Furst v. Mayne

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMarch 31, 2024
Docket2:20-cv-01651
StatusUnknown

This text of Furst v. Mayne (Furst v. Mayne) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Furst v. Mayne, (D. Ariz. 2024).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Hanna Furst, et al., No. CV-20-01651-PHX-DLR

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Linda Mayne, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 16 In the operative complaint, Plaintiff brings breach of fiduciary duty claims against 17 Defendants under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). (Doc. 1.) 18 Within the deadline for amending pleadings, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his 19 complaint to add a common law breach of fiduciary duty claim. (Doc. 89.) Although 20 ERISA would preempt such a common law claim, Plaintiff wished to bring a common law 21 claim in the alternative and out of caution, in the event the plan at issue is found not to be 22 governed by ERISA. Given the liberal policy favoring amendments that are requested 23 within the deadline for amending pleadings, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave 24 to amend on March 3, 2023. (Doc. 102.) Under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1(a), 25 Plaintiff was required to file and serve his amended pleading within 14 days of the order 26 granting leave. Plaintiff did not do so. 27 On May 25, 2023, the Court held a telephonic conference to discuss whether either 28 side intended to file a dispositive motion. (Doc. 103.) At this conference, Plaintiff realized 1 his error in failing to timely file and serve his amended complaint, and Defendants 2 indicated that they would oppose a tardy filing because discovery had since closed, and 3 they were preparing to file a summary judgment motion. 4 Later that day, Plaintiff filed his amended complaint. (Doc. 104.) Defendants have 5 moved the Court to strike it. (Doc. 105.) And in response, Plaintiff has asked the Court to 6 retroactively extend the 14-day deadline and accept his amended complaint as timely. 7 (Doc. 106.) 8 When a party fails to timely file a document, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 6(b)(1)(B) permits the Court to retroactively extend the deadline for good cause “if the 10 party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Excusable neglect is an “elastic concept.” 11 Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 392 (1993). 12 When considering whether a party’s neglect is excusable, the Court considers: “(1) the 13 danger of prejudice to the non-moving party, (2) the length of delay and its potential impact 14 on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the 15 reasonable control of the movant, and (4) whether the moving party’s conduct was in good 16 faith.” Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the Supreme Court 17 and Ninth Circuit have repeatedly stated that mere “inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, 18 or mistakes construing the rules” do not constitute excusable neglect. Id.; see also Kyle v. 19 Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 931–32 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[M]isconstruction of a 20 nonambiguous rule cannot, under Ninth Circuit precedent, constitute excusable neglect to 21 justify an extension of time[.]”). 22 Here, Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1(a) is clear and unambiguous, and Plaintiff 23 offers no reason for his failure to comply. As such, the third factor—the reason for the 24 delay—cuts decisively against Plaintiff. And absent “a persuasive justification for his 25 misconstruction of nonambiguous rules . . . there is no basis for deviating from the general 26 rule that a mistake of law does not constitute excusable neglect.” Committee for Idaho's 27 High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 825 (9th Cir. 1996). 28 Instead of offering a reason for his delay, Plaintiff focuses on the remaining three 1 equitable factors. But even among those, only one weighs in his favor. The Court agrees 2 there is no evidence Plaintiff’s delay was the product of bad faith. But the Court disagrees 3 with Plaintiff’s contention that his delay caused no prejudice to Defendants or to the just, 4 speedy, and expensive resolution of this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 5 Plaintiff filed his amended complaint 69 days late. Fact discovery closed months 6 before Plaintiff filed his motion to retroactively extend his amendment deadline. And his 7 motion came a mere 9 days before the dispositive motions deadline. Defendants have since 8 filed a dispositive motion based on the operative complaint, and that motion is fully briefed 9 and under advisement by the Court. (Docs. 108, 113, 119.) To permit Plaintiff to inject a 10 new claim with new requests for relief into the case now would necessitate reopening 11 discovery and probably a second round of dispositive motions. Thus, in addition to being 12 unjustified, Plaintiff’s delay in filing his amended complaint would prejudice Defendants, 13 upend the case management schedule, and protract this litigation. 14 On the other side of the equitable ledger, the Court also is unpersuaded that Plaintiff 15 would be prejudiced absent a bending of the rules to accommodate his unexplained delay. 16 As noted, the operative complaint brings breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA. 17 Plaintiff alleges that the plan at issue is a qualifying plan governed by ERISA (Doc. 1 ¶ 18 10), and Defendants admitted that the plan is covered by ERISA in their answer (Doc. 81 19 ¶ 10). Defendants have filed nothing with this Court suggesting that they intend to argue 20 otherwise. Instead, they have repeatedly confirmed their belief that the plan at issue is 21 governed by ERISA, as Plaintiff claims it is. (See, e.g., Doc. 91 at 7 (“[A]s result of the 22 plain language of the Plan, ERISA applies[.]”)). Accordingly, there appears to be no 23 genuine dispute between the parties that the plan is governed by ERISA, which would 24 preempt the common law breach of fiduciary duty claim Plaintiff wishes to bring in the 25 alternative. Indeed, given the fact that Plaintiff has alleged, and Defendants have agreed 26 that ERISA governs, it is not clear to the Court why it is necessary for Plaintiff to assert an 27 alternative common law claim, given the American judicial system is adversarial and 28 operates on party presentation. This is not a situation in which the Court should excuse a || party’s neglect to avoid an injustice. 2 For these reasons, 3 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for a retroactive extension of his deadline 4|| to file and serve his amended complaint (Doc. 106) is DENIED and Defendants’ motion || to strike Plaintiff's tardy amended pleading (Doc. 105) is GRANTED. The amended 6 || complaint filed at Doc. 104 is stricken. The original complaint remains operative. 7 Dated this 31st day of March, 2024. 8 9 10 {Z, 11 _- {UO 12 Upited States Dictric Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Furst v. Mayne, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/furst-v-mayne-azd-2024.