G. Ashley v. Michael Rey Moore

District Court, C.D. California·Decided June 21, 2023·No. 2:22-cv-04909·Unknown

Opinion

Thomas C. Hurrell, State Bar No. 119876 E-Mail: thurrell@hurrellcantrall.com Nzhdeh Aghazaryan, State Bar No. 316492 E-Mail: naghazaryan@hurrellcantrall.com Ryan C. Oca, State Bar No. 303113 E-Mail: roca@hurrellcantrall.com 725 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 3800 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 426-2000 Facsimile: (213) 426-2020 Attorneys for Defendants, MICHEL MOORE, JUSTIN PETERS, EDGAR MURO, KRISTOPHER CLARK, NICHOLAS CHACON, BEN MCPHEETERS, JERITT ARMANDO HOYOS, JAMES ZOUREK and DAVID CHRISTENSEN G. ASHLEY, Case No. 2:22-cv-04909-DMG (KSx) ____________ Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS' [PROPOSED] PROTECTIVE ORDER TO LIMIT v. DISSEMINATION OF DOCUMENTS AND TO PROHIBIT MICHAEL GARCETTI, GILBERT MICHEL MOORE ROBERT BLUMENFIELD, NITHYA Judge: Hon. Dolly M. Gee MARTINEZ, MONICA RODIGUEZ, Trial Date: 04/09/24 RIDLEY-THOMAS, MICHAEL O'FARRELL, KEVIN DE LEON, BRIGGS II, EILEEN DECKER, DALE STEVE SOBOROFF, LAPD OFFICERS J. PETERS 37708, E. MURO 36863, CLARK 39587, N. CHACON, B. McPHEETERS 30483, RUBEN CHAVEZ, DAVID IVAN GUILLERMO, ARMANDO SEVERNS, JAMES ZOUREK, and 2 DEFENDANTS, 1-10, Defendants

Pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and based on Defendants’ Proposed Protective Order filed on June 20, 2023, the terms of the Protective Order are adopted as a protective order of this Court (which generally shall govern the pretrial phase of this action) except to the extent, as set forth below, that those terms have been modified by the Court’s amendment of paragraphs 1(B)(i)(ii), 3, 6.2, 7.1, 7.2, 12.2, and addition of Exhibit A to the Protective Order. BY THE COURT1

PROTECTIVE ORDER

1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the Defendants hereby motion and petition the Court to enter the following Protective Order. The Defendants acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The Defendants further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information 1 The Court’s additions to the Protective Order are generally indicated in bold typeface, and under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. i. Document dissemination This action is likely to involve the exchange of Police Officer Personnel information and Open Investigations Consisting of Official Information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecution of this action is warranted. Such confidential materials and information consist of, among other things, medical records containing Police Officer Personnel information and Open Investigations Consisting of Official Information. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part as follows: (1) In General. A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending—or as an alternative on matters relating to a deposition, in the court for the district where the deposition will be taken. The motion must include a certification affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action. The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: . . . (D) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters; . . . A court may, for good cause, issue a protective order to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). To obtain a protective order, the party seeking limitations in discovery has the burden of proving good cause for its issuance, which requires a showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if the protective order is not granted. Id.; see also Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.2003). If a court finds particularized harm will result from disclosure of information to the public, then it balances the public and private interests to decide whether a protective order is necessary. See Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002). In doing this balancing, courts consider whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests, whether the information is being sought for a legitimate or improper purpose, whether disclosure of the information will cause a party embarrassment, whether confidentiality is being sought over information important to public health and safety, whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote fairness and efficiency, whether a party benefitting from the order of confidentiality is a public entity or official, and whether the case involves issues important to the public. In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). Further, when discovery is sought from third parties, a protective order may be more easily obtained. Dart Indus. Co., Inc. v. Westwood Chem. Co., Inc, 649 F2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1980). Good cause exists to enter a protective order in this case as the documents, discovery are entitled to privileges and protections under the United States Constitution, First Amendment, the California Constitution, Article I, Section 1, California Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7 and 832.8, California Evidence Code sections 1040 and 1043 et. seq, the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552, the Official Information Privilege, the right to privacy, and information otherwise generally unavailable to the public and protected from disclosure. ii. Chief Moore’s Deposition Plaintiff refused to stipulate to entry of the order, purporting to take issue with the scope of the order and with limiting the use of the documents to the present action alone. Additionally, Plaintiff is seeking the deposition of Chief Michel Moore, an apex witness and named defendant in this matter. The only claims brought by Plaintiff against Chi

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