Fulshear v. Randon

18 Tex. 275
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 1, 1857
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 18 Tex. 275 (Fulshear v. Randon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fulshear v. Randon, 18 Tex. 275 (Tex. 1857).

Opinion

Wheeler, J.

In order to bind a party to a written contract or ageeement, it is not necessary that his signature should appear at the end oí it. If .he writes his name in any part of the agreement, it may be taken as his signature, provided it was there written for the purpose of giving authenticity to the instrument, and thus operating as a signature. (2 Parsons on Con. 287.) In Johnson v. Dodson, (2 M. & W. 653,) where the question was whether there was a signing by the party, within the provision of the Statute of Frauds, Lord Abinger said, “ The cases have decided, that, although the signature be in the beginning or middle of the instrument, it is as binding as if at the foot of it; the question being always open to the jury, whether the party, not having signed it regularly at the foot, meant to be bound by it as it stood; or whether it was left so unsigned because he refused to complete it. But when it is ascertained that he meant to be bound by it as a complete contract, the Statute is satisfied—there being a note in writing showing the terms of the contract, and recognized by him.” (See 12 Johns. R. 102; 14 Id. 484; 13 Mass. 87.) If the contract was made and delivered by the defendant as his agreement and undertaking, it would bind him; and it would make no difference that the same person may have written the signatures, if authorized thereunto by the parties. The defendant did not put in issue the making of the contract, so as to put the plaintiff upon proof of its execution. (Hart. Dig. Art. 741.) And it was no objection to the admission of the writing in evidence, that the signatures of the other parties appeared to be in the same hand writing. [278]*278We are of opinion therefore that the Court erred in sustaining the defendant’s objection to the admission of the evidence ; for which the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Gothard v. Saunders
415 S.W.2d 718 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1967)
Brown v. State Automobile Insurance Assn.
12 N.W.2d 712 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1944)
Oliver Farm Equipment Sales Co. v. French
91 S.W.2d 887 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1936)
Colter v. State
7 S.W.2d 769 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1928)
Limburger v. State
260 S.W. 227 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1924)
City Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Farrington
243 S.W. 544 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1922)
Nelson v. State
73 S.W. 398 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1903)
McHowell v. State
53 S.W. 630 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1899)
Lawson, Guardian v. Estate of Dawson
53 S.W. 64 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1899)
State v. Hill
66 N.W. 541 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1896)
Taylor v. State
16 Tex. Ct. App. 514 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1884)
Lanier v. Perryman
59 Tex. 104 (Texas Supreme Court, 1883)
Close v. Judson
34 Tex. 288 (Texas Supreme Court, 1871)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 Tex. 275, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fulshear-v-randon-tex-1857.