS, VICENTE LOPEZ, JERITT SEVERNS, JAMES ZOUREK, and 2 27 UNKNOWN NAMED DEFENDANTS, 1-10, 1 Defendants

2 3 Pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and based 4 on Defendants’ Proposed Protective Order filed on June 20, 2023, the terms of 5 the Protective Order are adopted as a protective order of this Court (which 6 generally shall govern the pretrial phase of this action) except to the extent, as 7 set forth below, that those terms have been modified by the Court’s 8 amendment of paragraphs 1(B)(i)(ii), 3, 6.2, 7.1, 7.2, 12.2, and addition of 9 Exhibit A to the Protective Order. 10 11 TERMS OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER AS ADOPTED AND MODIFIED 12 BY THE COURT1

13 PROTECTIVE ORDER 14

15 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 16 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 17 proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure 18 and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. 19 Accordingly, the Defendants hereby motion and petition the Court to enter the 20 following Protective Order. The Defendants acknowledge that this Order does not 21 confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the 22 protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited 23 information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable 24 legal principles. The Defendants further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, 25 below, that this Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information 26 27 1 The Court’s additions to the Protective Order are generally indicated in bold typeface, and 1 under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and 2 the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file 3 material under seal. 4 B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 5 i. Document dissemination 6 This action is likely to involve the exchange of Police Officer Personnel 7 information and Open Investigations Consisting of Official Information for which 8 special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than 9 prosecution of this action is warranted. Such confidential materials and information 10 consist of, among other things, medical records containing Police Officer Personnel 11 information and Open Investigations Consisting of Official Information. Accordingly, 12 to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over 13 confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties 14 are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable 15 necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address 16 their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective 17 order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that 18 information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing 19 be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a 20 confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of 21 the public record of this case. 22 Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part 23 as follows: 24 (1) In General. A party or any person from whom discovery is sought 25 may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending—or 26 as an alternative on matters relating to a deposition, in the court for the district 27 where the deposition will be taken. The motion must include a certification 1 affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action. The 2 court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 3 annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including 4 one or more of the following: 5 . . . (D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope 6 of disclosure or discovery to certain matters; . . . 7 A court may, for good cause, issue a protective order to protect a party from 8 annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 26(c)(1). To obtain a protective order, the party seeking limitations in discovery has 10 the burden of proving good cause for its issuance, which requires a showing that 11 specific prejudice or harm will result if the protective order is not granted. Id.; see 12 also Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.2003). If a 13 court finds particularized harm will result from disclosure of information to the public, 14 then it balances the public and private interests to decide whether a protective order 15 is necessary. See Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 16 1211 (9th Cir. 2002). In doing this balancing, courts consider whether disclosure will 17 violate any privacy interests, whether the information is being sought for a legitimate 18 or improper purpose, whether disclosure of the information will cause a party 19 embarrassment, whether confidentiality is being sought over information important 20 to public health and safety, whether the sharing of information among litigants will 21 promote fairness and efficiency, whether a party benefitting from the order of 22 confidentiality is a public entity or official, and whether the case involves issues 23 important to the public. In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 661 24 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). Further, when discovery is sought from third parties, 25 a protective order may be more easily obtained. Dart Indus. Co., Inc. v. Westwood 26 Chem. Co., Inc, 649 F2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1980).

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